Friday, August 26, 2011

Russia and Syria: Arms and Alliances

The story referenced below gives a good overview of the relationship between Russia and Syria.  It is especially interesting that the ties that have made Russia and Syria "allies" are commercial and center on arms.  Russia, by supporting Syria with weapons, is able to maintain influence in the region.  This is an interesting contrast to the deteriorating arms relationship with Iran.


As international pressure on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria grows, Russia has maintained a perplexing timidity towards developments. Moscow has steadfastly refused to stake out an unambiguous position on events in Syria, a diplomatic paralysis that may end up proving more costly to Moscow in the long run. 
Some analysts say the Kremlin's careful stance is a result of its unwillingness to lose its only real Middle Eastern ally and a desire to avoid a confrontation with the West. 
"Syria remains Russia's only ally in the Middle East," Vladimir Karyakin from the state Institute for Strategic Research said. "We abandoned the rest either during perestroika or during the recent Arab revolutions. We even betrayed some - like Libya or Egypt, for example."
Russia has been a major arms supplier to Syria since the Soviet era and political cooperation with Damascus has often been far more valuable to Moscow than money. In 2005, Russia wrote off more than 70 percent of Syria's $13-billion debt, much of which was the result of Soviet-era arms deliveries. 
Although financial interests now play a more important role in defining Moscow's approach to Syria than during the Cold War, political concerns still remain the cornerstone, analysts say. Since the early 1970s, the country has hosted Russia's only naval supply and maintenance base outside the former Soviet Union in its Mediterranean port of Tartus.
"If we lose such an ally, we will lose our foothold in the Middle East," Karyakin warned.

Conflicting interests paralyze Russian diplomacy on Syria: analysts | Features & Opinion | RIA Novosti:

The following graphs show the growing importance of Russian arms imports to Syria.  I put together the graphs using data from SIPRI.



Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Russian and US Arms Exports - A Very general Overview

This particular post is just a bit of motivation for me.  I am doing a little exploratory work for my dissertation, but I am also working on learning how to use R for statistical analysis/graphing.  This is the result of my afternoon and evening.  The data come from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

These graphs show the total arms exports from both the US and Russia (USSR before 1991).  There are two things that stand out from this simple visualization: 1) arms transfers are a cyclical process at the macro level, and 2) Russian arms exports dropped off much more quickly than the U.S., but are now rebounding along with the U.S.

The Russian military’s manpower problem « Russian Military Reform

The Russian military’s manpower problem « Russian Military Reform

This article does a good job of pointing out the fact that the training and culture of the military has a lot to do with the weapons that it can deploy. This is a key to understanding arms transfers and sales throughout the world. A military cannot simply buy the best equipment it can afford financially - it has to buy the equipment that its forces are capable of wielding.

In the longer term, Arbatov and Dvorkin make a convincing case for the value of a transition to a fully professional military. The expectation that the future Russian military will be equipped with more technologically advanced weapons means that there will not be enough time to train conscripts serving for one year to use this technology. Furthermore, hazing (dedovshchina) will continue to be a problem as long as young men continue to be inducted into the military against their will. Professionalization is the best way to solve this problem. Finally, professionalization will eliminate the corruption associated with the conscription system, including both systemic bribery used in avoiding the draft and the use of “free” conscript labor for private ends by senior officers. One article in NVO calculated the total value of bribes received during the annual call-up at 138 billion rubles. Arbatov and Dvorkin point out that the only fully professional unit in the Russian military — the 201st motorized rifle division based in Tajikistan — has long shown itself to have a high level of readiness and no hazing and can serve as a model for every unit in the ground forces.

AFP: Medvedev scraps Ukraine visit after gas merger fails

AFP: Medvedev scraps Ukraine visit after gas merger fails

This particular piece of news contains some interesting tidbits:


A Russian defense ministry source told AFP on Friday that Medvedev had cancelled plans to go to Sevastopol to preside over a Navy Day parade amid an unexpected surge in tensions, saying the status of the parade was unexpectedly downgraded.
I am not sure how a head of state can preside over a military parade in a sovereign neighbor's territory.

It is also interesting how high a level the talks are between Gazprom and Naftogaz since Medvedev was the president of Gazprom before he was Prime Minister.


Ukraine has also repeatedly insisted that any joint business with Gazprom should be implemented on equal terms and ruled out an outright merger.
It seems as if Ukraine - even under a relatively pro-Russian president has problems being strong-armed. It will be interesting to keep an eye on the region.