A recent article about India's pursuit of advanced aircraft illustrates the complicated world of arms transfers.
The article itself is correcting some misinformation that India was going to purchase the F-35 and open up some joint manufacturing facilities for the aircraft there. It turns out that initial inquiries into the possibility of F-35s in the future was confused with a current bid for the purchase of F-16 fighters. India is looking to upgrade its aircraft but is in the bidding stage with both Saab and Lockheed Martin.
In both cases, the Indians will open factories to perform final assembly. Such licensing and joint production is common. F-16s are manufactured in Turkey under a similar agreement, for example. The F-35 is a unique program because it is being built on licensing and co-production from the very beginning with partners all over the world. It is a complex and collaborative endeavor that relies on pre-existing alliance ties and mutual trust and support.
India is not approved for the purchase of the F-35 at this time. The authors of the article noted that the issues of technology transfer that are more acute with this particular advanced aircraft. The components are more advanced and there is a real worry that the technology could fall into the wrong hands.
For me this article is fascinating because it touches on so many of the complex and fascinating aspects of arms sales that I have been thinking about for the past few years. The first is the importance of relations and relationship building. There is a great deal of high-level negotiation that takes place for these arms deals - because they must be approved (in the case of the US) by the State Department working with the Department of Defense. It is not just a mater of defense firms going out and making sales.
The complexity of licensing and production deals is another aspect of arms transfers that is unique. There is an incentive for many states to build their own capacity while they purchase weapons systems. This makes sense from a realist perspective of anarchy and fits with the logic of internal balancing outlined by Morrow (1993). States don't want to be too dependent on arms imports because it limits their own actions. States that wish to play a more independent role in international relations will avoid becoming too dependent on a supplier.
Even if the production facilities are mainly symbolic, they offer some work, build native capabilities, and establish the state as being less dependent than a state that simply imports finished arms. My current thinking about arms is about the ways that they are used to socialize states, and the use of licensing deals is an avenue that needs to be explored in more depth.
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The article itself is correcting some misinformation that India was going to purchase the F-35 and open up some joint manufacturing facilities for the aircraft there. It turns out that initial inquiries into the possibility of F-35s in the future was confused with a current bid for the purchase of F-16 fighters. India is looking to upgrade its aircraft but is in the bidding stage with both Saab and Lockheed Martin.
In both cases, the Indians will open factories to perform final assembly. Such licensing and joint production is common. F-16s are manufactured in Turkey under a similar agreement, for example. The F-35 is a unique program because it is being built on licensing and co-production from the very beginning with partners all over the world. It is a complex and collaborative endeavor that relies on pre-existing alliance ties and mutual trust and support.
India is not approved for the purchase of the F-35 at this time. The authors of the article noted that the issues of technology transfer that are more acute with this particular advanced aircraft. The components are more advanced and there is a real worry that the technology could fall into the wrong hands.
For me this article is fascinating because it touches on so many of the complex and fascinating aspects of arms sales that I have been thinking about for the past few years. The first is the importance of relations and relationship building. There is a great deal of high-level negotiation that takes place for these arms deals - because they must be approved (in the case of the US) by the State Department working with the Department of Defense. It is not just a mater of defense firms going out and making sales.
The complexity of licensing and production deals is another aspect of arms transfers that is unique. There is an incentive for many states to build their own capacity while they purchase weapons systems. This makes sense from a realist perspective of anarchy and fits with the logic of internal balancing outlined by Morrow (1993). States don't want to be too dependent on arms imports because it limits their own actions. States that wish to play a more independent role in international relations will avoid becoming too dependent on a supplier.
Even if the production facilities are mainly symbolic, they offer some work, build native capabilities, and establish the state as being less dependent than a state that simply imports finished arms. My current thinking about arms is about the ways that they are used to socialize states, and the use of licensing deals is an avenue that needs to be explored in more depth.
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Morrow, James D. (1993) Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. International Organization 47: 207–233.
