How do Arms Sales and Human Rights Work?

Two separate news stories in my reader last week have caused me to think about how states really think about human rights and arms transfers.  If you are inclined to think that arms sales should be responsible and that states should have to account for their behavior in order to procure more coercive power, then these two stories might make you happy. As someone who thinks a lot about the underlying premise of arms sales, these stories make me happy in other ways.

They are evidence, or at least confirmations, that the ways that I am thinking about arms sales is fruitful.  That is heartening, since I picked back up my book manuscript (dissertation) this past month and have been furiously cranking out new words, new ideas, and updates in a bid to have the book written by the end of this year. I won't spill too many words here about my new ideas (they're awesome, trust me), but I do want to outline how many (most?) states are responsible in their approach to arms sales.

The first story comes from RFE/RL and is a discussion of Hungary's bid to ease arms export sanctions to Belarus. They want to ease restrictions on some spare parts and gun parts. The EU put arms sanctions on Belarus in 2010 after government crackdowns.  It has eased off on sanctions in other areas after Belarus has improved its human rights record.  I am working on a paper that compares Kazakhstan and Belarus, so I have recently looked at Belarus's arms imports.  They don't really have a lot of sources for supply in the first place.

Imports to Belarus (1991-2016) [1]
Exporter	Years	Total Value	Percent
RUS	9	748	93.3
UKR	5	52	6.5
CHN	1	2	0.2

Up until last year only Russia, Ukraine, and China have provided to Belarus post independence (in terms of major conventional weapons).  The types of weapons that Hungary is asking for might not make it onto this list at all.  

The second story is about Germany and Hungary, two NATO allies. The German government and members of civil society have called for Germany and other states to stop supplying arms to Turkey because of their recent foray into Syria.  Germany has strict laws against supporting ongoing conflicts and providing arms to human rights abusers, and so the chance that Turkish troops could target civilians in their operations is the cause of this concern.  

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These stories tell me two things.  The first is that states do try to be responsible, and that human rights matter.  The second thing that it tells me is that aggregate numbers of weapons may not tell the whole story.  In the case of Turkey, for example, the sale of tanks (the weapons system that Turkey wants Germany to upgrade) took place from the 1980s through the 2000s.  In an aggregate study without very careful research design, it could appear that Germany doesn't take human rights or conflict involvement seriously when it comes to providing arms to other states. This is an issue that I think has crept into the arms transfer literature as it has tried to account for state choice.  Aggregate data may not be the best way to do that.  

Richard Johnson and I have a forthcoming article in ISQ that looks at this type of aggregate data, and the picture that we find is not rosy.  It may be, however, that we are simply looking a the wrong thing in the wrong way to find the answers we want.  To our credit, we make this point.  Our study was meant to replicate earlier studies in ways that tried to at least take into account a more nuanced picture of decision-making.  Our attempt used this same kind of aggregated data, however.

The takeaway for me is that we need more work on the fundamentals of arms sales.  We need a variety of work that looks at both macro trends and micro decision-making.  Both types of work need to be guided by theory in ways that it simply isn't now.

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1. Source: SIPRI TIV values (www.sipri.org).  Total value is Millions of USD.

Russia and Burma - Arms Sales in the News

My last post, on the unsurprising turn in US foreign policy regarding arms sales outlined part of the arguments that I am developing about the underlying reasons for arms sales by states.  A story on the RFE/RL website the next day has got me thinking again. It is not always easy defending arms sales as a practice.  As a practice, arms sales may seem to justify policies and regimes which engage in ugly activities.  Those activities may be directed at neighbors, or at their own population.  Arms are fungible to the extent that once states have them, they can be used as the recipient state sees fit. 

Russia is planning on selling advanced fighter aircraft to Burma (Myanmar), which is in the midst of an ethnic cleansing crisis. The US has condemned the sale, saying that the military is conducting this ethnic cleansing.  This sale by Russia has a bad appearance.  A state's military is directly involved in an ongoing campaign that is violating human rights - and causing death and suffering on a large scale. The question that I had after reading this was whether or not the US condemnation of Russian sales are hypocritical.

Richard Johnson and I in a forthcoming ISQ article break down arms sales by type to examine the hypothesis that democratic states do not sell arms to human rights abusers.  Our theory is that many weapons are not that useful in violating human rights (arms are only partially fungible), and so states will make deals for certain types of weapons with states that are human rights violators.  Our paper is an observational study where we look to establish broad patterns.  We find that there doesn't seem to be discernment across weapons systems (except for land-based vehicles sold by the US) for any of the major democratic arms suppliers (US, Britain, Germany, France).  In general, states sell arms to human rights violators.

In a follow up study, we should examine whether or not the military of those states are involved in repression, or if there are other state actors.  The reason that this distinction would be important, is that if the military is viewed as being professional, and outside of the internal repression apparatus, there may be an expectation by supplying states that the weapons sold will not, in fact, be used for repression (or that there is a low likelihood that they will be). The US position on Burma may be a reflection of this view.  The military is involved in the repression, and therefore all arms sales should be banned until the situation is clearer.

In this case, the US position seems less like hypocrisy, and more like a nuanced policy that engages with the dual nature of arms.  States have a monopoly on violence, and that violence can be turned inward.  However, the consequences to the international system of states where there is not a monopoly of violence (weak and failing/failed states) can ultimately lead to worse outcomes. The sale of arms is part of this complex interaction.  Russia's actions seem to be driven more for a need to establish any kind of influence with any state that will have them.  Putin as salesman in chief needs wins, and he'll take them even if it leads to the loss of life by others.

Aircraft Round Up for June 2016

My news feed has been filled with stories related to the sale of aircraft.  I want to link to those articles with a bit of my own commentary about how these sales fit in with my own theories and ideas about arms sales.

Nigeria and the Super Tucano

This is an interesting case of a Brazilian plane being manufactured in the US for Afghanistan and Lebanon.  Nigeria wants to buy these anti-insurgency aircraft to fight against Boko Haram, but the US needs to approve the sale since the manufacturing takes place on US territory. This is the first example of this type of arrangement that I have run across, and it simnply fascinates me.  The web of interconnected production facilities makes arms sales and production as well as their sales multi-national.  I wonder about the ability of states like the US to act as veto players for such sales.  What is the trade-off or point at which Brazil would move manufacturing to its own territory in order to avoid any such complications in the future?

Canada and the F-35 Rejection
Canada is no longer on board with the F-35.  As one of the initial partners, this is an interesting case.  It is also interesting whether Trudeau will be in power long enough to find an alternative to the Canadian Air Force's aging fleet. The F-18 Superhornet, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Rafale and Grippen are the alternatives that Canada is currently considering.

"For 10 years, the Conservatives completely missed the mark when it came time to deliver to Canadians and our military the equipment they need," the Liberal prime minister said in parliament.

"They clung to a plane that does not work and is far from working."

The biggest issue with Canada dropping out is the political fallout.

Pakistan and the F-16 End Run

This piece illustrates the difficulty of using arms as a carrot or stick in foreign policy.  If the US refuses to sell F-16s to Pakistan, it will seek to buy used aircraft from Jordon.  In this case, the initial sales decision by the US must be considered even more carfully if there is a question about resale potential.  This is a realistic possibility because many countries fly the F-16 and so it should be possible to find spare parts from willing suppliers.  Pakistan is shopping because of Congressional demands that it stop harboring Islamic militants.

China, Russia, and the US and Next Generation Bombers

Bomber aircraft are the most strategic of the aircraft.  They have previously been built primarily by the US and Russia. China is now in on the game.  Russia, the US, and China all expect to have these new bombers as part of their arsenal by 2025.  The 9-year time frame from now shows the complication of developing and manufacturing these aircraft.  In the US case, the arms acquisition bureacuracy is such that projects tend to drag longer and longer with each new generation of aircraft.

F-35 can't compete?

Adding to the woes of the F35 is the analysis that it cannot compete with older Soviet/Russian models of aircraft, specifically the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker.  The F35 is the Pentagon's most expensive arms acquisition ever and it has been mired in delays, scandals, and bureaucratic infighting from its inception.

Turkey and Attack Helicopters
Turkey is still trying to obtain an attack helicopter.  The most interesting part of this article (which is about Turkey shortlisting potential companies from which to purchas) is the discussion about human rights and the problems of competing in arms sales when such restrictions are not universally applied:

Franco-German company Eurocopter's position was made more difficult as Berlin initially banned it from participating because of concerns over human rights in Turkey, although the German Government relented.

Philippe Camus, co-chief executive of European Aeronautic, Defense and Space, says the Turkish decision against Eurocopter will push the issue of common export policy to the top of the agenda and that Europe's capitals must work together to create a single coherent policy.

Apache for Qatar

It seems as if these are part of the payment for Qatar's role as broker in getting Bergdahl from the Taliban.  It seems like a steep price to pay.  If Qatar will be an ally in other areas, then this might be okay. It seems hypocritical considering Qater's human rights record vs. that of Turkey that advanced attack aircraft were easily obtained by that government.