Maybe I'm old fashioned, but....

So I read this article on the Duck of Minerva about a week ago and I had a bit of a visceral and angry reaction to it.  I saved it to read later, and am now re-reading it. In this article, Mackenzie talks about the standards of combat for men and women and concludes that for a number of reasons there should be a re-evaluation of the physical standards of combat so that the military will not remain "behind."

If standards don’t change, inevitably, very few women will ‘make the (male) cut’ into combat roles, including into the Marines. But a lack of change will also keep the entire military behind. There is a need to  develop physical standards that reflect modern warfare, recognise areas that women excel physically- including in endurance and flexibility, and changing a sexist culture that values bands of brothers and men’s bodies over all else.

Mackenzie discuses both the changing nature of combat, and the fact that all soldiers (male and female) receive combat training, but is upset at the apparently anachronistic physical standards required for combat missions.  I have a number of problems with the article.

First, is the conflation of the fact that our most recent wars have a different character than past conflicts means that there is no difference between military tasks. This is not true, and it is laughable on its face.  Even someone with only a cursory understanding of warfare will understand that there are different physical abilities needed for driving a truck versus fighting in the infantry.  These different physical standards limit the number of men who are allowed to do certain highly physical tasks.

Combat training - and remember that basic training is just that: Basic Combat Training - is designed to make every soldier a minimally proficient soldier.  This applies to men, women, intelligence specialists, truck drivers, mechanics, cooks, etc.  When I went through basic training in the summer of 2001 it was at Fort Jackson, South Carolina - in an integrated male-female basic training. Something that has been around since the early 1990s.  We were all soldiers in combat support roles.  I was in intelligence. Others in my platoon were intelligence, some were clerks, some were cooks, and some were mechanics.  Many of the females were going on to be medics.

At some point - based on the fact that we were in the Army - we could expect to be in combat.  But combat for the infantry has a very different nature than that of the intelligence specialist and truck driver. Yes, in Iraq, women are in convoys that are attacked, are on bases that are attacked, or may be part of patrols and teams that come under fire.  Having basic skills is key.  This is different than the task that was given to the Marines in the battle of Fallujah.  It is different than the skills used by the 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne in 2003 in fighting against regular military and irregular militia in the beginning part of the war in Iraq.  I know because that is who I was with - as an intelligence guy assigned to an infantry unit.  And I was not prepared.  I am a big man - 6'4" who at the time was in the best shape of my life.  And I was out of my depth.  I did not have the training to be doing what was done.

The purpose of the military is to fight and win battles.  Combat roles are open to women who meet the standards.  I am not convinced that Mackenzie has made a cogent argument about why those standards should be relaxed.

In Mosul in May 2003 - after I had already traveled across the whole country with the Infantry.  Flying in helicopters is so much easier.

 

Russia and India Arms Relations Redux

Vladimir Putin spent some time in India this past week.  One of the primary deals struck between the two states during the visit, was the sale of $3 Billion worth of Russian helicopters - a tender, which was rumored to be going to the United States earlier in the month.

The Russian Ambassador to India had this to say about plans for further cooperation between the two states: (source)

...the deals that have been struck as part of the ten-year programme of military and technical cooperation between India and Russia are estimated at $30 billion. 

On Monday, during the Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India, several important agreements in the military area were signed in New Delhi.

The helicopter and other aircraft deal looks like this:

Under one contract, India will buy 71 Mi-17B-5 Hip helicopters worth $1.3 billion, while the other provides for the delivery of assembly kits for 42 Su-30MKI Flanker fighters, worth $1.6 billion. 

The two countries also signed a number of cooperation agreements in the defense and technology sector, notably between Russian Helicopters and Elcom Systems Pvt Ltd.

Here is the blurb from a BBC story that really highlights the personal role that Putin is playing in getting these deals signed:

In an article in India's Hindu newspaper, Mr Putin described as a "historic step" the declaration of strategic partnership between the two countries signed in 2000. 

The Russian leader also said that the military co-operation between the two nations has reached an "unprecedented level". 

Russia's currently accounts for some 70% of India's arms purchases, the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi reports. 

But India has recently signed a number of big defence contracts with the US and other countries, including France and Israel, our correspondent says. 

Russia is concerned, he adds, that its traditional position as India's main arms supplier could be under threat.

And that's the rub.  As I have already pointed out on this blog (11/30/2012 "Are they Related?"), India is one of Russia's primary partners.  China has gained ground recently, but India is still number one or two in all years since the early 1990s - and essentially helped keep Russia afloat in the arms export world in the 1990s.  The fact that Putin is soliciting arms deals and spending his time indicates that to the Russian government (in the form of Putin), arms sales are an important aspect of foreign policy.  This is mostly likely due to the domestic implications of losing the ability to produce arms and shutting down the factories that produce Russia's most sophisticated export materials.

When Cooperation, Competition, and Politics Collide

The world of international arms transfers is a complicated one. The more I study the complex interactions of states in this arena, the more complexity I see.  The US and Russia are the world's largest arms exporting states.  In most arenas they are competitors.  The reasons for this are both historical  and current.  The reasons are historical in the sense that there is path dependence in arms patterns established during the Cold War. They are current in that Russia's own domestic political weakness is a factor in its anti-US foreign policy decision-making (See Ortmann 2011).

The US has problems with Russia's arms export agency, Rosoboronexport:

Rosoboronexport was subject to US sanctions from 2006 to 2010 for allegedly providing nations including Iran and Syria with equipment that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. (Source)

The Pentagon, in its Afghanistan mission, has turned to Russia's export agency to provide ammunition for the Afghan forces as well as to supply the reconstituted Afghan army with helicopters.  The first batch of helicopters has been delivered and a new contract is in the works.  The US Congress (both the Senate and the House) are working on legislation to prevent US agencies to work with Rosoboronexport:

In mid-June, US Senator John Cornyn called on the Pentagon to take action against Rosoboronexport, but the Pentagon dismissed his claims, saying that dealing with Russia’s arms exporter was the "only legally available method" to supply the helicopters to Afghanistan.

In this transaction the US is essentially acting as an agent for the Afghan military, which has a preference for the Russian helicopters.  This preference is probably based more on historical considerations than current events, but it is their preference.  The Pentagon is caught in the middle.

This transaction - and others like it in Iraq - show the limits in my current research on the arms trade.  When the sale of helicopters is completed it will show that Russia sold arms to Afghanistan.  The US involvement in the transaction - including paying for the equipment with US taxpayer money is not accounted for.

While such transactions are not the norm, they do highlight weaknesses in the way we code arms transfer data and limitations in the ways we can make inferences from such data.

References

Ortmann, Stefanie. 2011. “The Russian Network State as a Great Power.” In Russia as a Network State: What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not?, eds. Vadim Kononenko and Arkady Moshes. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 139–163.