"Why Does Russia Support Dictators?"

This article in RIA has an interesting take on Russia's stand in Syria. In it Fyoder Lykonov argues that Russia is just being consistent in its foreign policy on interventionism in general.

Is Russia's policy really that short-sighted? Its prospects for having influence in the Middle East look vague indeed. The reserve of confidence built up during the Soviet period has been depleted, and it is unclear whether today's Russia is ready to step out onto the global stage. But the rest of Russia's policy is not so unreasonable. 

Moscow has made it clear that bypassing legitimate measures is not an option, this just results in random actions like the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which everyone  now recognizes was a mistake. So others can either respect Russia’s opinion by taking a neutral stance on the conflict in Syria, or act at their own risk and peril, something which it appears no one is willing to do.

The focus is, of course, on Russia’s global status, but Moscow also wants to keep the door open for an alternative solution to be found. The only other option is a military and political tunnel which will inevitably lead to a war with international ramifications.

 I have no problem with the idea that Russia is acting on principle in the Syrian case.  It is clear that Russia is not opposed to states taking their own interests into their own hands - as in its dispute with Georgia a few years ago.  Those states will then need to deal with the fallout of their own actions. Russia is opposed to cloaking those interventions with international respectability.  While this is a perfectly valid worldview, and consistent with the premium that Moscow places on state sovereignty, it will not make Russia's adherence to the principle any easier, or any more palatable to the narrative of human rights and compassionate interventionism that is the basis of the dialogue in Syria presently. 

World Arms Network 1950 and 1975

I am starting work on my dissertation.  The first thing I needed to do was to get all of my arms transfer data into a form that I can work with it for network analysis.  That effort is going nicely.  I spent a little time today playing around with the graphs for the year 1950.  Here is the worldwide arms network for 1950:

I also ran a quick graph of the arms network in 1975.  The thing that jumps out is the difference in the number of states that are importing weapons.  The graph as an analytical tool is nearly useless given the crowded nature of the arms market.  This is why I have to utilize real Social Network Analysis tools to get at the questions I really want to answer.  Graphs are fun, though.

Russia, Syria, and Arms - Oh My!

The following excerpts from this Russian news article highlight the strange "dependence" of Russia on arms sales.  Russia seems intent on proving that it is a "Great Power" through demonstrations of how it can defy the rest of the world community.  This continued "opposition" strategy does not imply that Russia is strong enough to do what it wants.  It really seems to show that Russia is not confident enough in its own position to take a non-realist, non-material stance on issues.  Thoughts?

Russia to honor Syria arms contracts | World | RIA Novosti: "Libya.

Russia will honor all arms contacts with Syria despite continuing violence against anti-government protesters in the country, a senior military official said on Sunday. 

“Since there are no restrictions on the supply of arms to Syria, Russia will fulfill its obligations under the contracts signed with this country,” Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, deputy head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, told reporters in Dubai. 

“Russia is interested in continuing mutually beneficial cooperation with the new Libyan government, both on the already-signed contracts and prospective deals,” he said.
In September, Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil said his country would not buy Russian arms. Observers said the decision came as little surprise because of Moscow’s links with the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and its slowness to recognize the rebel leadership as the legitimate government. 

Dzirkaln also said Russia hoped to continue arms sales to Yemen when violence there ended."

Does it matter how the violence ends?  If Russia continues to support the Assad regime does it do so because it is afraid that a different regime will not look to Russia for arms?  How do these arms contracts that Russia seems so keen to uphold further Russian interests in the long-term?

Venezuela, Bonds, and Russian Arms

Venezuela bond deals point to arms buying: Caracas, Venezuela (UPI) Nov 8, 2011



Bond deals by Venezuela point to defense purchases made in Moscow to circumvent a U.S. arms embargo and other difficulties faced by Caracas in its quest for military suppliers for its armed forces.
The bond deals worth $3.6 billion come at a time of growing political uncertainty in Venezuela over the health of President Hugo Chavez, who is receiving treatment for cancer in Cuba.


As a reference for the news article above is a graph I pulled together from data from SIPRI (www.sipri.org) on Russian arms exports to Venezuela.  The data are for the years 1992-2010.  As I have noted in posts on Syria, Russia appears to play by different rules with foreign policy when arms deals are available.

Russian Service Members Pay Increase - Troubling Trend?

Russian service members to earn almost as much as NATO counterparts: President Dmitry Medvedev has signed a law raising the salaries of Russian service personnel starting January 1, 2012.

Will the raises in salary come with an expected rise in professionalism?  Much of the Russian military structure and activity has always seemed to be based on cheap/unskilled labor of conscripts and a core of officers that are proficient.  It seems that the rank structure would have to change in order for the pay changes to seem feasible and responsible.  

This, coupled with Putin's recent remarks about the foreign policy of the United States, may be cause for a little concern.  Is Russia becoming a military state?

Russia’s military spending will begin increasing rapidly in 2012, from 13.9% of budget expenses in 2011 to 14.6% in 2012, 17% in 2013 and 18.8% in 2014. 

“Military spending will grow 1.5%-2% nearly every year, which is a considerable increase,” said Igor Nikolayev, chief strategist at FBK, a private audit firm. “Together with spending on security and law enforcement, this is more than one-third of all budget expenditures.” 

Increased military spending was one of the reasons behind the resignation of Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who urged a reconsideration of the military spending program. 

While military spending will grow, allocations for education and healthcare will be reduced. In particular, spending on education will fall from 5.1% this year to 4.7% in 2012, 4% in 2013 and 3.4% in 2014. Healthcare expenses will be even smaller: 4.6% in 2011, 4.4% in 2012, 3.7% in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014.

Stalingrad Footage

This is an interesting video of footage from Stalingrad.  I thought it would be appropriate near Veterans' Day.
See the whole series on Stalingrad at: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20111108/168520301.html

Russia and Syria: Arms and Alliances

The story referenced below gives a good overview of the relationship between Russia and Syria.  It is especially interesting that the ties that have made Russia and Syria "allies" are commercial and center on arms.  Russia, by supporting Syria with weapons, is able to maintain influence in the region.  This is an interesting contrast to the deteriorating arms relationship with Iran.

As international pressure on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria grows, Russia has maintained a perplexing timidity towards developments. Moscow has steadfastly refused to stake out an unambiguous position on events in Syria, a diplomatic paralysis that may end up proving more costly to Moscow in the long run. 

Some analysts say the Kremlin's careful stance is a result of its unwillingness to lose its only real Middle Eastern ally and a desire to avoid a confrontation with the West. 

"Syria remains Russia's only ally in the Middle East," Vladimir Karyakin from the state Institute for Strategic Research said. "We abandoned the rest either during perestroika or during the recent Arab revolutions. We even betrayed some - like Libya or Egypt, for example."
Russia has been a major arms supplier to Syria since the Soviet era and political cooperation with Damascus has often been far more valuable to Moscow than money. In 2005, Russia wrote off more than 70 percent of Syria's $13-billion debt, much of which was the result of Soviet-era arms deliveries. 

Although financial interests now play a more important role in defining Moscow's approach to Syria than during the Cold War, political concerns still remain the cornerstone, analysts say. Since the early 1970s, the country has hosted Russia's only naval supply and maintenance base outside the former Soviet Union in its Mediterranean port of Tartus.
"If we lose such an ally, we will lose our foothold in the Middle East," Karyakin warned.

Conflicting interests paralyze Russian diplomacy on Syria: analysts | Features & Opinion | RIA Novosti:

The following graphs show the growing importance of Russian arms imports to Syria.  I put together the graphs using data from SIPRI.