Military Aircraft Decisions - News Roundup

Pakistan and China are working on a joint fighter project to reduce Pakistan's dependence on Western arms imports. From the article:

The FC-1/ JF-17 Thunder is a joint Chinese-Pakistani project that aimed to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on western firms for advanced fighters, by fielding a low-cost multi-role lightweight fighter that can host modern electronics and precision-guided weapons. It isn’t a top-tier competitor, but it represents a clear step up from Pakistan’s Chinese MiG-19/21 derivatives and French Mirage III/V fighters. This positioning addresses a budget-conscious, “good enough” performance market segment that the West once dominated, but has nearly abandoned in recent decades.

 This reminds me of Caverly and Kapstein's (2012) article in Foreign Policy about the wisdom of the US moving to a model that builds "good enough" weapons that are more attractive for export.  The US has plenty of issues with Pakistan, but in terms of building long-term relations with countries, having them locked into your weapons systems seems to be a good one. 

Airbus sold the C295 to the Ivory Coast.  The Ivory Coast operates a very small air force (two transport planes and 3 helicopters) but are now purchasing from Europe.  The other aircraft are old Soviet aircraft, so this represents a shift to new suppliers, which is an interesting development.

In other decision-news, Singapore has chosen US-made F-35s as the next generation fighter rather than French or Chinese aircraft.  Singapore has a modern military and operates a lot of US equipment already, and decided to stay with the US in terms of upgrading its fighter fleet.

It took Singapore more than five years to make a decision on which planes to buy as they had to look carefully at specifications and what was needed, said Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen in a Facebook post. 

"Our agencies will now have to speak to their US counterparts to move the process forward," Ng said, adding it could be up to a year before any planes are purchased 

The F-16s are due to be taken out of service in around 10 years' time, meaning it was time to acquire their replacement and begin training pilots, he said.

The timeline is interesting.  A ten-year horizon to plan and implement the next generation of aircraft (and a five-year decision timeline) really locks states into relationships in ways that deserve further exploration.
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Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. (2012) Arms Away. Foreign Affairs 91: 125–132.

The complexity of Arms Sales

A recent article about India's pursuit of advanced aircraft illustrates the complicated world of arms transfers.

The article itself is correcting some misinformation that India was going to purchase the F-35 and open up some joint manufacturing facilities for the aircraft there.  It turns out that initial inquiries into the possibility of F-35s in the future was confused with a current bid for the purchase of F-16 fighters.  India is looking to upgrade its aircraft but is in the bidding stage with both Saab and Lockheed Martin.

In both cases, the Indians will open factories to perform final assembly.  Such licensing and joint production is common.  F-16s are manufactured in Turkey under a similar agreement, for example.  The F-35 is a unique program because it is being built on licensing and co-production from the very beginning with partners all over the world.  It is a complex and collaborative endeavor that relies on pre-existing alliance ties and mutual trust and support. 

India is not approved for the purchase of the F-35 at this time.  The authors of the article noted that the issues of technology transfer that are more acute with this particular advanced aircraft.  The components are more advanced and there is a real worry that the technology could fall into the wrong hands.

For me this article is fascinating because it touches on so many of the complex and fascinating aspects of arms sales that I have been thinking about for the past few years.  The first is the importance of relations and relationship building.  There is a great deal of high-level negotiation that takes place for these arms deals - because they must be approved (in the case of the US) by the State Department working with the Department of Defense.  It is not just a mater of defense firms going out and making sales.

The complexity of licensing and production deals is another aspect of arms transfers that is unique.  There is an incentive for many states to build their own capacity while they purchase weapons systems.  This makes sense from a realist perspective of anarchy and fits with the logic of internal balancing outlined by Morrow (1993).  States don't want to be too dependent on arms imports because it limits their own actions.  States that wish to play a more independent role in international relations will avoid becoming too dependent on a supplier.

Even if the production facilities are mainly symbolic, they offer some work, build native capabilities, and establish the state as being less dependent than a state that simply imports finished arms. My current thinking about arms is about the ways that they are used to socialize states, and the use of licensing deals is an avenue that needs to be explored in more depth.
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Morrow, James D. (1993) Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. International Organization 47: 207–233.

Fighter Aircraft Sales and the Involvement of the Chief Executive: More Questions than Answers

One of the key questions within the academic literature on arms transfers is simply “why”.  Why do states transfer coercive capability to potential rival states?  The answer to this question is not easy, and there appear to be as many answers to the question as there are states that sell arms.  Explanations for arms sales typically boil down to economic imperatives or state interests. These are good explanations as far as they go, but even if we assume that these are the two main pressures that states face to sell arms, the degree to which one is more important than the other is still on the table.

My own beginning in the literature was launched with an assumption that arms sales by powerful states are used as a deliberate foreign policy tool.  I used the SIPRI classifications for exporters and assumed that the US and Russia (as heir to the Soviet Union) as hegemonic suppliers would be deliberate in their use of arms sales to enhance their foreign policy goals.  I found that this was not the case in either the US or Russia.  Russia is more dependent on arms sales - for a number of reasons that I won’t go into here - than is the US, but that arms sales are still driven by economic and other special interests in the US context.

What is surprising, is the fact that arms sales are an issue that make it onto the agenda of state executives and in meetings between heads of state. In today’s post, I am interested in a number of news articles detailing the sale of aircraft [1] by Russia and the United States.

The first article is mundane.  It describes the delivery of 4 refurbished F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia by the United States. The article describes the process of refurbishment and the means of delivery, and then notes that this is part of a sale of 16 fighters to the Indonesian government.  This article is most interesting when contrasted to the next article.  This article describes a letter sent by two Senators to the Trump administration arguing that the US should sign an agreement to allow F-16s to be produced in India.  The Senators argue that the deal is important to protect American jobs and the capability of producing a weapons system that is vital to the US arsenal.  (The US has almost as many F-16s in its arsenal - 1000 as India has fighter aircraft 1050 - and India has the world’s 4th largest capacity).  

This argument is interesting to me, because it assumes that the President will become involved in brokering deals with other states on behalf of private firms.

The third article is interesting because it examines the communication between different branches of the US government, but in the opposite direction. This article describes the Trump administration’s intention to allow the sale of F-16s to Bahrain reversing the Obama  administration decision that had stopped the sales because of human rights concerns.

The State Department originally notified Congress of the planned $4.87 billion sale last September during the Obama administration.
But it was pulled back because of the Obama administration's concerns that Bahrain had not made promised progress on human rights matters.
The decision by the new administration signals its backing for Sunni-led countries as counterweights to Shi'ite Iran's influence in the region.
Brian Dooley of Washington-based Human Rights First said separating the sale of the warplanes from human rights requirements would "encourage further repression" and create instability in Bahrain.

In my dissertation, I found that the US takes many considerations into view when selling arms, but that state security interests trump all the other considerations.  In this case, regional stability is more important than regime stability.  

The final article is one that describes the use of Arms as a deal sweetener by the Putin regime in negotiation with Serbia for a number of weapons systems.

Serbia is to soon receive six Mikoyan MiG-29 jets from Russia as a gift, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said.
Vucic made the comment after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who personally approved the transfer, Tass reported.
"President Putin will sign a decree in the coming days to transfer the planes to us," Vucic said. "Then, technical issues will have to be tackled: how to transport the planes, whether they should be disassembled into parts or one of the countries will provide its airspace for their flight. Of course, we favor the latter option because this is faster.

Putin has shown a willingness to be involved in bargaining for arms transfers.  He may be considered the arms saleseman in chief because many of his meetings with foreign leaders result in new arms deals being signed.  I am not sure, still, what to make of this behavior from a state and its leader, but I am very interesting in thinking through these issues for a long time.

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[1] Aircraft because that is the latest project I’m working on with one of my coauthors.

Aircraft Round Up for June 2016

My news feed has been filled with stories related to the sale of aircraft.  I want to link to those articles with a bit of my own commentary about how these sales fit in with my own theories and ideas about arms sales.

Nigeria and the Super Tucano

This is an interesting case of a Brazilian plane being manufactured in the US for Afghanistan and Lebanon.  Nigeria wants to buy these anti-insurgency aircraft to fight against Boko Haram, but the US needs to approve the sale since the manufacturing takes place on US territory. This is the first example of this type of arrangement that I have run across, and it simnply fascinates me.  The web of interconnected production facilities makes arms sales and production as well as their sales multi-national.  I wonder about the ability of states like the US to act as veto players for such sales.  What is the trade-off or point at which Brazil would move manufacturing to its own territory in order to avoid any such complications in the future?

Canada and the F-35 Rejection
Canada is no longer on board with the F-35.  As one of the initial partners, this is an interesting case.  It is also interesting whether Trudeau will be in power long enough to find an alternative to the Canadian Air Force's aging fleet. The F-18 Superhornet, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Rafale and Grippen are the alternatives that Canada is currently considering.

"For 10 years, the Conservatives completely missed the mark when it came time to deliver to Canadians and our military the equipment they need," the Liberal prime minister said in parliament.

"They clung to a plane that does not work and is far from working."

The biggest issue with Canada dropping out is the political fallout.

Pakistan and the F-16 End Run

This piece illustrates the difficulty of using arms as a carrot or stick in foreign policy.  If the US refuses to sell F-16s to Pakistan, it will seek to buy used aircraft from Jordon.  In this case, the initial sales decision by the US must be considered even more carfully if there is a question about resale potential.  This is a realistic possibility because many countries fly the F-16 and so it should be possible to find spare parts from willing suppliers.  Pakistan is shopping because of Congressional demands that it stop harboring Islamic militants.

China, Russia, and the US and Next Generation Bombers

Bomber aircraft are the most strategic of the aircraft.  They have previously been built primarily by the US and Russia. China is now in on the game.  Russia, the US, and China all expect to have these new bombers as part of their arsenal by 2025.  The 9-year time frame from now shows the complication of developing and manufacturing these aircraft.  In the US case, the arms acquisition bureacuracy is such that projects tend to drag longer and longer with each new generation of aircraft.

F-35 can't compete?

Adding to the woes of the F35 is the analysis that it cannot compete with older Soviet/Russian models of aircraft, specifically the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker.  The F35 is the Pentagon's most expensive arms acquisition ever and it has been mired in delays, scandals, and bureaucratic infighting from its inception.

Turkey and Attack Helicopters
Turkey is still trying to obtain an attack helicopter.  The most interesting part of this article (which is about Turkey shortlisting potential companies from which to purchas) is the discussion about human rights and the problems of competing in arms sales when such restrictions are not universally applied:

Franco-German company Eurocopter's position was made more difficult as Berlin initially banned it from participating because of concerns over human rights in Turkey, although the German Government relented.

Philippe Camus, co-chief executive of European Aeronautic, Defense and Space, says the Turkish decision against Eurocopter will push the issue of common export policy to the top of the agenda and that Europe's capitals must work together to create a single coherent policy.

Apache for Qatar

It seems as if these are part of the payment for Qatar's role as broker in getting Bergdahl from the Taliban.  It seems like a steep price to pay.  If Qatar will be an ally in other areas, then this might be okay. It seems hypocritical considering Qater's human rights record vs. that of Turkey that advanced attack aircraft were easily obtained by that government.