A recent story about Bulgaria’s dilemma in upgrading its MiG aircraft illustrates the difficulty of moving out of a long-term arms relationship. The issue is that Bulgaria is part of NATO, but that its aircraft are out of date. Bulgaria can’t afford to change its total air force. There are numerous costs involved in such a potential shift, both directly and indirectly. Direct costs include the cost of purchasing new aircraft and paying for training for pilots of the new versions of aircraft. Some of the indirect costs are the loss of expertise and experience that are necessary for competence in war-fighting.
Since MiGs are Russian-made, to upgrade them usually requires Russian involvement. In this case, the Bulgarian government is considering using a Polish firm which upgraded Polish MiGs a few years ago when Poland faced a similar dilemma. In this case, Bulgaria can bypass potential issues by using an ally country.
What if Poland was not an option? The relations between Russia and the West have changed dramatically over the past decade. A decade is not a long time in the life-cycle of a major conventional weapon like a fighter jet or tank. Changing suppliers is hard - even when the geopolitical environment has been fundamentally altered.
What can this episode teach us about the arms-buying relationship? First of all, the decision about suppliers is one that cannot be taken lightly by states - especially states that have real security needs. Secondly, once that decision is made, it is quite sticky, and that has consequences. These consequences are visible across a number of different domains.
In terms of security, purchasing arms from a supplier makes it harder to fight against that supplier later. This is due to the intimate knowledge that the supplying country will have with the strengths and weaknesses of the system due to firsthand experience. It likely means (in the case of aircraft) that battles will hinge on the better trained military, and the resource imbalance that leads to exports vs. imports should normally provide an advantage here to the exporting rather than the importing state.
Also important in terms of security are the technological issues of supply of replacement parts, a maintenance program and the ability to upgrade equipment on a reasonable schedule. Exporting states will have the advantage also in updating and improving the performance of the weapon system.
There is also another potential strategic advantage to the selling state. The move to a new supplier is a potential indicator of future intentions or at least the assessment of the state about the potential for conflict in the future. This offers an early warning advantage to the state providing arms. It can also offer a first mover advantage in terms of conflict.
Even if a move from one supplier to another is not the result of strategic fears in the short and medium terms, the shift in relationships can be a powerful indicator about the status of the relations between the supplying and recipient states. The sale of arms between states is a gamble always because once a state acquires weapons they can only be eliminated after the passage of a long amounts of time or through costly war.
Because I am interested in the social relationship that is created and maintained by arms sales, such demonstrations of both interdependence and vulnerability provide fascinating insights into the potential mechanisms for studying and understanding interstate relations more completely.
Since MiGs are Russian-made, to upgrade them usually requires Russian involvement. In this case, the Bulgarian government is considering using a Polish firm which upgraded Polish MiGs a few years ago when Poland faced a similar dilemma. In this case, Bulgaria can bypass potential issues by using an ally country.
What if Poland was not an option? The relations between Russia and the West have changed dramatically over the past decade. A decade is not a long time in the life-cycle of a major conventional weapon like a fighter jet or tank. Changing suppliers is hard - even when the geopolitical environment has been fundamentally altered.
What can this episode teach us about the arms-buying relationship? First of all, the decision about suppliers is one that cannot be taken lightly by states - especially states that have real security needs. Secondly, once that decision is made, it is quite sticky, and that has consequences. These consequences are visible across a number of different domains.
In terms of security, purchasing arms from a supplier makes it harder to fight against that supplier later. This is due to the intimate knowledge that the supplying country will have with the strengths and weaknesses of the system due to firsthand experience. It likely means (in the case of aircraft) that battles will hinge on the better trained military, and the resource imbalance that leads to exports vs. imports should normally provide an advantage here to the exporting rather than the importing state.
Also important in terms of security are the technological issues of supply of replacement parts, a maintenance program and the ability to upgrade equipment on a reasonable schedule. Exporting states will have the advantage also in updating and improving the performance of the weapon system.
There is also another potential strategic advantage to the selling state. The move to a new supplier is a potential indicator of future intentions or at least the assessment of the state about the potential for conflict in the future. This offers an early warning advantage to the state providing arms. It can also offer a first mover advantage in terms of conflict.
Even if a move from one supplier to another is not the result of strategic fears in the short and medium terms, the shift in relationships can be a powerful indicator about the status of the relations between the supplying and recipient states. The sale of arms between states is a gamble always because once a state acquires weapons they can only be eliminated after the passage of a long amounts of time or through costly war.
Because I am interested in the social relationship that is created and maintained by arms sales, such demonstrations of both interdependence and vulnerability provide fascinating insights into the potential mechanisms for studying and understanding interstate relations more completely.
No comments:
Post a Comment