Thursday, August 18, 2016

Bureaucracy and the University

I am not a big fan of bureaucracy.  I understand the point of it, and probably tend toward the bureaucratic in organizing my own life and time.  I am opposed to it when it is imposed upon me. This aversion to bureaucracy is probably a function of my own experiences with it.  It was one of the reasons that a long-term career in the military ceased to be appealing to me after awhile. The daily tasks of my job were fine, and in the context of my own small unit, things made sense.

For the same reason I see the virtue of setting standards and having rules for the academic department where I am currently chair. Our goal is to turn out well-rounded political science undergraduates and MA students. To do that we need to have some organization, and there have to be rules to organize that.  Beyond establishing basic frameworks and minimum standards, however, I am loathe to start to dictate what is happening in an individual course - let alone in individual lessons.

One of the most useful aspects of a liberal arts education is an exposure to the unevenness of life. Students can learn a lot about life by dealing with different types of professors with different types of classes and different types of personalities. The skills that we are teaching: critical thinking, analysis, synthesis, writing, and a broader exposure to problems and opportunities in the world are by their nature difficult to impart.

A graduate with a BA in political science can do a lot of things - but there is no nationwide professional test that needs to certify skills and knowledge like there is for engineering [in the US context], for example. We tell our students that the main object of their education is to learn to evaluate sources of information, identify what is important, and to be able to make their own arguments about what is important and why. There is not one single path or set of learning outcomes, activities, or objectives that will instill those skills into all of our graduates in the same way. 

*****

This is why this article from Inside Higher Ed really has me thinking about the current push in my own university to adopt more and more bureaucratic top-down procedures for designing, tracking, and reporting the work that is taking place in the classroom.

In this case a professor refused to put learning outcomes on his syllabus and has been relieved of teaching duties. He is suing the university over this.

Dillon’s complaint alleges defamation and violations of due process and his First Amendment rights. It’s heavily concerned with academic freedom, and it certainly has all the hallmarks of that kind of fight. The American Association of University Professors, for example, has appealed to the college on Dillon’s behalf. Its statement on assessment says that faculty members maintain “primary responsibility for establishing the criteria for assessment and the methods for implementing it.” 
But Dillon’s lawsuit also centers on the role of the accreditor in assessment. Hinting that the college may have used its upcoming accreditation review as an excuse to swat a known gadfly, the complaint says that a “single paragraph in a professor’s syllabus cannot possibly jeopardize any college’s reaccreditation.” 
Is that true? Dillon notes, correctly, that SACSCOC's Principles of Accreditation do not address syllabus content. Yet student learning outcomes -- a growing focus for regional accreditors -- loom large in those standards. SACSCOC’s principles on institutional effectiveness, for example, say that the college or university “identifies expected outcomes, assesses the extent to which it achieves these outcomes and provides evidence of improvement based on analysis of the results” in several areas. Those include “educational programs, to include student learning outcomes.”
For me this reveals many of the underlying tensions between professors and administration. The most important audience for the administration is whoever is signing the check, and whoever is signing the checks.  

The rules that trickle down to syllabi from school and department are a symptom of the need for administrators to "understand" what is happening. James Scott, in "Seeing like a State", describes the lengths that states go to change the landscape in order to make it readable for the tax collector and regulator.  

I wonder about issues of trust between faculty and administrator.  The rise of the professional administrator and tracks to administration that don't organically arise out of long years in the classroom and lab will likely increase this distrust.  Faculty resistance to these downward demands are often treated as simple pettiness or a desire to ditch accountability.  The idea that professors may have principled reasons for resisting the bureaucratic encroachment into their territory - to be treated as simple interchangeable cogs of information-dispensing diminishes the role and potential of professionals.  

Ironically, it is the skills that are most difficult to measure - the ones that get past the banal list of bullet-pointed outcomes - which are the real value added of a university education. Simple information consumption and fact-gathering can be "scaled" in ways that analysis and critical thinking cannot.

Monday, July 11, 2016

Russian Arms Propaganda?

I wonder about the effectiveness of propaganda sometimes.  In this post I share two different stories that seem to be part of Russia's propaganda offensive.  One has to do with the capabilities of Ukraine, and the other a disputed version of events. I wonder about the audiences for these particular pieces and the larger strategic thinking - and whether this is strategic or simply business as usual.
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There is an article in the "Sputnik" news about the state of the arms export business in Ukraine. It's the type of article that I am interested in reading in a region that I am interested in reading about.  

The article details some shady deals and shoddy workmanship and highlights the fact that Ukraine's Military Industrial Complex is dependent on reworking or simply reselling its stock of inherited Soviet weapons - not on the development and sale of new weapons.

The problem isn’t however, that a lion’s share of those exports consisted of decades-old weapons and parts Ukraine had inherited from the Soviet Union. 
Even before the 2014 “Maidan revolution” the head of the Verhovna Rada’s defense and security committee Anatoly Kinakh admitted that weapons developed and built in post-Soviet Ukraine accounted for less than 20 percent of its exports.

By these standards, it would be interested to note what percentage of weapons sold by Russia have been developed and built post Soviet Union. Furthermore, an interesting question is the extent to which those more advanced weapons are used in the Russian military.

The Russian military industrial complex is still in fairly bad shape from top to bottom.  There has been some new development of weapons, but production has been sporadic and there has been a problem in delivering those weapons to the Russian military - and to foreign customers.  The fact that Ukraine is experiencing these problems is not surprising.  It is also questionable, to what extent the sale of arms is a priority for the Ukrainian government and economy.

The arms industry was highly integrated during the Soviet Era, and many firms have struggled to find markets and to integrate.  The Motorsich firm in Zaporozhye was building motors for Russian helicopters through the 2000s, but the number or orders was a fraction of what it used to be.

Dispute over incident in Mediterranean Sea

RT, Russia's official propaganda station airs this video and accuses the USS Gravely of breaching international safety protocols during the encounter shown in the video below.  The version of events as told by the US is much different.  In their version, the Russian Frigate claimed to be having problems with maneuverability, but was constantly trying to interfere with the USS Truman.  The video shown is the USS Gravely maneuvering to stay between the Frigate and the Truman - this is its job as part of the Carrier Battle Group.  (US Version)





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It is interesting to me that Russian media is starting to fight back against the propaganda shown on domestic channels.  I don't know much about propaganda as a subject, but it is fascinating to see how much it comes up in relation to the subjects that I study.

Tuesday, July 5, 2016

Russian Consistency on Regime Change (and odds and ends)

Russia is warning the US about a push for regime change in Syria (LINK).  I think that Russia's policy has always been consistent in this regard. And their position has been borne out in the chaos that enveloped Egypt, Libya, and Iraq in the absence of strong leadership.  Democracy promotion is fine and good, but there has to be some semblance of political order and institutional ability (or social capital) to be able to develop it.

The lesson from Iraq is that any regime change imposed from the outside needs to be accompanied by very strong planning for the post-regime period.  Organic changes to leadership from popular uprisings may also be shaky.

We have given Putin's Kremlin plenty of ammunition in its offensive against democracy promotion by supporting regime change irresponsibly.

____________________

This is an interesting article on the shake up of the Baltic Sea Fleet.

Clearly, for the purge to be so large and so open, the misconduct in the Baltic Fleet had to be very serious and very widespread. Yulia Nikitina and Irina Tumakova from Fontanka.ru have published a long article documenting the faults attributed to the fleet’s now-former leadership. The condition of the fleet under Viktor Kravchuk had supposedly declined when compared to how it was under his predecessors, who received much less financing than he did in the last four years. 
In other words, the Baltic Fleet purge appears to be a signal to other Russian military commanders (including mid-level ones) that corruption that has a negative effect on combat readiness will not be tolerated and will result in punishment far more severe than the usual honorable retirement given to senior officials who misbehave.
 Russia's military readiness has become political. 

Sunday, July 3, 2016

Aircraft Round Up for June 2016

My news feed has been filled with stories related to the sale of aircraft.  I want to link to those articles with a bit of my own commentary about how these sales fit in with my own theories and ideas about arms sales.

Nigeria and the Super Tucano

This is an interesting case of a Brazilian plane being manufactured in the US for Afghanistan and Lebanon.  Nigeria wants to buy these anti-insurgency aircraft to fight against Boko Haram, but the US needs to approve the sale since the manufacturing takes place on US territory. This is the first example of this type of arrangement that I have run across, and it simnply fascinates me.  The web of interconnected production facilities makes arms sales and production as well as their sales multi-national.  I wonder about the ability of states like the US to act as veto players for such sales.  What is the trade-off or point at which Brazil would move manufacturing to its own territory in order to avoid any such complications in the future?

Canada and the F-35 Rejection
Canada is no longer on board with the F-35.  As one of the initial partners, this is an interesting case.  It is also interesting whether Trudeau will be in power long enough to find an alternative to the Canadian Air Force's aging fleet. The F-18 Superhornet, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Rafale and Grippen are the alternatives that Canada is currently considering.

"For 10 years, the Conservatives completely missed the mark when it came time to deliver to Canadians and our military the equipment they need," the Liberal prime minister said in parliament.

"They clung to a plane that does not work and is far from working."

The biggest issue with Canada dropping out is the political fallout.

Pakistan and the F-16 End Run

This piece illustrates the difficulty of using arms as a carrot or stick in foreign policy.  If the US refuses to sell F-16s to Pakistan, it will seek to buy used aircraft from Jordon.  In this case, the initial sales decision by the US must be considered even more carfully if there is a question about resale potential.  This is a realistic possibility because many countries fly the F-16 and so it should be possible to find spare parts from willing suppliers.  Pakistan is shopping because of Congressional demands that it stop harboring Islamic militants.

China, Russia, and the US and Next Generation Bombers

Bomber aircraft are the most strategic of the aircraft.  They have previously been built primarily by the US and Russia. China is now in on the game.  Russia, the US, and China all expect to have these new bombers as part of their arsenal by 2025.  The 9-year time frame from now shows the complication of developing and manufacturing these aircraft.  In the US case, the arms acquisition bureacuracy is such that projects tend to drag longer and longer with each new generation of aircraft.

F-35 can't compete?

Adding to the woes of the F35 is the analysis that it cannot compete with older Soviet/Russian models of aircraft, specifically the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker.  The F35 is the Pentagon's most expensive arms acquisition ever and it has been mired in delays, scandals, and bureaucratic infighting from its inception.

Turkey and Attack Helicopters
Turkey is still trying to obtain an attack helicopter.  The most interesting part of this article (which is about Turkey shortlisting potential companies from which to purchas) is the discussion about human rights and the problems of competing in arms sales when such restrictions are not universally applied:

Franco-German company Eurocopter's position was made more difficult as Berlin initially banned it from participating because of concerns over human rights in Turkey, although the German Government relented.

Philippe Camus, co-chief executive of European Aeronautic, Defense and Space, says the Turkish decision against Eurocopter will push the issue of common export policy to the top of the agenda and that Europe's capitals must work together to create a single coherent policy.

Apache for Qatar

It seems as if these are part of the payment for Qatar's role as broker in getting Bergdahl from the Taliban.  It seems like a steep price to pay.  If Qatar will be an ally in other areas, then this might be okay. It seems hypocritical considering Qater's human rights record vs. that of Turkey that advanced attack aircraft were easily obtained by that government.

Friday, June 3, 2016

Arms Odds and Ends (June 3, 2016)

Canada

Sometimes Canada gets good press, and sometimes bad.  The decision of the liberal government to continue a sale of armored vehicles to Saudia Arabia is turning into quite a political scandal. (LINK) Arms sales are fascinating precisely because of the highly political nature of these sales and the very real economic and security issues (domestically) that play into arms export decisions.

Nigeria

Nigeria has lost over $15 billion dollars due to arms acquisition corruption (LINK).  I wrote about Russia's own fraud problem a few years ago with some nice graphs.  Check it out (LINK)!

Russia

A good analysis of the effect of the economic crisis on Russia's military modernization process (LINK).

Another article examines problems within the Russian arms industry.  Some of this stems from corruption, some from incompetence.  (LINK)

On an unrelated (but not completely) note: more evidence that Russia is very concerned about the perceived legitimacy of its annexation of Crimea domestically (LINK). The political effects of the sanctions would be much worse if there wasn't a rally effect based on a widely-shared belief that Russia's actions were righteous and justified.

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Education Odds and Ends

On this blog I have not written a lot about education.  My focus and the source of the title for the blog is the grim yard of security issues that I research for a living and for fun.  However, many life choices have brought me to a point where I have to think of education a lot more.  I work at Nazarbayev University - a western-style university established 6 years ago in Astana, Kazakhstan.  I began working here after one year of being Dr. Willardson and after a very enjoyable, but very temporary experience as a Visiting Assistant Professor at UNLV.

The university is growing. Most of my colleagues are young, early-career academics.  However, the fact that I was only 1 year post-PhD did not reflect the fact that I had a bit of life experience under my belt. My administrative abilities and my willingness to do a bit of extra work resulted in my appointment as the acting chair of the department of political science and international relations.

It all started my first fall when I showed up and we were scheduling classes for spring. The process was quite chaotic.  The stated degree requirements that we had given to students were impossible to meet with the number and composition of our faculty.  Especially since we began an MA program along with our BA program the same year I started.  I spent the year working to update our program requirements to make them match what we could do while maintaining a program that was similar to programs in the US.  Along the way, I was elected to the Faculty Senate and was assigned to work on the University Quality Control committee.

Now much of my non-research time is spent trying to comply with increasingly intrusive demands from all sides about what our curriculum "must" do. Our university employs academics from all over the world and many of our administrators are British.  That model is very different from the one that I am familiar with, and much different than our school (which is partnered with University of Wisconsin, Madison) is modeled after.

This article (LINK) that showed up in my news reader feed struck a chord with me:

This story began in the 1990s, when reformers thought they could improve teaching and learning in college if they insisted that colleges declare their specific “learning goals,” with instructors defining “the knowledge, intellectual skills, competencies and attitudes that each student is expected to gain.” The reformers’ theory was that these faculty-enumerated learning objectives would serve as the hooks that would then be used by administrators to initiate reviews of actual student work, the key to improving teaching. 
That was the idea. But it hasn’t worked out that way. Not even close. Here is one example of how the mindless implementation of this idea distracts rather than contributes to the goal of improved student learning. When a team from the western accreditor, the WASC Senior College and University Commission, visited San Diego State University in 2005, it raised concerns that the school had shut down its review process of college majors, which was supposed to involve outside experts and the review of student work. Now, 10 years have passed and the most recent review by WASC (the team visit is scheduled for this month) finds there are still major gaps, with “much work to be done to ensure that all programs are fully participating in the assessment process.”
We are in the process of making our "LOs".  In some ways it is useful.  We are codifying expectations and standards that we can use to hold each other (as faculty) accountable.  However, each new round of reforms calls for increasing reports and monitoring and standardization of courses to the point that professors are viewed by many as simply "content delivery" devices.  The paradox of red tape and the need for administrators to quantify and monitor things that are out of their control and out of their competence is one that is at the heart of the modern university. It is often quite depressing.

Ammunition

A study on the negative effect of electronic devices in the classroom offers me some ammunition in my personal quest to kill Whatsapp, instagram, and all the other media use that distracts students.  (LINK)

Monday, May 30, 2016

A round up of arms-related goodness

This is a post for me to take care of some bookkeeping tasks.  There have been a number of articles written about arms sales that relate to my research interests lately.  However, I have needed to put them aside to finish up some other projects and to finish up the end of the year.  I will present this as a roundup list with a little commentary so I can come back and do some deeper work with these sources later.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War ended long ago.  The US has now lifted its arms prohibition on the country.  It was done via an executive order and announced by President Obama.  This is an interesting story for me.  In this case, the prohibition on sales was political - trumping economic concerns.  This decision is also political - a signal to China about the US interests in security in the region. It looks like the US will start fielding requests for aircraft. (LINK)

Russia has been supplying arms to Vietnam for a long time.  I wrote a vignette about naval sales to Vietnam for a paper I wrote in 2012 (unpublished).  Here is an interesting piece on the mechanics who maintain Russian-made Sukhoi jets for Vietnam (LINK).  This aspect of arms sales and military effectiveness has not really made its way into the literature on arms sales.  I think that it is really fascinating. If arms are something more than symbolic, they need to be maintained. The capacity for states to maintain their own high-end equipment puts them ahead of states that need to rely solely on the manufacturing country.  I am still thinking of how this could be incorporated into a research paper, so for now it remains an interesting small question.

Russia

Russia and arms are always interesting.  An interesting article from RFE/RL outlines the proliferation of new and fancy weapons being built by Russia and the fear that they will lead to a new arms race.

In other interesting news, Russia and the US (along with the rest of the P5) agreed to re-arm the Libyan government for that government to fight internal rebels (LINK).  This is a very interesting state of affairs.  The norm for western governments has been to avoid providing weapons to states to deal with internal repression (at least in policy and rhetoric). Now states are agreeing that states arming to fight against extremists is okay.  This in many ways validates the Russian position in Syria. States have a right to protect their regime from violence. Does this signal a shift in norms to take into account the growing threat of Islamic violence (i.e. ISIS), or is this a unique case?

F-35

The Pentagon admitted that the F-35 will be delayed and will not be ready for full production until (at least) 2018 (LINK).  The delays in this program are an interesting issue in arms acquisition and production.  The F-35 was supposed to be cheaper and better and it is morphing into a hybrid that is neither.  For me the interesting question to ask in a few years is whether the political capital gained by outsourcing and cooperating on its production are worth the cost in terms of acquisition cost and speed as well as the ratio of those two factors in effectiveness.

Wednesday, April 27, 2016

Zhirinovsky and the Power of Nationalism

RFE/RL has a good story today about the ways in which Russian governance is closer to the wack-a-doo ideas of Vladimrir Zhirinovsky than is comfortable.  I read the article with interest and reminisced about a paper that I wrote for a graduate seminar in comparative politics during my third year of graduate school in the Fall Semester of 2010.

The paper that I wrote was titled: Punching above Their Weight: Nationalist Parties in Presidential Systems.  The inspiration for the paper was the rise of the influence of Zhirinovsky in Russian politics.

I think that the idea of the paper was pretty good - although my execution of it was pretty limited.  Here is a piece from my theoretical set up from the paper:

Nationalist parties can occupy an important ideological space. Nationalist parties have their own policy preferences, and those preferences are communicated to the public. If the ideological space occupied by a nationalist party becomes a salient issue which a president must “own” in order to maintain office specifically and legitimacy more generally, then that party has “ideological blackmail potential.” This ideological blackmail potential will differ from polity to polity based on institutional and ideological factors.
The basic idea is that nationalist parties stake out key policy points that are sometimes incredibly salient.  In the case of Russia, the LDPR has occupied the space related to anger over the loss of great power status, the desire for international respect, and the idea that Russia has a special mission in the world.  Putin, because of domestic economic factors, has needed to use some of these themes to maintain support.  That usage comes at a cost - and part of that is adopting some of the more radical language espoused by the LDPR.  It means giving Zhirinovsky more power than he would have based on actual support for his total platform.


Presidential Susceptibility to Ideological Blackmail
Nationalist Ideology
Nationalist
Cosmopolitan
Institutional Constraints on Presidential Power
Strong
Low/Med
Low
Weak
High
Low

Watching Russia is never boring.