Arms transfers and the politics and relationships that surround them are everywhere when you are tuned in to them. I know that I suffer from an extreme case of selective attention in the case of arms transfers, but I find them fascinating to think about. I am constantly surprised both by how much we think about arms transfers in terms of human rights and foreign policy, but how little we actually think about the strategic logic of transferring coercive capabilities between states. It is an area that is deeply in need of theorizing, and that is what I've taken as my central research task.
This week I had a few stories pop up in my news feed that reinforce the social and political nature of arms transfers. The first one is one that I find very fascinating - it is the case of Turkey ordering S-400 missiles from Russia. The original sale is problematic from the point of view of NATO since the S-400 is designed to shoot down NATO aircraft. The symbolic move of Turkey away from NATO suppliers to Russia also signaled some deeper trends in the fracturing relationship between Erdogan and the West as a whole.
I wrote about that sale in more detail earlier this year on this blog (LINK) and focused on the aspect that this particular sale may be an interesting case of a leading indicator that can be used to predict a state's alliance and ideological affiliation in the future. One aspect that I didn't think of was the current state of Russian-Western relations and the fact that Russia faces sanctions. The US is telling Turkey along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to back out of the purchase of these missiles from Russia or face the threat of sanctions themselves. LINK
In terms of the sanctions regime, it makes sense that explicitly military goods would be at the top of the list of sanctioned goods. The fact that these arms are being considered by US allies is potentially troubling in and of itself in terms of what it may mean about the strength of trust between these states and the US in terms of security guarantees.
The second story that caught my eye was the potential for Ukraine to jointly produce armored vehicles with Thailand (LINK). An article by Vucetic and Tago (2015) that I recently discovered (via Twitter) does a very good job of outlining the trade-off between autonomy and efficiency in the acquisition of arms. It is most efficient to purchase arms off the shelf, but that leaves a state vulnerable to pressure from the selling state (which is the subject of the first part of this post). It is costly and inefficient from an economic standpoint.
What I found fascinating was the description of the meeting between the delegation from Thailand who came to Kyiv as part of bilateral talks between the nation. The talks between the delegations are about strategic partnerships. One way that is being considered to increase that partnership is to go into the business of arms together. One aspect of arms transfers that has been interesting to me since I started researching them 8 years ago is the high level of discussions that are involved in these purchases and how often heads of state or with cabinet/department level heads.
The building of relationships through the transfer of weapons often seems to be part of an elaborate trust exercise. I love the idea of Suchman and Eyre (1992) and their institutional logic of arms transfers, but I think that the social aspect of states bargaining and building relations based on arms tells an even deeper and surprising story. It's a story that I'm happy to keep chipping away at.
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This week I had a few stories pop up in my news feed that reinforce the social and political nature of arms transfers. The first one is one that I find very fascinating - it is the case of Turkey ordering S-400 missiles from Russia. The original sale is problematic from the point of view of NATO since the S-400 is designed to shoot down NATO aircraft. The symbolic move of Turkey away from NATO suppliers to Russia also signaled some deeper trends in the fracturing relationship between Erdogan and the West as a whole.
I wrote about that sale in more detail earlier this year on this blog (LINK) and focused on the aspect that this particular sale may be an interesting case of a leading indicator that can be used to predict a state's alliance and ideological affiliation in the future. One aspect that I didn't think of was the current state of Russian-Western relations and the fact that Russia faces sanctions. The US is telling Turkey along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to back out of the purchase of these missiles from Russia or face the threat of sanctions themselves. LINK
In terms of the sanctions regime, it makes sense that explicitly military goods would be at the top of the list of sanctioned goods. The fact that these arms are being considered by US allies is potentially troubling in and of itself in terms of what it may mean about the strength of trust between these states and the US in terms of security guarantees.
The second story that caught my eye was the potential for Ukraine to jointly produce armored vehicles with Thailand (LINK). An article by Vucetic and Tago (2015) that I recently discovered (via Twitter) does a very good job of outlining the trade-off between autonomy and efficiency in the acquisition of arms. It is most efficient to purchase arms off the shelf, but that leaves a state vulnerable to pressure from the selling state (which is the subject of the first part of this post). It is costly and inefficient from an economic standpoint.
What I found fascinating was the description of the meeting between the delegation from Thailand who came to Kyiv as part of bilateral talks between the nation. The talks between the delegations are about strategic partnerships. One way that is being considered to increase that partnership is to go into the business of arms together. One aspect of arms transfers that has been interesting to me since I started researching them 8 years ago is the high level of discussions that are involved in these purchases and how often heads of state or with cabinet/department level heads.
The building of relationships through the transfer of weapons often seems to be part of an elaborate trust exercise. I love the idea of Suchman and Eyre (1992) and their institutional logic of arms transfers, but I think that the social aspect of states bargaining and building relations based on arms tells an even deeper and surprising story. It's a story that I'm happy to keep chipping away at.
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Suchman, Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. (1992) Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation. Sociological Forum 7: 137–161.
Vucetic, Srdjan, and Atsushi Tago. (2015) Why Buy American? The International Politics of Fighter Jet Transfers. Canadian Journal of Political Science 48: 101–124.
