France and Russian Ship Deal - Russia not to Build its Own Ships

Here is the story:

Russia's new Defence Minister has made the decision that Russia will not build Mistral class helicopter-carriers, the Vedomosti newspaper reports with reference to sources in the Defence Ministry. 

According to earlier agreements, France was to build two such ships, with the costs totalling more than a billion euros, while Russia was to build two more ships at its own shipyards. 

But, according to the periodical, the concept of using Mistral class ships by the Russian Navy has turned out to be questionable, while the building and maintenance costs, too heavy. 

France is already building two helicopter-carriers for Russia, with the first one due to be commissioned in 2014, while the second one, in 2015.
Both naval ships will be based in Vladivostok.

My question on this particular case is whether or not Russia is backing out because it just doesn't have the capacity to build enough advanced ships for its own navy while maintaining its ship export commitments.

Russia and India Arms Relations Redux

Vladimir Putin spent some time in India this past week.  One of the primary deals struck between the two states during the visit, was the sale of $3 Billion worth of Russian helicopters - a tender, which was rumored to be going to the United States earlier in the month.

The Russian Ambassador to India had this to say about plans for further cooperation between the two states: (source)

...the deals that have been struck as part of the ten-year programme of military and technical cooperation between India and Russia are estimated at $30 billion. 

On Monday, during the Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India, several important agreements in the military area were signed in New Delhi.

The helicopter and other aircraft deal looks like this:

Under one contract, India will buy 71 Mi-17B-5 Hip helicopters worth $1.3 billion, while the other provides for the delivery of assembly kits for 42 Su-30MKI Flanker fighters, worth $1.6 billion. 

The two countries also signed a number of cooperation agreements in the defense and technology sector, notably between Russian Helicopters and Elcom Systems Pvt Ltd.

Here is the blurb from a BBC story that really highlights the personal role that Putin is playing in getting these deals signed:

In an article in India's Hindu newspaper, Mr Putin described as a "historic step" the declaration of strategic partnership between the two countries signed in 2000. 

The Russian leader also said that the military co-operation between the two nations has reached an "unprecedented level". 

Russia's currently accounts for some 70% of India's arms purchases, the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi reports. 

But India has recently signed a number of big defence contracts with the US and other countries, including France and Israel, our correspondent says. 

Russia is concerned, he adds, that its traditional position as India's main arms supplier could be under threat.

And that's the rub.  As I have already pointed out on this blog (11/30/2012 "Are they Related?"), India is one of Russia's primary partners.  China has gained ground recently, but India is still number one or two in all years since the early 1990s - and essentially helped keep Russia afloat in the arms export world in the 1990s.  The fact that Putin is soliciting arms deals and spending his time indicates that to the Russian government (in the form of Putin), arms sales are an important aspect of foreign policy.  This is mostly likely due to the domestic implications of losing the ability to produce arms and shutting down the factories that produce Russia's most sophisticated export materials.

Aggressive Tactics or Business as Usual?

RIA Novosti carried this story the other day: (link here)

MOSCOW, December 20 (RIA Novosti) - Russia’s Vnesheconombank (VEB) will provide Indonesia with a total of $399.5 million in credit to finance purchases of aircraft and related equipment from Russia’s state-run arms export company Rosoboronexport. 

credit will be provided for a seven-year term, Rosoboronexport said.
This is the second credit agreement between VEB and Indonesia’s Finance Ministry in the past two years. 

Last week VEB's deputy chief Alexander Ivanov said VEB won the Indonesian Finance Ministry’s tender to finance the purchase of six Russian-made Su-30MK2 Flanker multirole fighter aircraft.

After looking at aggregate numbers for arms sales, I am still not sure of how specific transactions go down most of the time.  Is this a fairly common practice, or is it unusual?

Here is a look at Indonesia's arms imports for the past 20 years (give or take) created using STATA and data from SIPRI:

Russia is the second largest supplier (By cost) of weapons to Indonesia in the period from 1991 to 2010.  However, the total amount of arms sales has been around $700 million dollars.  Here's a breakdown of Russia's sales (by year) over that same period:

The relationship between Russia and Singapore only began in 2001- and although it has been relatively steady, the maximum amount per year has been just over $200 million dollars.  My guess is that Indonesia is still not considered to be a reliable customer, and this financing deal is meant to try to lock Indonesia's government into longer-term deals that can bring them more fully into Moscow's arms corner.

When Cooperation, Competition, and Politics Collide

The world of international arms transfers is a complicated one. The more I study the complex interactions of states in this arena, the more complexity I see.  The US and Russia are the world's largest arms exporting states.  In most arenas they are competitors.  The reasons for this are both historical  and current.  The reasons are historical in the sense that there is path dependence in arms patterns established during the Cold War. They are current in that Russia's own domestic political weakness is a factor in its anti-US foreign policy decision-making (See Ortmann 2011).

The US has problems with Russia's arms export agency, Rosoboronexport:

Rosoboronexport was subject to US sanctions from 2006 to 2010 for allegedly providing nations including Iran and Syria with equipment that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. (Source)

The Pentagon, in its Afghanistan mission, has turned to Russia's export agency to provide ammunition for the Afghan forces as well as to supply the reconstituted Afghan army with helicopters.  The first batch of helicopters has been delivered and a new contract is in the works.  The US Congress (both the Senate and the House) are working on legislation to prevent US agencies to work with Rosoboronexport:

In mid-June, US Senator John Cornyn called on the Pentagon to take action against Rosoboronexport, but the Pentagon dismissed his claims, saying that dealing with Russia’s arms exporter was the "only legally available method" to supply the helicopters to Afghanistan.

In this transaction the US is essentially acting as an agent for the Afghan military, which has a preference for the Russian helicopters.  This preference is probably based more on historical considerations than current events, but it is their preference.  The Pentagon is caught in the middle.

This transaction - and others like it in Iraq - show the limits in my current research on the arms trade.  When the sale of helicopters is completed it will show that Russia sold arms to Afghanistan.  The US involvement in the transaction - including paying for the equipment with US taxpayer money is not accounted for.

While such transactions are not the norm, they do highlight weaknesses in the way we code arms transfer data and limitations in the ways we can make inferences from such data.

References

Ortmann, Stefanie. 2011. “The Russian Network State as a Great Power.” In Russia as a Network State: What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not?, eds. Vadim Kononenko and Arkady Moshes. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 139–163.

Are they related?

In today's mystery music show we examine two news items from the Russian press and ask the question: are they related?

The first is a stringent denial that Russia has lost a bid to supply India (its second largest customer for arms after China)* heavy helicopters:

MOSCOW, November 28 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport denied on Wednesday media reports that it had lost tenders on the delivery of heavy-lift helicopters and aerial tankers to the Indian air force. 

“Rosoboronexport denies media speculation about Russia’s loss in both tenders as these reports are false,” the company said in a statement. (Link to full article)

The second is a story related to the ongoing corruption scandal in the Russian military.

MOSCOW, November 28 (RIA Novosti) – Companies controlled by the Russian Defense Ministry embezzled more than a combined 10 billion rubles ($257 million) this year, investigators said on Wednesday. 

The alleged sum included 6.7 billion rubles ($215 million) suspected to have been stolen via a corruption scheme that cost Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov his job earlier this month, Investigative Committee spokesman Alexander Sorochkin said. The sum in the high-profile case was previously reported to be 3 billion rubles. (Link to full article)

Russia's intertwined military industrial complex may be eating itself.  If the corruption within the system increases to a point where Russia cannot competitively sell its arms to longtime partners, the entire house of cards could come crashing down.

Verdict: Possibly related.


* Here is a fun graph I made to show this relationship:

Corruption investigations in the MoD - Filed under: Speculation

This is just a kind of tidbit - a nugget of joy - along with some wild speculation.  For what it's worth.

There has been a story developing about corruption among Russia's Defense Ministry's property department.  That has led to what appears to be a full investigation with documents and other items being seized today in Moscow.

From the article in RIA:

Oboronservis was set up in 2008 and carries out repair and services for Defense Ministry properties as well as repair and maintenance of military equipment and provision of services to military garrison towns. 

A law enforcement source told RIA Novosti that no detentions are planned in the near future as part of the ongoing investigation. 

Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov was informed of the investigation and arrived at one of the locations being searched, law enforcement sources said on Thursday morning. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin met with Serdyukov and instructed him to ensure interaction with investigators on the Oboroneservis case. 

Presidential administration head Sergei Ivanov said it will be up to the court to rule who is guilty. 

“Only the court may determine whether a person is guilty or not. All the rest is vibrating air and propaganda,” Ivanov told journalists.

More details about the latest seizure and ongoing investigation can be found here.

Speculations

Now for the wild speculation.  It does not seem that any large and visible investigation such as this one is every done without the knowledge/approval of the Kremlin.  This investigation, and its timing, may indicate the model of having civilians as a part of the ministry of defense, and part of the defense and security structures within Russia, is under attack.  Many in the military have been unhappy with the civilian head of the Defense Ministry.  A good bio can be found at Wikipedia.

This may be more "Clan" maneuvering among Russia's elites, especially given the fact that Ivanov's held the position of Defense Minister prior to moving over to be head of the the Presidential administration in 2007.  If Kremlin watching is back in vogue, this makes for compelling television.

Why arms control is hard...

This item has been sitting in my reader for a few days.  This statement, made by Vladimir Putin, touches on so many aspects of international relations that I didn't quite know what direction I wanted to take in examining it.  First, the statement:

"Only sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council can serve as a basis for restricting weapons supplies to any particular country. In all other cases, nobody can use any pretext to dictate to Russia or any other country on how they should trade and with whom."

I would like to address two interesting points from the standpoint of my own research on arms transfer that this statement evinces.

1. Arms control is inherently difficult to begin if the two states that have the largest stake in the arms transfer game have an effective veto on limitations of their right to sell weapons.  This is a highly rational position for Russia to take if it sees arms sales as a vital part of its economic, military, or foreign policy portfolio. The built-in veto of the security council turns this international organization into a forum for state to state diplomacy rather than international action in the case of arms transfers.  What I mean by this is that in the case of the US and Russia having disputes over arms transfers to Syria, for example, the veto on the security council by each state means that either state can effectively get what they want in the absence of all but the most spirited international consensus.  
2. The second point is that Putin seems to put arms sales in the same category as other trade.  Nobody can dictate how they trade and with whom.  This is a very interesting sentiment for a state which recently was accepted into the WTO to have.  

The question about arms transfers being a different type of trade is one that I'll leave to another time.  However, Russia continues to hold firm to its position of autonomy in foreign policy.  Its leaders are unwilling to allow the state to be constrained by other states (i.e. the United States) or even by the international community more broadly.  

Russian Domestic Politics

Understanding Russian politics has always required a touch of second sight.  We had a talk on campus by John Zaller yesterday.  His talk was about American political parties. He noted that there is a lack of data about party nominations for most races - even Congressional races - in most years.  This is in a pretty open society.  The problem of data availability in Russia often leads to speculation - Kremlin watching - and inferences from the visible acts of the administration.

None of this is news to anyone who follows Russian politics.  I hadn't fully appreciated the issues associated with this issue until I began trying to understand Russian foreign policy.  Brian Whitmore over at Radio Free Europe has written a column detailing the schism between the elites in the Kremlin. He writes that this split is over the degree to which the Kremlin is willing to compromise with the middle class, continue its economic reforms, and tolerate media and popular dissent with the regime.  In this struggle in the Kremlin it is Putin v. Medvedev and their respective camps.  This particular conflict has likely been brewing behind the scenes for some time, but the position swapping of Putin and Medvedev in the most recent election seems to have exacerbated the tensions.

All of this serves as the backdrop for Russia's latest foreign policy moves vis-a-vis the United States.  According to Konstantin Von Eggert:

Russia became an irrelevant second-tier policy issue for the Americans quite some time ago. Until fairly recently, the Russian leadership had responded by using the so-called nuisance factor – i.e. making life difficult for the U.S. without crossing any red lines that might prompt an unpredictable U.S. reaction. No more. 

First by openly challenging the U.S. and the EU over Syria, and now by booting out an American government agency, Vladimir Putin has shown that he intends to turn this irrelevance to his regime's advantage and draw the red lines himself. 

He also demonstrated that his main policy concern is in fact domestic. Priority number one for Putin and his entourage is keeping his regime firmly in power and preventing development of the so-called Orange Scenario, along the lines of the peaceful 2004 revolution in Ukraine, which is widely perceived in Moscow to have been a Western plot to change the pro-Moscow regime there.

These domestic concerns also bear directly on the military and the military industrial complex in Russia.  One of the first items on Putin's agenda is the overhaul of Russia's defense sector.  This week he met with the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Defense industry, Dmitry Rozgin to push for modernization of the defense sector in Russia.

“This program must be tailored so that enterprises are modernized in parallel with the resolution of these social issues,” Putin said during a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.
Rogozin, who oversees the Russian defense industry, now faces the formidable task of streamlining weaponry development and production in the country. 

“This is an acute problem and you must take the appropriate steps in line with the state defense order,” Putin said. 

The president stressed the importance of direct support for the defense industry from both the state and the private sector. 

Russia’s defense industry brings together 1,353 organizations and companies in 64 regions of the country, and employs over 2 million people. 

The government has allocated 20 trillion rubles ($641 billion) to the comprehensive rearmament of Russia's Armed Forces. It is hoped this will see the share of modern weaponry reach 30% by 2015, with this figure rising to 70% by 2020. 

An additional 3 trillion rubles (approximately $100 bln) in public funds and about the same amount in private investment have been allocated to modernize the defense industry over the next decade.

These internal changes to Russia's defense industry will likely also affect Russia's foreign arms sales capabilities and priorities.  

"Private" Military Companies in Russia

The headline in my RSS feed from RIA Novosti made me think that Russia was going to privatize its military production.  It turns out that the "Private Military" companies would be state owned/sponsored private security forms on the order of Blackwater or whatever they are calling themselves these days:

The Russian government’s Military Industrial Commission may consider creating private military companies in Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said Wednesday. 

Russia’s significant economic interests abroad often operate in “difficult” conditions, and such companies would facilitate their work, said Rogozin, who oversees Russia's military-industrial complex. 

“We are thinking about whether our money should go toward financing foreign private security [and] military companies, or whether we should consider the feasibility of such companies in Russia itself,” he said.

 The article points out that such firms are useful for the US because it saves the government insurance money when people die on missions that are contracted to these firms rather than carried out by the military.  Insurance isn't a problem for the Russian military which doesn't really deal in such financial niceties according to Alexander Golt:

“In Russia, the state has practically no financial responsibility to the loss of military personnel.”

The question that remains for me is what affect such state-sponsored paramilitary firms would have on Russia's foreign policy actions.  It is plausible to think of such firms being hired by Assad, for instance, to perform various protective tasks, training, or necessary maintenance.  It would provide a bit of cover to Russia's government which could point to market principles and non-interference with private firms to justify unpopular foreign policy commitments.  This will definitely be an interesting area to watch in the coming years.

A Love Hate Relationship with R is Born

I am interested in arms transfers.  I am also interested in networks. In my dissertation I am combining those two interests.  I think that I am looking at some really cool relationships.  This is well and good. However, to do this fun research stuff I have had to leave my comfort zone of STATA and work in R.  Now I am fighting through the twin troubles of learning new software (and a language to code in) and learning new models.

I did a preliminary round of study to make sure that I could do this analysis in an advanced statistics class last semester.  Over the summer R changed versions. The package I use to do my ERGM analysis broke.  That package was updated.  Then my code broke and nothing worked the past two weeks as I have tried to get my analysis done for my dissertation.

After hours of frustrated Googling, I found a note on a blog (that I can't find a link to now... arrrrrgh!) about R namespaces and needing to remove the igraph and statnet packages and reinstall statnet first in order for it to work correctly.  I did this (without reinstalling igraph, just to be sure).  Now things run.  Now I can actually do analysis and not debugging and firefighting with the software.

Enough of the hate. I love Rstudio.  After running through some model specifications last night I decided to try out the knitr package. Awesome.  I still have a lot to learn to make things into real good documents and documentation of my analyses, but you can check out this link to my output for my test models here.

And here is a network graph of France's (egocentric) arms network during the 1950s.  The network is created from the main world network.  The world network accounts for all arms transactions from 1950 to 1959.  The sociomatrix shows a 1 if state i sold weapons to state j at any point during the 10 year window.

Created Using R. Data come from SIPRI.

Putting Dollars in STATA Graphics Titles

This post is mostly so I remember how to do this.

There is a problem that I run into a lot when I am plotting in STATA.  The $ symbol is used by STATA to call up various macros.  When you try to add it as a currency symbol in a graph title it ends up disappearing. Take, for instance the following code and its associated graphical output:

twoway dot percapmil id, mlabel(description) mlabpos(12)
scheme(s1mono)
xlabel(0(1)5)
ylabel(, angle(0))
xtitle("")
ytitle("$1000 US Per Military Personnel")
title("Per Capita (Mil. Personell) Spending of US and Russian Customers", size(medium))
subtitle("1992-2000 and 2001-2002")

Notice the y-axis label is missing the dollar sign.  I really want to emphasize the fact that the y axis represents money spent by states for defense.  How can I add the dollar sign to the graph?  This requires using a STATA Markup Control Language (SMCL) workaround.  

The modified code looks like this (just taking the relevant line of code):

ytitle("{c $|}1000 US Per Military Personnel")

With this modification the graph looks the way that I want it to. 

It's a little bit inconvenient to have to add the extra code {c $|} just to get the symbol to show up like it should, but once you know what the workaround is you can get your work done instead of endlessly Googling.  Now back to work.

Feudal Domains - Congress, the Military, and Arms Procurement

As part of my dissertation research I am examining the processes through which states make foreign policy decisions.  I am specifically interested in the policies that lead to the export of arms from one state to another. My dissertation focuses on this decision-making in the United States and Russia.  Today's reading of Chapter 5 of Richard Halloran's book To Arm a Nation proved to be a rich source of material.

This chapter focuses on the "Feudal Domains" within both the military and Congress which create unnecessary duplication of efforts in acquisition of arms.  The problems of acquisition are a result of turf battles within both institutions - Congress and the Military. The issue in Congress is the temptation to use the vast military budget to gain political advantage:

"Congress is the site of dozens of fiefs, each more concerned with its own turf....The primary reason is simple - money.  The military budget is so immense that everyone seeks to get as much of it as possible spent in his home state or election district." (Halloran 1986, 146-7)

Within the defense department, the problems come as a result of turf battles between powerful procurement chiefs that are exacerbated by the inter service rivalry within the military more generally.

"But the personnel fiefs are minor compared with those in the procurement of arms, equipment, vehicles ammunition, spare parts, and the vast storehouse of supplies for a modern military force.  It is surely the most divided and conflicting set of fiefs within the military establishment, rarely developing weapons that would be used by more than one service and hence could be produced economically." (Halloran 1986, 161)

Another point that is made by Halloran is of interest to those trying to research processes of decision making.   That is the difference between the people and the system.  He discusses some of the idiosyncrasies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He contends that they don't function well as advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.  The written reports and advice that comes from the Joint Chiefs is "...generally irrelevant, normally unread, and most always disregarded." (Halloran 1986, 163).  This is in contrast to informal meetings between the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense which were characterized by Harold Brown (President Carter's SECDEF).  Brown noted that these face-to-face meetings were "extremely helpful" (ibid).

Of particular interest to those interested in the processes leading to exports are the vignettes on page 170 of ways that Members of Congress push for extra production of weapons systems that benefit their district.

• Carl Levin (D, MI) - Pushes for an additional 120 M1 tanks (840 as opposed to the 720 requested by military)
• Howard Metzenbaum (D, OH) - critic of military spending but big supporter of the B1 bomber program because of the components made in Ohio.
• Sam Nunn (D, GA) - "respected for his evenhanded approach [to defense spending]" fought to have additional C5 aircraft built in Georgia even though the Army and Air Force favored a new plane.

In these cases it seems that there would be pressure from Congress to find foreign outlets for such weapons systems built in their home districts.  If we can sell such items to allies across the world, it is even better for the local economies that Members of Congress represent so fiercely.  Is that a reasonable assumption to make?  Can I think of this as one of the drivers of US arms export policy?

References

Halloran, Richard. To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America’s Endangered Defenses. 1st ed. Macmillan, 1986.

Bringing The War Home - Afghanistan, Georgia, the US and Russia's Reaction

The Russia-Georgia rift shows no sign of healing.  This piece provides an interesting twist to the arms transfer debate.  How much is a state's overall capability enhanced by bringing back the TOE equipment from a 940 person contingent back to Georgia?  Will those M4s and armored HMMWV (HUMVEES) really change the balance of power in the region?  Russia is worried enough about this possibility that they have actually filed a note at the US embassy.

The study of arms transfers will never be boring.  States attach too much significance to weapons to ever make them a purely economic commodity.

“We view it as a very significant issue that weapons used by Georgian troops in Afghanistan should not be supplied to Georgia,” Lukashevich said, adding that Saakashvili’s regime could use them against Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russian nationals residing there as well.

The spokesman also warned against any military cooperation with Tbilisi, citing “the grave consequences for global and Caucasus security” that can be caused by “Saakashvili’s unstable and irresponsible regime.”

Afghan Weapons Should be Kept Away from Georgia – Russian Foreign Ministry | World | RIA Novosti:

'via Blog this'

Odds and Ends: Russian Foreign Policy

I recommend all of Karaganov's columns for concise and clear analysis of Russian politics and for interesting policy prescriptions.  His latest article is no exception.  You can read the entire article by following the link below.

Russia's Luck Has Run Out Sergey Karaganov Russia has been unbelievably lucky in its relations with foreign powers over the past 12 years. But despite positive trends, things are looking less rosy on the country's domestic political front. Read more >

One item that Karaganov picks up on is one that is echoed in a column from Dmitri Trenin.  Karagonov writes: 

In terms of economic development, it is crucial that Russia link itself more closely to the Asian economic powers. This can be accomplished by developing Siberia and the Far East. Russia needs to attract huge foreign investment in the region's infrastructure, raw materials processing and timber. In return, Russia would need to provide highly favorable tax incentives and legal guarantees. 

To boost these efforts, the Kremlin should consider moving part of its functions to a major city in Siberia or the Far East — a "second capital" of sorts. For Russia to have any hope of rivaling Asia's spectacular rise, it would need a modern-day project on a par with the construction in the early 1700s of St. Petersburg, Peter the Great's "window to Europe." 

 Trenin writes (link to article here):

The chief new element in the relationship is easy to see. It is the historical role reversal. In 1979, China's gross domestic product was a mere 40 per cent of that of the Russian republic within the Soviet Union. Nowadays, China's GDP is between four and five times bigger than Russia's. At the heyday of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Soviet Union was a military superpower and the People's Liberation Army was essentially preparing for a "people's war". Today, China's defense budget is the world's second largest, way ahead of the 5th-placed Russia. Even more importantly, China's research and development budget dwarfs Russia's. Ultimately - Russians, who heretofore have never lived with a strong China, need to adjust to the new reality. 

For the Russians, of course, having refused in a previous era a junior partnership arrangement with the US, to run now into China's embrace would be not only bitter irony - but supreme folly. Right now, Moscow is busy to craft an Asia policy that is more than a China one. They are already reaching out to Japan, are strengthening relations with South Korea, and are revamping their long-time strategic bonds with India - by now much frayed. They are also seeking economic and security integration with Central Asia, which the Chinese are increasingly viewing as their own backyard.

The irony of Russia's focus on the west and missile shields and problems in Europe is that conflict with another state is more likely to come in one of the Central Asian republics with interference from China.  In terms of what I usually think about on this blog - how will these shifting alliances and economic development change the way that arms are sold throughout the world, and throughout this region?

"Why Does Russia Support Dictators?"

This article in RIA has an interesting take on Russia's stand in Syria. In it Fyoder Lykonov argues that Russia is just being consistent in its foreign policy on interventionism in general.

Is Russia's policy really that short-sighted? Its prospects for having influence in the Middle East look vague indeed. The reserve of confidence built up during the Soviet period has been depleted, and it is unclear whether today's Russia is ready to step out onto the global stage. But the rest of Russia's policy is not so unreasonable. 

Moscow has made it clear that bypassing legitimate measures is not an option, this just results in random actions like the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which everyone  now recognizes was a mistake. So others can either respect Russia’s opinion by taking a neutral stance on the conflict in Syria, or act at their own risk and peril, something which it appears no one is willing to do.

The focus is, of course, on Russia’s global status, but Moscow also wants to keep the door open for an alternative solution to be found. The only other option is a military and political tunnel which will inevitably lead to a war with international ramifications.

 I have no problem with the idea that Russia is acting on principle in the Syrian case.  It is clear that Russia is not opposed to states taking their own interests into their own hands - as in its dispute with Georgia a few years ago.  Those states will then need to deal with the fallout of their own actions. Russia is opposed to cloaking those interventions with international respectability.  While this is a perfectly valid worldview, and consistent with the premium that Moscow places on state sovereignty, it will not make Russia's adherence to the principle any easier, or any more palatable to the narrative of human rights and compassionate interventionism that is the basis of the dialogue in Syria presently. 

World Arms Network 1950 and 1975

I am starting work on my dissertation.  The first thing I needed to do was to get all of my arms transfer data into a form that I can work with it for network analysis.  That effort is going nicely.  I spent a little time today playing around with the graphs for the year 1950.  Here is the worldwide arms network for 1950:

I also ran a quick graph of the arms network in 1975.  The thing that jumps out is the difference in the number of states that are importing weapons.  The graph as an analytical tool is nearly useless given the crowded nature of the arms market.  This is why I have to utilize real Social Network Analysis tools to get at the questions I really want to answer.  Graphs are fun, though.