Russia and Burma - Arms Sales in the News

My last post, on the unsurprising turn in US foreign policy regarding arms sales outlined part of the arguments that I am developing about the underlying reasons for arms sales by states.  A story on the RFE/RL website the next day has got me thinking again. It is not always easy defending arms sales as a practice.  As a practice, arms sales may seem to justify policies and regimes which engage in ugly activities.  Those activities may be directed at neighbors, or at their own population.  Arms are fungible to the extent that once states have them, they can be used as the recipient state sees fit. 

Russia is planning on selling advanced fighter aircraft to Burma (Myanmar), which is in the midst of an ethnic cleansing crisis. The US has condemned the sale, saying that the military is conducting this ethnic cleansing.  This sale by Russia has a bad appearance.  A state's military is directly involved in an ongoing campaign that is violating human rights - and causing death and suffering on a large scale. The question that I had after reading this was whether or not the US condemnation of Russian sales are hypocritical.

Richard Johnson and I in a forthcoming ISQ article break down arms sales by type to examine the hypothesis that democratic states do not sell arms to human rights abusers.  Our theory is that many weapons are not that useful in violating human rights (arms are only partially fungible), and so states will make deals for certain types of weapons with states that are human rights violators.  Our paper is an observational study where we look to establish broad patterns.  We find that there doesn't seem to be discernment across weapons systems (except for land-based vehicles sold by the US) for any of the major democratic arms suppliers (US, Britain, Germany, France).  In general, states sell arms to human rights violators.

In a follow up study, we should examine whether or not the military of those states are involved in repression, or if there are other state actors.  The reason that this distinction would be important, is that if the military is viewed as being professional, and outside of the internal repression apparatus, there may be an expectation by supplying states that the weapons sold will not, in fact, be used for repression (or that there is a low likelihood that they will be). The US position on Burma may be a reflection of this view.  The military is involved in the repression, and therefore all arms sales should be banned until the situation is clearer.

In this case, the US position seems less like hypocrisy, and more like a nuanced policy that engages with the dual nature of arms.  States have a monopoly on violence, and that violence can be turned inward.  However, the consequences to the international system of states where there is not a monopoly of violence (weak and failing/failed states) can ultimately lead to worse outcomes. The sale of arms is part of this complex interaction.  Russia's actions seem to be driven more for a need to establish any kind of influence with any state that will have them.  Putin as salesman in chief needs wins, and he'll take them even if it leads to the loss of life by others.

Is there a coup a-brew in Turkey?

Over the past 18 months I've read half a dozen books about Turkey and scores of articles.  I did this for a long-term project in which Turkey's position in the international network of rivalries is very interesting.  That project is looking at Turkey as a case for whether an unknown social position that is determined by the cumulative social choices of all states about which states pose a threat (rivalry) can affect state behavior.  There is also a question about whether factors within a state may cause it to become central in such a network.

I am far from an expert on Turkish politics, but my foray into the academic international relations and historical literature about that state has made me curious.  The events within Turkey over the past six months have made the country even more interesting from the standpoint of someone who is interested in civil-military relations.

The reporting on the abortive coup and its aftermath has been interesting and scattered.  On the one hand, it seems as if the coup itself was largely theoretical and ineffective.  The prolonged and continued effort to blame the coup on Gulen and his followers has seemed like a naked political maneuver to minimize any influence that Erdogan's former ally has within the polity.  However, Michael Rubin from the American Enterprise Institute has been writing about other issues with Turkey, and specifically about the chance for a real coup to take place sometime in the coming year.
(article)

Much of the reporting about Turkey in the West focuses on either President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s efforts to draft a new constitution or the aftermath of the abortive July 15 coup. But, behind-the-scenes, there is a story with ramifications as great: the competition for control of the military between followers of Erdogan on one hand and those of ultra-nationalist and former Maoist political leader and businessman Dogu Perincek on the other. Perincek’s followers have long occupied top role in the Turkish military which was fine when Erdogan and Perincek sought to take on common enemies: Kurds, liberals, followers of Fethullah Gülen etc. I had previously written about the Erdogan-Perincek struggle within the Turkish military here, but now it seems that the conflict may be accelerating. 

In recent days, Perincek has appeared on television and insisted Erdogan give up on his dreams of changing the constitution. He has cited a letter from a member of his political party calling for a popular rebellion and has now openly called for a change in government. Perincek has also suggested that Turkey could be aflame by March. One prominent Perincek supporter, prominent retired air force officer Ahmet Zeki Ucok has openly said there will be a new coup, but with full buy-in from all levels of the Turkish military.

 The continued unrest within Turkey, including the murder of Russia's ambassador, attacks carried out by ISIS, and Kurdish restiveness provide the military with plenty of arguments for the need to change the leadership of the state in order to right the security situation. While the idea that there may be a coup in Turkey is still speculative, the growing instability in the country's security situation heightens the risk that such a change could occur.

I am teaching a course this semester on civil-military relations, and we will be doing a lot of Turkey watching.