Russian Domestic Politics

Understanding Russian politics has always required a touch of second sight.  We had a talk on campus by John Zaller yesterday.  His talk was about American political parties. He noted that there is a lack of data about party nominations for most races - even Congressional races - in most years.  This is in a pretty open society.  The problem of data availability in Russia often leads to speculation - Kremlin watching - and inferences from the visible acts of the administration.

None of this is news to anyone who follows Russian politics.  I hadn't fully appreciated the issues associated with this issue until I began trying to understand Russian foreign policy.  Brian Whitmore over at Radio Free Europe has written a column detailing the schism between the elites in the Kremlin. He writes that this split is over the degree to which the Kremlin is willing to compromise with the middle class, continue its economic reforms, and tolerate media and popular dissent with the regime.  In this struggle in the Kremlin it is Putin v. Medvedev and their respective camps.  This particular conflict has likely been brewing behind the scenes for some time, but the position swapping of Putin and Medvedev in the most recent election seems to have exacerbated the tensions.

All of this serves as the backdrop for Russia's latest foreign policy moves vis-a-vis the United States.  According to Konstantin Von Eggert:

Russia became an irrelevant second-tier policy issue for the Americans quite some time ago. Until fairly recently, the Russian leadership had responded by using the so-called nuisance factor – i.e. making life difficult for the U.S. without crossing any red lines that might prompt an unpredictable U.S. reaction. No more. 

First by openly challenging the U.S. and the EU over Syria, and now by booting out an American government agency, Vladimir Putin has shown that he intends to turn this irrelevance to his regime's advantage and draw the red lines himself. 

He also demonstrated that his main policy concern is in fact domestic. Priority number one for Putin and his entourage is keeping his regime firmly in power and preventing development of the so-called Orange Scenario, along the lines of the peaceful 2004 revolution in Ukraine, which is widely perceived in Moscow to have been a Western plot to change the pro-Moscow regime there.

These domestic concerns also bear directly on the military and the military industrial complex in Russia.  One of the first items on Putin's agenda is the overhaul of Russia's defense sector.  This week he met with the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Defense industry, Dmitry Rozgin to push for modernization of the defense sector in Russia.

“This program must be tailored so that enterprises are modernized in parallel with the resolution of these social issues,” Putin said during a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.
Rogozin, who oversees the Russian defense industry, now faces the formidable task of streamlining weaponry development and production in the country. 

“This is an acute problem and you must take the appropriate steps in line with the state defense order,” Putin said. 

The president stressed the importance of direct support for the defense industry from both the state and the private sector. 

Russia’s defense industry brings together 1,353 organizations and companies in 64 regions of the country, and employs over 2 million people. 

The government has allocated 20 trillion rubles ($641 billion) to the comprehensive rearmament of Russia's Armed Forces. It is hoped this will see the share of modern weaponry reach 30% by 2015, with this figure rising to 70% by 2020. 

An additional 3 trillion rubles (approximately $100 bln) in public funds and about the same amount in private investment have been allocated to modernize the defense industry over the next decade.

These internal changes to Russia's defense industry will likely also affect Russia's foreign arms sales capabilities and priorities.  

"Private" Military Companies in Russia

The headline in my RSS feed from RIA Novosti made me think that Russia was going to privatize its military production.  It turns out that the "Private Military" companies would be state owned/sponsored private security forms on the order of Blackwater or whatever they are calling themselves these days:

The Russian government’s Military Industrial Commission may consider creating private military companies in Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said Wednesday. 

Russia’s significant economic interests abroad often operate in “difficult” conditions, and such companies would facilitate their work, said Rogozin, who oversees Russia's military-industrial complex. 

“We are thinking about whether our money should go toward financing foreign private security [and] military companies, or whether we should consider the feasibility of such companies in Russia itself,” he said.

 The article points out that such firms are useful for the US because it saves the government insurance money when people die on missions that are contracted to these firms rather than carried out by the military.  Insurance isn't a problem for the Russian military which doesn't really deal in such financial niceties according to Alexander Golt:

“In Russia, the state has practically no financial responsibility to the loss of military personnel.”

The question that remains for me is what affect such state-sponsored paramilitary firms would have on Russia's foreign policy actions.  It is plausible to think of such firms being hired by Assad, for instance, to perform various protective tasks, training, or necessary maintenance.  It would provide a bit of cover to Russia's government which could point to market principles and non-interference with private firms to justify unpopular foreign policy commitments.  This will definitely be an interesting area to watch in the coming years.

A Love Hate Relationship with R is Born

I am interested in arms transfers.  I am also interested in networks. In my dissertation I am combining those two interests.  I think that I am looking at some really cool relationships.  This is well and good. However, to do this fun research stuff I have had to leave my comfort zone of STATA and work in R.  Now I am fighting through the twin troubles of learning new software (and a language to code in) and learning new models.

I did a preliminary round of study to make sure that I could do this analysis in an advanced statistics class last semester.  Over the summer R changed versions. The package I use to do my ERGM analysis broke.  That package was updated.  Then my code broke and nothing worked the past two weeks as I have tried to get my analysis done for my dissertation.

After hours of frustrated Googling, I found a note on a blog (that I can't find a link to now... arrrrrgh!) about R namespaces and needing to remove the igraph and statnet packages and reinstall statnet first in order for it to work correctly.  I did this (without reinstalling igraph, just to be sure).  Now things run.  Now I can actually do analysis and not debugging and firefighting with the software.

Enough of the hate. I love Rstudio.  After running through some model specifications last night I decided to try out the knitr package. Awesome.  I still have a lot to learn to make things into real good documents and documentation of my analyses, but you can check out this link to my output for my test models here.

And here is a network graph of France's (egocentric) arms network during the 1950s.  The network is created from the main world network.  The world network accounts for all arms transactions from 1950 to 1959.  The sociomatrix shows a 1 if state i sold weapons to state j at any point during the 10 year window.

Created Using R. Data come from SIPRI.