Review of "Soviet Leaders and Intelligence"

Raymond L. Garthoff

Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War

Georgetown University Press

2015

ISBN:978-1-62616-229-7

160 Pages

$26.95

Books on intelligence history often get bogged down in details.  Books on history, and especially on historical leaders, are often ignorant of the details of intelligence that could add depth to their analyses.  Soviet Leaders and Intelligence is a book that avoids both of these problems.  This slim volume eschews pages of details about intelligence minutia and instead focuses on the issue of leader assessment of the US within the context of intelligence collection and analysis. While it is a slim book, it has within it a great deal to offer to scholars of not only intelligence, but of Cold War History, foreign policy, and diplomacy.  It is also a book that will be of interest to general audiences who are interested in the Cold War, Soviet history, and US-Soviet relations.

Garthoff’s study of the way that Soviet leaders view intelligence is situated squarely within the context of the Cold War.  Garthoff does this in two ways. First he outlines the geopolitical causes of the Cold War between the two states.  Second, he outlines the way that ideology on the part of the Soviet leaders both exacerbated tensions and shaded their perceptions of the United States, its intentions, and its actions.  This primary context of the book is the thread that ties together each of the chapter vignettes.  The book itself is arranged so that each Soviet leader – from Stalin through Gorbachev has his own chapter (with the exception of Andropov and Chernenko, whose short tenures were such that they are simply appended to Brezhnev and Gorbachev respectively).

One of the key insights of this book is the individual insights into the worldview of each of the Soviet leaders. Stalin, for instance, relied on personal relationships and his own analysis of the world, eschewing the analysis of intelligence and diplomatic personnel.  In the case of Stalin, his own isolation led to misconceptions and a belligerence toward the west, western media, and western leaders (Garthoff 2015, 3). Like Stalin, Khrushchev’s view of the United States was not affected by the intelligence provided to him (Garthoff 2015, 25), but he was also able to learn from early mistakes and bluffs against Kennedy.  Khrushchev was affected by his own experiences visiting America and his meetings with two presidents.  He credited President Kennedy for bringing more caution to the tone which the United States used in describing the Soviet Union (Garthoff 2015, 34).

The lesson that comes across throughout the book, however, is just how little the leaders of the Soviet Union heeded intelligence estimates.  Garthoff (2015, 75) describes how Gorbachev’s own worldview evolved:

As had occurred with his predecessors, personal contact and communication with a literally personified ‘adversary’ brought about changed perceptions and new policies.

The shifting attitudes of Gorbachev are contrasted with the continued negative view of US actions by the KGB and GRU led to what Garthoff (2015, 84) characterizes as an “intelligence war” between the US and Soviet intelligence services.  This intelligence war did not affect Gorbachev, and in fact his “…early interest in intelligence reports quickly declined” (Garthoff 2015, 85).

The politicization of intelligence, and intelligence skewed by a heavy ideological bias diminished the utility of that intelligence to the state leaders.  In the case of Stalin, the bias came from the top, by the time that Gorbachev had taken power, it had moved to the intelligence services.  The end result was that intelligence lost its consumers, the intelligence services lost their taskings, was cut out of the feedback loop, and ultimately lost its relationships with the Central Committee and its staffs (Garthoff 2015, 87).

These descriptions of the troubled relationship between intelligence services and the leaders that they are meant to represent touch on issues that are relevant to scholars and policy-makers today. The possible lessons from these vignettes are manifold, but I focus on two central themes that are of particular import.  The first is on the importance of leaders and leadership perceptions.

A great deal of scholarship in foreign policy analysis is focused on the assessment of state leaders. This scholarship began in the intelligence analysis community and moved into more general scholarship later.  The work of Leites (1953) was the first to really delve into issues of leader perception.  Later work on the operational code has yielded interesting insights into the worldviews of state leaders (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999; George 1969; Schafer and Walker 2006).  While Garthoff focuses on historical figures and accounts of their perceptions, other scholars have attempted to ascertain the operational code of current Russian leader, Vladimir Putin (Dyson 2001).

The tie between Putin’s own intelligence career and subsequent rise to the top of Russian politics is even more interesting when considered in tandem with the insights made by Garthoff. Yuri Andropov was also a career KGB officer.  His own use of intelligence and the coloring of his worldview based on his intelligence training was a key component of his views of the United States. Two important points are raised in connection to Andropov’s own intelligence services worldview. The first of these is in connection with the downing of KAL 007 in August 1983. After Reagan strongly condemned the Soviets, Andropov responded by describing the incident as a provocation organized by US intelligence services (Garthoff 2015, 66–67). He connected the US aggressive tactics as a conscientious attempt to provoke the Soviets into shooting down the civilian airliner. This tendency to view the world in terms of information and misinformation, of plots, purpose, and of propaganda makes cooperation very difficult.

The second point that is raised concerning the tenure of Andropov is the increased cooperation between security services during his tenure.  The “Gavrilov channel” was opened to create a telephone hotline to arrange meetings between the intelligence services of both states during periods of tension.  The channel allowed both sides, during a period of intense hostility, to meet secretly “without political posturing” to seek clarifications and dispel misperceptions (Garthoff 2015, 70).

Doctored Intelligence and ISIS, is this a Crisis?

Why don’t political scientists study intelligence as part of other issues? That is a longer post for a different day and the subject of a paper that I currently have under review at a journal. For today, though, I am interested in the potential for politicization of intelligence processes.

This is in the news again.  A few months ago a news story caught my eye about the fact that intelligence analysts at CENTCOM were being asked to change their assessments about ISIS (A good recap of the controversy is here).  The story is in the news again after the Paris attacks and the new conflagration that is occurring in Syria presently.

Analysts assert that they were asked to tone down assessments that the Islamic State was growing in strength despite the coalition actions against them.

Among the complaints is that after the U.S. air campaign started in August 2014, the metrics to measure progress changed. They were modified to use measures such as the number of sorties and body counts -- a metric not used since the Vietnam War -- to paint a more positive picture. 

Critics say this "activity-based approach" to tracking the effectiveness of strikes does not paint a comprehensive picture of whether ISIS is being degraded and contained.

President Obama has responded to the allegations and said that he doesn't think that the White House has been kept in the dark about the nature of ISIS, and that the administration didn't want intelligence "shaded by politics."

Whether or not President Obama was directly involved in ordering intelligence to be "softened politically" is not the question.  The question is how any president can expect to get unvarnished intelligence when the incentives are built into the system to give information to the boss that things are going well.

In a recent book, Garthoff (2015)[1] explores the relationship between Soviet Leaders and Intelligence.  One of the key points of his book is that Soviet leaders relied on their own conceptions of the main adversary (the US) in evaluating intelligence.  Even if a system exists to funnel "pure intelligence" to a leader, his or her particular lens on the world will always affect the interpretation, and subsequent decisions based on that intelligence.  One of the fundamental questions about foreign policy is whether or not states behave as rational actors.  This depends on whether or not individuals act rationally. Theories of satisficing, of using heuristics to make decisions rather than carefully exploring all options helps us to understand behavior quite well.  If we truly want to understand how intelligence works, we need to understand not only the processes by which it is produced, but the processes by which it is consumed.

In the case of the CENTCOM reports, if the President was given access to the raw intelligence, it is unlikely that the doctored reports made that much difference in national-level decision making.  However, having reports that show success may change the calculus at the operational level, leading to poor strategic outcomes.

One of the other lessons from Garthoff was that Soviet leaders could not rely on intelligence assessment from the KGB and GRU precisely because those organizations were expressly ideological and their assessments were not objective enough to provide clear guidance for decision-making. If the US Intelligence Community (IC) becomes similarly politicized it will lead to marginalization of that government function.

From a bureaucratic survival perspective, then, it is is probably in the best interest of the IC to be (or at least appear to be) politically neutral and ideology free.  The short-term gains in political favor will lead to long-term decline in the political power of the institution.

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[1] Garthoff, Raymond. 2015. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War. Georgetown University Press.

MH17 And Ukraine - Obfuscation and Domestic Audiences

One theory that about Russia's involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is that its involvement got heavier after the downing of Malaysian flight 17 by the rebels.  Russia's increased involvement was not due to wanting more territory, but out of fear of what the rebels that they had released and enabled would do to Russia's reputation if left unchecked.  After the bloodless coup and takeover of Crimea, the events in Eastern Ukraine got very bad very quickly.  The downing of the flight was a PR nightmare.

The Dutch issued a report on the event this week that identifies the missile that took down the plane as a BUK missile.  The report is thorough and took a year to compile because of the many technical difficulties in obtaining the plane, and analyzing the data.  RFE/RL has some great articles on how this report has been obfuscated, ignored, and fought by the Russian propaganda machine at every turn.

A great aspect of the reporting is the step-by-step account of how the Dutch investigators rebuffed Russian efforts to soften language (LINK):

Appendices published (here and here) with the Dutch Safety Board’s report show that Russia attempted to convince investigators to invoke "other scenarios," such as the possibility that Flight MH17 was struck by an air-to-air missile. 

Critics have accused Moscow of floating the air-to-air-missile and other theories in order to deflect attention from substantial evidence indicating the Boeing 777 was downed by a Russian-made surface-to-air missile system known as a Buk, fired from an area controlled by pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. 

But the documents released with the report show that, behind the scenes, the Dutch Safety Board also rejected alternative scenarios proposed by Russia as essentially baseless before concluding that a Buk missile exploded next to the Boeing 777 and sent it crashing to the ground, killing all 298 people on board. 

With arcane discussions of physics, telemetry, and military technology, the conclusions of the 15-month investigation largely match up with theories put forth by Ukraine, the United States, and other nations.

Read the full article with the full outline of the charges and counter-charges.

Another interesting development is that the Buk manufacturer immediately put out their own report denying the Dutch version (LINK):

The Russian company that manufactures the Buk ground-to-air missile system plans to issue a report on the July 2014 downing of a Malaysian Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine on October 13, the same day the Dutch Safety Board plans to issue the results of its investigation into the incident. 

Almaz-Antei said in a press release on October 8 that it had carried out the detonation of a Buk missile under a decommissioned Boeing passenger jet in a "life-scale, real-time" experiment as part of its investigation into the disaster. 

The company said that preliminary results from the experiment support the conclusions that the firm presented in June -- namely, that the plane was shot down by a Buk missile fired from territory controlled by the Ukrainian military. 

This has now become a he-said, she-said battle over telemetry and math.  The upshot is that with the competing claims, Russia can still deny its involvement in the incident, even if other evidence points to that very involvement (LINK LINK).

If Moscow is really hoping only to keep its own citizens convinced that it is not operating in Ukraine - it seems to be working.  Follow this link to see responses to the BUK report by Muscovites.

Russia and Ukraine Links - Tanks and Missile Launchers Edition

A few weeks ago I put up some links about Russia and Ukraine (LINK).  I am adding to that collection again today. 

Russian tanks in the crisis (LINK).  It is getting harder and harder for Russia to deny that it is materially supporting the rebels in the breakaway region.  The article is a fascinating study in the use of open sources and social media to gather intelligence.  While this intelligence can be shared easily, since it doesn't involve disclosing classified sources or methods, the danger is that it feeds into the narrative of the Kremlin about US misinformation and propaganda regarding its role. Winning the propaganda game is very difficult for the defensive side. Not only are Russian tanks being used, but the training and showmanship associated with Russia.  Russia has been running tank olympics for the past few years, and the rebels did the same thing with their tanks a few weeks ago (LINK).



The same group that is finding evidence of Russian tanks and soldiers in Ukraine is releasing evidence of Russia's BUK missiles being used to shoot down the Malaysian Airlines jet in July 2014. (LINK).

Bellingcat, which analyzes information available on the Internet, said on October 8 that the Buk antiaircraft system involved in the incident can be traced from the Russian city of Kursk in June 2014 to a field outside the Ukrainian town of Snizhne in Donetsk Oblast on the day of the flight MH17 disaster. 

The next day, the launcher from the same Buk system -- with only three missiles instead of the normal compliment of four -- was documented to be near the Russian border in Luhansk Oblast, the report says. 

"We have looked at all the open-source investigation we've done over the last 18 months and it seems a pretty firm conclusion that the Russian military provided the missile launcher that shot down MH17, that the missile was launched from outside of Snizhne," Bellingcat founder and director Eliot Higgins says. "And we were able to track the Buk missile launcher back to the actual unit who provided it, the 53rd Brigade." 

Higgins added that Bellingcat has forwarded information about the individual members of the 53rd Brigade who might have been involved in shooting down MH17 to authorities investigating the incident.

 Is it any wonder that Ukraine now views Moscow as the main aggressor in their new military doctrine (LINK)? I mentioned in an earlier post about Russia's involvement in Syria that Putin is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy about the encirclement of Russia by NATO (LINKhttp://grimyard.blogspot.com/2015/10/russia-and-syria-arms-related-issues.html). He has only himself to blame.

Arms Procurement Links: Japan Jumps in and India Sinking

One area that I neglected (out of ignorance and not deliberately) in my dissertation was the effect of domestic arms arms procurement procedures on arms exports and imports.  This is an area that I covered recently in a course that I am teaching on the Politics of Arms in International Relations.  I think that I have been primed to see problems of acquisitions because of the readings that we did in class - along with my own personal epiphany about the lack of such thinking in my earlier work. At the bottom of this post I'll post the readings that I had my class look at that turned my own view on the subject.  First, however, I am linking to two stories about domestic arms acquisitions that caught my attention in the past few weeks.

1. Japan to Launch a Defense Procurement Agency (LINK)

Japan's Ministry of Defense will use its new constitutional powers to set up an agency to manage international trade of weapons and military equipment. 

The ministry confirmed with IHS Jane's that the new agency will be named the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, and will begin operations on October 1. 

The agency's key objectives will include promoting international cooperation on the procurement of defense equipment, enhancing project management, and enhancing development for Japanese defense production and technology bases. 

The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency is set to become one of the most powerful wings of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, and will employ 1,800 people.

It is interesting to think that Japan did not have this agency earlier.  The country obviously has the capacity to engage in defense acquisitions, but those functions were not concentrated in a ministry that was part of the defense establishment.  This new move may not necessarily make acquisition more rational (Caverley and Kapstein), but it will make the Ministry of Defense more powerful.  This will be an interesting subject to follow over the next few years.

2. India's acquisitions process is corrupt and broken (LINK)

In a long and interesting story, the details of India's decades-long failure to replace its rapidly aging and diminished artillery is still not complete.  Problems of corruption meant that the acquisition agency changed its rules.  These rules have negative consequences:

The other problem involved India’s Ministry of Defence. India’s defense procurement establishment has shown an extreme risk-averse behavior and Defense India observes external link that when a competition devolves to a single-vendor solution, the practice is often to re-tender. Soltam and Denel’s exit left just BAE Bofors, until they, too were eliminated by allegations that Bofors had paid INR 640 million (about $16 million) in bribes, trying to secure the order. 

The net effect of corporate blacklists, plus single-vendor prohibitions, is a process that can’t field equipment to India’s military when it’s needed – and sometimes ever. Unfortunately for India’s front-line soldiers, their need for working artillery hasn’t changed.

Things only got worse and weirder.  I recommend that you read the entire article.  The more I think that I understand the dynamics of the arms trade, the more new information like this appears.  I guess I should be happy that there is still plenty of research for me out there!

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Class readings related to (at least tangentially) to domestic arms acquisition processes:

Kovacic, William E., and Dennis E. Smallwood. 1994. “Competition Policy, Rivalries, and
Defense Industry Consolidation.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(4): 91-110.

Mayer, Kenneth R., and Anne M. Khademian. 1996. “Bringing Politics Back in: Defense Policy and the Theoretical Study of Institutions and Processes.” Public Administration Review
56(2): 180-90.

Pearson, Frederic S. 1989. “The Correlates of Arms Importation.” Journal of Peace Research
26(2): 153-63.

Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2012. “Arms Away.” Foreign Affairs 91(5):
125-32.

Qingmin, Zhang. 2006. “The Bureaucratic Politics of US Arms Sales to Taiwan.” The
Chinese Journal of International Politics 1(2): 231-65.

Smith, Ron, Anthony Humm, and Jacques Fontanel. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting
Arms.” Journal of Peace Research 22(3): 239-47.

Humor - More F-35s and Photoshop!

US Air Force photo.

Pentagon Requests 500 Gold-Plated F-35s

Read more: http://www.duffelblog.com/2015/09/pentagon-requests-500-gold-plated-f-35s/#ixzz3o2uHjFdN

This added to the Red Baron (LINK) post from a few weeks ago made my day!



The barrage of photoshop memes in response to REN-TV in Russia photoshopping the US Ambassador onto a Kremlin protest is hilarious.

Russia and Syria - Arms Related Issues

Russia is now involved in the war in Syria.  Air strikes and naval bombardment along with cruise missile launches, along with the addition of ground troops as advisers is serious business.  The potential for adverse international incidents has increased.  The fighting in Ukraine is contained.  The fighting in Syria is taking place in the context of continued Western and US airstrikes.  The potential for a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia is higher than it has been for a long time.

I am interested in Russia's endgame here.  I am curious as to what Putin thinks he will gain. I just started reading a great book that analyzes Putin's actions, and this quote really jumped out at me:

"...we cannot take any story or so called fact at face value when it comes to Vladimir Putin ... we are dealing with someone who is a master at manipulating information, suppressing information, and creating pseudo-information...In today's world of social media, the public has the impression that we know, or can easily know, everything about everybody.  Nothing, it seems, is private or secret.  And still, after 15 years, we remain ignorant of some of the most basic facts about a man who is arguably the most powerful individual in the world, the leader of an important nation.  When there is no certifiably real and solid information, any tidbit becomes precious." [1]

This jumped out to me again when I watched the Daily Vertical podcast about Putin challenging the western world's way of thinking and facts (LINK).  While I don't think I have any really new insights into what Russia is doing and thinking, I can at least make some observations about the effects of what they are doing in an area that I do have some insights into: arms transfers.

Negative and Potential Negative Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

I have already covered the issue of the Mistral ships.  Russia lost these ships as a direct result of their actions in Ukraine.  The latest word is that Egypt is going to purchase these ships, which is good for France (LINK). Is there a potential that Russia will lose out on other purchases?  Yes, but Russia doesn't import a lot of equipment, so for them, this is just a temporary setback.

The more serious setback for Russia would be if states began cancelling orders for weapons after seeing their actions.  This is a real possibility.  Turkey is very upset at Russia over incursions into its air space as Russia began its air actions over Syria.  This has already had an effect on a joint pipeline project (LINK), and has the potential to damage other relations.  Russia and Turkey have cooperated on helicopter manufacturing in the past (a case study from my dissertation), and if Turkey sees Russia becoming a security risk, it will likely move away from such relations.

The performance of Russian equipment in Syria is also a potential negative side effect.  If Russian equipment performs poorly (like reports of four cruise missiles crashing in Iran instead of hitting targets in Syria (LINK)), then potential customers may decide to look for other options.

Potential Positive Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

There are two potential positive consequences of Russian actions in Syria from the point of view of Russian arms sales. The first is the converse of the last point made above: positive performance by Russian equipment is free advertising for Russian arms.  Seeing weapons tested in combat and working is a great selling point to potential customers.

Other current and potential customers will take note of the point above and may also see the arms relationship becoming a proxy for more formal alliances, thus making continued arms purchases, or new arms purchases more attractive to buyers.  Venezuela recently expanded its arms deal with Russia (LINK), as has Thailand (LINK).  Interestingly, the deal with Thailand appears to be a barter deal for rubber.  This could be an effect of sanctions.  Thailand has been diversifying its arms portfolio in recent years.

Potential Positive Effects for US Arms Sales

For the US, Russia being seen as an aggressor may potentially make arms sales to neighboring states a higher priority.  States will see this as a way to further integrate with existing US-led defense pacts (NATO), and a way to strengthen and emphasize military ties. Norway, for instance, recently added more planes to its F-35 order because of Russian aggression and escalation in the Baltic and North Sea areas (LINK).  This will be dependent on whether states are satisfied with US military hardware, however, which in some recent cases doesn't appear to be the case (LINK).

Other Geopolitical Consequences

Just because I am not going to spend time trying to figure out Putin's motivations, does not mean that I won't point out some geopolitical consequences of Russian military adventurism. The most obvious is that Russia's fears of NATO are now becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as NATO moves to bolster its powers along Russia's borders and to strengthen commitments to states bordering Russia's active military adventures (Poland, Turkey) (LINK).  It is also leading, it appears, to a strengthening of the US resolve on the issue of Ukraine (LINK).

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[1] Hill, Fiona and Clifford G. Gaddy. 2015. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution. p 7.

The Politics and Economics of Arms Sales

I have been doing a lot of thinking lately about the nexus between the politics and the economics of arms sales.  It is a question that lies at the heart of my dissertation, but one which is mostly inadequately appreciated by both economists and political scientists.  I had my class (Politics of Arms in International Relations) read some pieces this week which relate to this decision-making nexus and it has brought some of these issues back to the forefront in my own thinking.

First off is a great quote from Smith, Dunn, and Fontanel (1985) about the problems of politics in the transfer of arms [1]. (Emphasis is mine)

"Although arms transfers comprise a significant component of world trade, they have received little attention from mainstream economists.  This partly reflects the data difficulties which inhibit accurate estimation and quantification, and partly the contamination of the topic by political and strategic elements beyond the economists' expertise."

The idea that an issue is contaminated by political and strategic elements is an interesting perspective of political science.  It is refreshing to see economists admit that there may be something that is beyond their expertise as well!

Smith et al (1985) argue that there are three primary reasons for states to wish to sell weapons:

1.     Strategic: governments wish to maintain an indigenous arms industry ins order to ensure weapons designed exactly to their requirements, national independence of supply, and access to the latest military technology. There is an incentive to export, even if exports are below the average cost. (242-3)
2.     Political leverage in foreign policy: nation can assist their "friends" by strengthening their military position while at the same time having potential to influence their behavior (Kinsella tie-in) or that there is a prohibition that weapons not used aggressively or for internal repression (tie-in with Blanton). (243)
3.     Economic benefits: these include technological spin-offs, employment benefits, economic momentum (243-44)

Caverley and Kapstein [2] look at similar arguments in the case of the United States arms production. They argue that the US lost its advantage in arms exports because of the domestic demands of the pentagon.  The penchant for the US military to ask for the nicest, highest spec equipment means that the finished product is priced out of range for non-domestic buyers.  They give the example of the F-35, which was designed to be a low-cost high tech fighter that would be good enough for most missions and which would be eminently exportable.  The rising costs of that aircraft have meant that many staunch allies have reduced or cancelled orders for the aircraft. The increased design specifications have made the aircraft less suitable for the domestic role that it was originally meant to fill.

This is an interesting dilemma.  The world's superpower which has the advantage of a strong domestic market is being squeezed out because of the unrealistic demands of that same market. This echoes the findings of Smith and colleagues in the case of decreased military spending by Britain, GDR, and the US means fewer exports, while the opposite was true for France and Italy.  They note that it was the civilian oversight of the procurement process in those states - with an eye toward exports - that caused this result.

I had some articles in my newsfeed about aircraft sales that made me think of these arguments today.

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Links

First F-35 built in Europe goes for its maiden Flight: LINK

Making F-35s more quickly can lead to problems: LINK

Kuwait is buying the Eurofighter.  LINK

Brazil is buying a Swedish fighter: LINK  LINK2

__________________________
REFERENCES

[1] Smith, Ron, Anthony Humm, and Jacques Fontanel. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting Arms.” Journal of Peace Research 22(3): 239–47.
[2] Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2012. “Arms Away.” Foreign Affairs 91(5): 125–32.

Arms related Humor

There are two pieces that I've seen in the past week or so that have me laughing.  The first is from the Onion, which is always fun.  The headline is the funniest part:

Lockheed Martin Sales Staff Instructed To Really Push Tactical Air-To-Surface Missiles This Week

and here is one of the quotes from the article:

“Do whatever it takes to unload this stuff: place a few cold calls to foreign defense agencies, offer to throw in a couple Stalker drones for free. I don’t care what you have to do, just so long as we can hit our numbers and make way for the anti-aircraft shipments we’ve got coming in at the end of the month.” 

Pure awesomeness! LINK

From Duffel Blog

For Sale: AGM-114K Hellfire Missile, Slightly Damaged. Asking $1000 OBO. Location: Fort Drum, NY LINK

And my personal favorite (with picture!)

Lockheed Upbeat Despite F-35 Losing Dogfight To Red Baron

LINK to the hilarious full post.

More Arms Round Up - Strategic Bombers and Navy for Russia and United States

US Aircraft News

I have been following the development of the F-35 with interest for the past few years.  It represents a new way of building aircraft, but seems like it may be a model that is not sustainable, or feasible.  I didn't know the US was looking at creating a third generation strategic bomber, but that seems to be the case.  This article gives some details about the development and testing of this new aircraft.  It will be some time before it is ready for production - if it is chosen as an option.  LINK  LINK2

US most Advanced Fighters, the F-22 raptor, deployed (kind of) to Europe as a reassurance against more aggressive Russian maneuvers in Europe's airspace.  The problem with this power projection is the weakness that it represents because of the low numbers of aircraft in service. LINK

Russian Bombers and MiGs

Meanwhile, Russia's strategic bombers the TU-160 is being modernized.  LINK  With new avionics: LINK

Russia's new smart bombs to go on those updated bombers. LINK

Russian MiGs owned by Bulgaria to be repaired in Poland.  LINK

This is a fascinating look at dependence (my students will have read Kinsella (1998) and should know about dependence) and using an outside state to provide maintenance.  This can't be good for Russia's long-term arms sales.  I am wondering about the long-term implications for arms sales if the supplier is seen as being too pushy.  That's a take on things that I don't think I've seen in the literature before.

Ukraine Crisis News Roundup

Background

I have been working on a paper about covert action.  The paper relies on an extended case study of Russia's various actions in Ukraine since the crisis began in November 2013.  I lived in Ukraine from April 1998 through February 2000 and spent most of my time (12 months) in Donetsk.  I spent another three months in Gorlovka and the remainder of my time in Zaporozhye.  The war in Ukraine is one that has touched the lives of people that I know and love.  My wife is from Russia and my mother-in-law still lives in Russia.  I get a lot of different views on the war living in Kazakhstan and watching Russian news and hearing my students' views of the events.

I won't outline my paper here in full, but the main argument is that states will react to revelations of their covert actions in different ways depending on whether the action was covert to protect the regime from internal pressures, or covert to avoid problems with external states.  I believe that the events in the Donbass have followed a pattern of deliberate misinformation by the Russian state to its own people primarily because Russian involvement in a ground war, civil war, was unpopular to begin with.  The reaction of the government to revelations of Russian involvement have been completely different than reactions to the events in Crimea - which has become a celebrated accomplishment of the regime.

I am collating a collection of information about the conflict that I can use in my own writing.  Maybe it will be useful to others that are looking for more information about what is happening in Ukraine this summer.

Links

Russia Annexing Donbass De facto?

This fascinating article discusses the consequences of Europe supporting Ukraine's position in the Donbass, specifically the need for special status for the Donbass territories to come only after Russia has removed its troops, the rebels have disarmed, and some semblance of order has been restored to the territories. 

Kyiv is insisting that the pro-Moscow rebels disarm, Russia withdraw its troops from Donbas, and that separatist-controlled areas of the border be returned to Ukraine's control before there can be any discussion about the territories' status. 

This puts Moscow in a tough position, which is being called a soft annexation.  

The moves to formally introduce the ruble in the separatist regions, the threats to hold a referendum on joining Russia, and the noise about issuing Russian passports are a last-ditch effort to pressure Kyiv. And Kyiv isn't budging.

Which leaves Moscow stuck taking its least worst option: call it a soft annexation.
And this removes the last bit of leverage Russia has over Kyiv.

"Ukraine will never now be a gray neutral territory between East and West," Ukrainian political analyst Serhiy Taran told Nezavisimaya Gazeta. "Either we won't emerge alive from this hell or else we will emerge very strong. I am convinced it will be the latter, if only because this is what everyone except Russia wants." 

Intelligence in the Conflict

Russia is said to be reactivating Soviet Area European spy networks. 

The Czech Republic's counterintelligence agency says the number of Russian spies remains high and the Kremlin is building a spy network in Europe similar to the Soviet network before World War II.

Link

Academic Stalking and other Notes from APSA 2015

I am currently attending the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.  As I was walking to a panel today I saw a man sitting and read his name tag: David Kinsella.  Dr. Kinsella is my academic hero.  A paper that I read of his during my first year of graduate school is what put me on the path to studying arms transfers.

I didn't have the guts to just go up to him and say hello and tell him how much his early work has inspired my own career.  I probably should have.

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I ran into two Iowa students at the poster session this morning (September 3rd).  They were both young graduate students when I was finishing up.  Now they are both getting close to the end of their graduate work.  They are both doing interesting work and had well-prepared posters.

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I saw a few interesting posters this morning.  One is related to my own arms sales research.  It is a test of arms data that shows that states that export weapons spend less on their own defense.  This is an interesting finding and one that I need to look more at before I do much more on my own project.

Link-O-Rama: Arms Edition

Apologies and Excuses

So much for resolutions! (Link) A bold prediction about my future blogging awesomeness followed by 1 post in 5 months is not a stellar beginning.  In my defense, the past 5 months have been as busy as any in my life.  These are the highlights of the past five months:

• The end of the semester
• chairing our graduate admissions committee
• A trip to the US to sit on a hiring committee
• A trip to the US a week later to attend a seminar at Brigham Young University
• Graduation
• A trip to Poland for a conference
• A vacation to the US for 5 weeks to visit family
• The return to Astana to start the new semester with a new role: acting department chairIn addition to the normal activities of getting ready for the semester (preparation of syllabi, courses, etc) I have had the new administrative tasks associated with my new position.  I also had an article accepted for publication that needed work to be ready for the publisher.  I have also been scrambling to put together my paper for the American Political Science Association Meeting (APSA) which is next week. 

I now have a better understanding of the wisdom of my PhD advisers who emphasized that life after graduate school was more busy.  The pressures and activities are a bit different, but it is definitely busy.

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Arms Links

With the preamble over, I am now going to post links to articles about arms.  I am doing this in conjunction with my PLS455/555 Politics of Arms in International Relations course at Nazarbayev University. I thought this would be a good resource for my students as they begin their case study assignments for the course. It is also a good way for me to organize these links and resources and to put together some initial thoughts.  In this edition I will keep my comments brief. I would like to do this more regularly and add more context and analysis. 

F-35

• Australia drops out of F-35 program. Large-scale weapons system collaboration is hard! Link
• A good roundup of lots of arms news.  News on Russian Sukhoi fighter jets, and the ongoing saga of the F-35 fighter. Link
• F-35B not doing well in carrier testing and certification. Link

Mistrel

• France returns Russia's money for the Mistrel.  This is a great example of the politicization of arms transfers. It's an interesting case of Russia importing (Russia is not a major arms importer) and being denied a weapon system that it really wanted. Link
• France needs to sell the Mistrels it is not selling to Russia.  That will prove very difficult. Link

Russian Arms and Navy

• Russia to develop a new "Doomsday" aircraft command center. Link
•  Russian navy to begin building new destroyer - with capabilities that are very impressive and challenging to the US Naval superiority. Does this mean a comeback for the defense industry in Russia? Link
• New Russian drone design. Link
• Seven new and scary Russian weapons systems.  In this sense scary is for the West, or potential military rivals of the Russian state.  Hypersonic weapons are a new class of weapons that pose an interesting dilemma.  They are definitely weapons of the offensive, but are meant to overcome missile shield technology that rendered earlier nuclear offensive capabilities less secure. This is a demonstration of a technological arms race. Link
• Morocco to buy Russian Amur class submarine.  Why? Link
• New love for an old Bear. The TU-95 and nuclear bomber advantages. Link
• Refurbished Russian submarine with all kinds of capabilities baffles US experts. "The Russians were always more innovative at this than we were."  What also struck me about this sub is its length.  It is half the length of a US aircraft carrier.  The Russians don't mess around when it comes to submarines. Link
• Russian air to air missiles R-73 are flying off the shelves of the arms bazaars. Link
• Story about Russia's new Armata tank. Link
• Interesting video of forum on Russian naval power in the 21st century. Link
• Russia selling powerful anti-aircraft missile system to Iran.  Link

India

• Predictions of US-Russian arms competition in India.  This is an interesting field of inquiry.  India just became part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but is also a democratic state, unlike most other members of the organization.  India has traditionally been one of Russia's biggest customers, and I have dealt with the issue of Russian-Indian arms purchases in other posts (Link, Link, Link). Will closer security cooperation cement the relationship that has been built between the two countries? Link
• India is going to be buying a lot of arms in the near to medium future. 4.7 Billion dollars is a good start. Link

US Navy and Military

• US begins work on second "Gerald R. Ford" Class of Aircraft Carrier to be named after JFK. Link
• An interesting piece on the size of the US navy.  Arguments on one side are qualitative (our fewer ships can do more than many more ships were able to do earlier.)  Arguments on the other are quantitative.  Fetishizing numbers is not good policy.  However, arguing in terms of threats faced and the ability of the naval force, as presently constituted, to respond to those threats is good policy. Questioning the definitions of threats is the next step in such an analysis.  Policy in the absence of strategy is rudderless. Link
• Russian jammers supposedly render aircraft carriers useless.  Whither the advantage of carrier groups? Link
• The US is not selling, but is deploying F-22s to Europe to ease the minds of allies.  Increased Russian air activity within the context of the Crimean and Ukrainian conflict is increasing tensions in the region. Link 
• Strong market for used US M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and its variants.  I spent a lot of time in one of these in Baghdad 2003. Link I spent more time in the Bradley, though.
• I don't understand why the US Air Force hates the A-10 so much.  I think the Army would be happy to have these aircraft. Link
• 
  

China

• China is holding a large military parade next week and is having trouble attracting western leaders: Link  and another Link

Communist China generally shies away from the vast annual demonstrations of military might that were a hallmark of the Soviet Union, normally holding such events once a decade to mark the foundation of the People's Republic. 

It has struggled to attract world-wide interest for the parade as world leaders are wary of the tone of the event, and the risk of lending it legitimacy. 

Beijing is becoming increasingly assertive in the region and regularly accuses Tokyo of failing to show sufficient contrition for Japan's 20th-century invasion of China.

Other Miscellaneous Arms Links 

• Analysis of Central Asian Military capabilities.  This should be of interest to my students. Link
• Sweden and Brazil sign a deal for Gripen fighters. The deal includes financial terms, as well as details about the licensing and production of half of the fighters in Brazil.  The jet was also modified to fit Brazil's needs.  Link
• French Deliver Rafale fighters to Egypt.  Link
• This link maybe the most interesting.  It details the problem with Pilatus aircraft that was sold to Chad by Switzerland. The aircraft is not mean to be armed or used offensively, but apparently it has been.  This has led the Swiss to pull back on other potential exports. It is interesting to see a principled stance on arms transfers. Economic theories of arms transfers would predict that Switzerland is under too much financial pressure to export in order to support its domestic manufacturing for a product that has a limited domestic market. Interesting counterexample/mini case study to think about in terms of policy-making and the complexity of arms sales as a topic. Link

Maybe I'm old fashioned, but....

So I read this article on the Duck of Minerva about a week ago and I had a bit of a visceral and angry reaction to it.  I saved it to read later, and am now re-reading it. In this article, Mackenzie talks about the standards of combat for men and women and concludes that for a number of reasons there should be a re-evaluation of the physical standards of combat so that the military will not remain "behind."

If standards don’t change, inevitably, very few women will ‘make the (male) cut’ into combat roles, including into the Marines. But a lack of change will also keep the entire military behind. There is a need to  develop physical standards that reflect modern warfare, recognise areas that women excel physically- including in endurance and flexibility, and changing a sexist culture that values bands of brothers and men’s bodies over all else.

Mackenzie discuses both the changing nature of combat, and the fact that all soldiers (male and female) receive combat training, but is upset at the apparently anachronistic physical standards required for combat missions.  I have a number of problems with the article.

First, is the conflation of the fact that our most recent wars have a different character than past conflicts means that there is no difference between military tasks. This is not true, and it is laughable on its face.  Even someone with only a cursory understanding of warfare will understand that there are different physical abilities needed for driving a truck versus fighting in the infantry.  These different physical standards limit the number of men who are allowed to do certain highly physical tasks.

Combat training - and remember that basic training is just that: Basic Combat Training - is designed to make every soldier a minimally proficient soldier.  This applies to men, women, intelligence specialists, truck drivers, mechanics, cooks, etc.  When I went through basic training in the summer of 2001 it was at Fort Jackson, South Carolina - in an integrated male-female basic training. Something that has been around since the early 1990s.  We were all soldiers in combat support roles.  I was in intelligence. Others in my platoon were intelligence, some were clerks, some were cooks, and some were mechanics.  Many of the females were going on to be medics.

At some point - based on the fact that we were in the Army - we could expect to be in combat.  But combat for the infantry has a very different nature than that of the intelligence specialist and truck driver. Yes, in Iraq, women are in convoys that are attacked, are on bases that are attacked, or may be part of patrols and teams that come under fire.  Having basic skills is key.  This is different than the task that was given to the Marines in the battle of Fallujah.  It is different than the skills used by the 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne in 2003 in fighting against regular military and irregular militia in the beginning part of the war in Iraq.  I know because that is who I was with - as an intelligence guy assigned to an infantry unit.  And I was not prepared.  I am a big man - 6'4" who at the time was in the best shape of my life.  And I was out of my depth.  I did not have the training to be doing what was done.

The purpose of the military is to fight and win battles.  Combat roles are open to women who meet the standards.  I am not convinced that Mackenzie has made a cogent argument about why those standards should be relaxed.

In Mosul in May 2003 - after I had already traveled across the whole country with the Infantry.  Flying in helicopters is so much easier.

 

Don't call it a comeback!

Dear Spencer,

I have not been keeping up with this blog at all in the last few months.  I am involved in many projects and am still in the process of settling into my job at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan.  I would like to make this blog more of a part of my process of writing and thinking through issues that I am working on, but I am still thinking of ways that I can do that meaningfully.

My job is to write and to produce content. That content needs to be peer reviewed and validated by gatekeepers.  The kind of writing that I am doing here - or  not doing here- is unfiltered and unfettered. I think that there is value in the interaction of both types of writing.  If there are any regular readers of this blog (not even my wife or mother read this, so I don't have a lot of hope), which is unlikely since there is no regular writer on this blog, please be patient as I get back into the swing of things.

Topics that I will be posting on in the future:

• Pedagogy - I am especially interested in incorporating undergraduates into the research process.
• Technology - My personal computer is now running UBUNTU.  My academic writing is done in a text editor and LaTeX.  I am moving from Stata to R for my statistical analysis work.  There are a lot of changes for me on the technology front.
• A new research area I am interested in: Covert Action by states.
• More on military issues and arms sales.
• Some work on role theory and network analysis - a new book project (from an ongoing paper project with my dissertation adviser and mentor, Cameron Thies).
• Russia-Ukraine stuff.  Because I lived in Donetsk for two years, and this is a pretty big deal.

That's the plan for the future.  I am aiming to have one or two short posts a week with maybe a longer piece up once a month or so.  I may be ambitious and work to get my longer pieces linked to, or re-posted on some of the blogs of the cool kids.  Wouldn't that be something!

Best,

Spencer