Arms and Civil War Intervention

The complexity of civil wars and intervention has been on my mind a lot lately.  I tend to look at everything through the lens of arms sales, and this is a really "good" time to think about these issues. Arms sales are in the news a great deal because of the ongoing proxy war in Yemen and the role that Western weapons are playing in that conflict as they are deployed by the different sides, especially by the Saudis.

In addition to proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, Libya is also the site of continued fighting.  Earlier this week, government forces found US weapons in the hands of rebel forces. There is an ongoing investigation about the source of these weapons, but it appears at first blush that they were originally sold to UAE (LINK). This would be a violation of the terms of sale to UAE and of the UN arms embargo to Libya in general, so it's a pretty serious issue.

I have a graduate student who is working on an MA thesis about outside intervention in civil wars, and she sent me an article from Brookings about this phenomenon. The article itself is about the analogies that we use to discuss wars and how analogies and history are weaponized and politicized to make different points, and that they take on a shorthand meaning to represent a certain viewpoint about intervention: think Munich vs. Vietnam as an analogy. Toward the end of the article there is a sentence that stood out to me and got me thinking about arms sales and civil war intervention:

"The proxy war problem highlights that, for the United States, ending civil wars is not merely a question of political will, but also a question of capacity. It is true that the US military is the most powerful in the world, but it is not the case that US military intervention will always tip the balance toward peace." 

 I thought about this in terms of two papers by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010, 2014) and how they have examined the "technologies of rebellion" and their effects on the outcome of civil war. They find that conventional war (fought with technology on both sides) leads to deadlier wars, but wars that are shorter in duration and with longer-lasting outcomes.

One way to think of this is that intervention on the part of the US government may not require physical intervention. Intervention in terms of providing equipment may be enough to tilt wars.  This brings me back to some of the research on arms transfers that took place at the height of the Cold War. Arms sales from the US and USSR to the third world were a deep concern because of the idea that these weapons may have been fueling conflict in many areas of the world.

There are a lot of normative and empirical pieces to unpack when thinking about intervening in civil conflicts. The role that arms can play (on both sides) is one that still needs to be explored more systematically.

Russian Consistency on Regime Change (and odds and ends)

Russia is warning the US about a push for regime change in Syria (LINK).  I think that Russia's policy has always been consistent in this regard. And their position has been borne out in the chaos that enveloped Egypt, Libya, and Iraq in the absence of strong leadership.  Democracy promotion is fine and good, but there has to be some semblance of political order and institutional ability (or social capital) to be able to develop it.

The lesson from Iraq is that any regime change imposed from the outside needs to be accompanied by very strong planning for the post-regime period.  Organic changes to leadership from popular uprisings may also be shaky.

We have given Putin's Kremlin plenty of ammunition in its offensive against democracy promotion by supporting regime change irresponsibly.

____________________

This is an interesting article on the shake up of the Baltic Sea Fleet.

Clearly, for the purge to be so large and so open, the misconduct in the Baltic Fleet had to be very serious and very widespread. Yulia Nikitina and Irina Tumakova from Fontanka.ru have published a long article documenting the faults attributed to the fleet’s now-former leadership. The condition of the fleet under Viktor Kravchuk had supposedly declined when compared to how it was under his predecessors, who received much less financing than he did in the last four years. 

In other words, the Baltic Fleet purge appears to be a signal to other Russian military commanders (including mid-level ones) that corruption that has a negative effect on combat readiness will not be tolerated and will result in punishment far more severe than the usual honorable retirement given to senior officials who misbehave.

 Russia's military readiness has become political. 

Russia and Syria - Arms Related Issues

Russia is now involved in the war in Syria.  Air strikes and naval bombardment along with cruise missile launches, along with the addition of ground troops as advisers is serious business.  The potential for adverse international incidents has increased.  The fighting in Ukraine is contained.  The fighting in Syria is taking place in the context of continued Western and US airstrikes.  The potential for a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia is higher than it has been for a long time.

I am interested in Russia's endgame here.  I am curious as to what Putin thinks he will gain. I just started reading a great book that analyzes Putin's actions, and this quote really jumped out at me:

"...we cannot take any story or so called fact at face value when it comes to Vladimir Putin ... we are dealing with someone who is a master at manipulating information, suppressing information, and creating pseudo-information...In today's world of social media, the public has the impression that we know, or can easily know, everything about everybody.  Nothing, it seems, is private or secret.  And still, after 15 years, we remain ignorant of some of the most basic facts about a man who is arguably the most powerful individual in the world, the leader of an important nation.  When there is no certifiably real and solid information, any tidbit becomes precious." [1]

This jumped out to me again when I watched the Daily Vertical podcast about Putin challenging the western world's way of thinking and facts (LINK).  While I don't think I have any really new insights into what Russia is doing and thinking, I can at least make some observations about the effects of what they are doing in an area that I do have some insights into: arms transfers.

Negative and Potential Negative Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

I have already covered the issue of the Mistral ships.  Russia lost these ships as a direct result of their actions in Ukraine.  The latest word is that Egypt is going to purchase these ships, which is good for France (LINK). Is there a potential that Russia will lose out on other purchases?  Yes, but Russia doesn't import a lot of equipment, so for them, this is just a temporary setback.

The more serious setback for Russia would be if states began cancelling orders for weapons after seeing their actions.  This is a real possibility.  Turkey is very upset at Russia over incursions into its air space as Russia began its air actions over Syria.  This has already had an effect on a joint pipeline project (LINK), and has the potential to damage other relations.  Russia and Turkey have cooperated on helicopter manufacturing in the past (a case study from my dissertation), and if Turkey sees Russia becoming a security risk, it will likely move away from such relations.

The performance of Russian equipment in Syria is also a potential negative side effect.  If Russian equipment performs poorly (like reports of four cruise missiles crashing in Iran instead of hitting targets in Syria (LINK)), then potential customers may decide to look for other options.

Potential Positive Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

There are two potential positive consequences of Russian actions in Syria from the point of view of Russian arms sales. The first is the converse of the last point made above: positive performance by Russian equipment is free advertising for Russian arms.  Seeing weapons tested in combat and working is a great selling point to potential customers.

Other current and potential customers will take note of the point above and may also see the arms relationship becoming a proxy for more formal alliances, thus making continued arms purchases, or new arms purchases more attractive to buyers.  Venezuela recently expanded its arms deal with Russia (LINK), as has Thailand (LINK).  Interestingly, the deal with Thailand appears to be a barter deal for rubber.  This could be an effect of sanctions.  Thailand has been diversifying its arms portfolio in recent years.

Potential Positive Effects for US Arms Sales

For the US, Russia being seen as an aggressor may potentially make arms sales to neighboring states a higher priority.  States will see this as a way to further integrate with existing US-led defense pacts (NATO), and a way to strengthen and emphasize military ties. Norway, for instance, recently added more planes to its F-35 order because of Russian aggression and escalation in the Baltic and North Sea areas (LINK).  This will be dependent on whether states are satisfied with US military hardware, however, which in some recent cases doesn't appear to be the case (LINK).

Other Geopolitical Consequences

Just because I am not going to spend time trying to figure out Putin's motivations, does not mean that I won't point out some geopolitical consequences of Russian military adventurism. The most obvious is that Russia's fears of NATO are now becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as NATO moves to bolster its powers along Russia's borders and to strengthen commitments to states bordering Russia's active military adventures (Poland, Turkey) (LINK).  It is also leading, it appears, to a strengthening of the US resolve on the issue of Ukraine (LINK).

________
[1] Hill, Fiona and Clifford G. Gaddy. 2015. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution. p 7.

Deals, Corruption, and Leader Involvement in Arms Sales

There have been a number of interesting stories piling up in my reader over the past few days.  I have wanted to get to them, but have also been trying to finish up the last chapter of my dissertation.  Priorities are fun.  This is what I'm doing on my break.

India

As a follow up to my post last week (here) about Russian corruption is an interesting story out of India.  India made a deal for helicopters with Finmeccanica (Italian firm), which now appears to be the result of bribes paid.  Now the Indian government is threatening to cancel the rest of the contract if the allegations prove true. (Read more here)

(And more here)

More from India.  India wants to start producing more of its own arms, particularly aircraft.  However, it is having difficulty because the firm that could potentially produce arms is so inefficient as to make this an untenable prospect.

James Hardy, an analyst at the defence consultancy IHS Jane's, says that HAL is "overextended", expressing an opinion largely shared by observers at home and abroad.

More here

Russia and Syria
Russia is continuing to supply the Syrian government with weapons from contracts that were already in place.

The head of Russia's arms exporter Rosoboronexport, Anatoly Isaikin, said Russian deliveries to the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad included air defence systems but not the advanced Iskander missiles sought by Damascus. 

"We are continuing to fulfill our obligations on contracts for the delivery of military hardware," Isaikin was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency.

Link

But Russia is not smuggling tank parts into Syria. (Link)

France and India

As part of my dissertation I am looking at the involvement of state leaders in arms deals.  I got a special gift from France's president Hollande on Valentine's Day.  The French President led an entourage to India to "clinch the world's biggest defense deal" in India.  The deal is a $12 Billion sale of 126 aircraft.  Along with this deal there are negotiations about French involvement in to help build a nuclear power plant in Maharashtra.

Link

"Private" Military Companies in Russia

The headline in my RSS feed from RIA Novosti made me think that Russia was going to privatize its military production.  It turns out that the "Private Military" companies would be state owned/sponsored private security forms on the order of Blackwater or whatever they are calling themselves these days:

The Russian government’s Military Industrial Commission may consider creating private military companies in Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said Wednesday. 

Russia’s significant economic interests abroad often operate in “difficult” conditions, and such companies would facilitate their work, said Rogozin, who oversees Russia's military-industrial complex. 

“We are thinking about whether our money should go toward financing foreign private security [and] military companies, or whether we should consider the feasibility of such companies in Russia itself,” he said.

 The article points out that such firms are useful for the US because it saves the government insurance money when people die on missions that are contracted to these firms rather than carried out by the military.  Insurance isn't a problem for the Russian military which doesn't really deal in such financial niceties according to Alexander Golt:

“In Russia, the state has practically no financial responsibility to the loss of military personnel.”

The question that remains for me is what affect such state-sponsored paramilitary firms would have on Russia's foreign policy actions.  It is plausible to think of such firms being hired by Assad, for instance, to perform various protective tasks, training, or necessary maintenance.  It would provide a bit of cover to Russia's government which could point to market principles and non-interference with private firms to justify unpopular foreign policy commitments.  This will definitely be an interesting area to watch in the coming years.

"Why Does Russia Support Dictators?"

This article in RIA has an interesting take on Russia's stand in Syria. In it Fyoder Lykonov argues that Russia is just being consistent in its foreign policy on interventionism in general.

Is Russia's policy really that short-sighted? Its prospects for having influence in the Middle East look vague indeed. The reserve of confidence built up during the Soviet period has been depleted, and it is unclear whether today's Russia is ready to step out onto the global stage. But the rest of Russia's policy is not so unreasonable. 

Moscow has made it clear that bypassing legitimate measures is not an option, this just results in random actions like the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which everyone  now recognizes was a mistake. So others can either respect Russia’s opinion by taking a neutral stance on the conflict in Syria, or act at their own risk and peril, something which it appears no one is willing to do.

The focus is, of course, on Russia’s global status, but Moscow also wants to keep the door open for an alternative solution to be found. The only other option is a military and political tunnel which will inevitably lead to a war with international ramifications.

 I have no problem with the idea that Russia is acting on principle in the Syrian case.  It is clear that Russia is not opposed to states taking their own interests into their own hands - as in its dispute with Georgia a few years ago.  Those states will then need to deal with the fallout of their own actions. Russia is opposed to cloaking those interventions with international respectability.  While this is a perfectly valid worldview, and consistent with the premium that Moscow places on state sovereignty, it will not make Russia's adherence to the principle any easier, or any more palatable to the narrative of human rights and compassionate interventionism that is the basis of the dialogue in Syria presently. 

Russia, Syria, and Arms - Oh My!

The following excerpts from this Russian news article highlight the strange "dependence" of Russia on arms sales.  Russia seems intent on proving that it is a "Great Power" through demonstrations of how it can defy the rest of the world community.  This continued "opposition" strategy does not imply that Russia is strong enough to do what it wants.  It really seems to show that Russia is not confident enough in its own position to take a non-realist, non-material stance on issues.  Thoughts?

Russia to honor Syria arms contracts | World | RIA Novosti: "Libya.

Russia will honor all arms contacts with Syria despite continuing violence against anti-government protesters in the country, a senior military official said on Sunday. 

“Since there are no restrictions on the supply of arms to Syria, Russia will fulfill its obligations under the contracts signed with this country,” Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, deputy head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, told reporters in Dubai. 

“Russia is interested in continuing mutually beneficial cooperation with the new Libyan government, both on the already-signed contracts and prospective deals,” he said.
In September, Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil said his country would not buy Russian arms. Observers said the decision came as little surprise because of Moscow’s links with the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and its slowness to recognize the rebel leadership as the legitimate government. 

Dzirkaln also said Russia hoped to continue arms sales to Yemen when violence there ended."

Does it matter how the violence ends?  If Russia continues to support the Assad regime does it do so because it is afraid that a different regime will not look to Russia for arms?  How do these arms contracts that Russia seems so keen to uphold further Russian interests in the long-term?

Russia and Syria: Arms and Alliances

The story referenced below gives a good overview of the relationship between Russia and Syria.  It is especially interesting that the ties that have made Russia and Syria "allies" are commercial and center on arms.  Russia, by supporting Syria with weapons, is able to maintain influence in the region.  This is an interesting contrast to the deteriorating arms relationship with Iran.

As international pressure on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria grows, Russia has maintained a perplexing timidity towards developments. Moscow has steadfastly refused to stake out an unambiguous position on events in Syria, a diplomatic paralysis that may end up proving more costly to Moscow in the long run. 

Some analysts say the Kremlin's careful stance is a result of its unwillingness to lose its only real Middle Eastern ally and a desire to avoid a confrontation with the West. 

"Syria remains Russia's only ally in the Middle East," Vladimir Karyakin from the state Institute for Strategic Research said. "We abandoned the rest either during perestroika or during the recent Arab revolutions. We even betrayed some - like Libya or Egypt, for example."
Russia has been a major arms supplier to Syria since the Soviet era and political cooperation with Damascus has often been far more valuable to Moscow than money. In 2005, Russia wrote off more than 70 percent of Syria's $13-billion debt, much of which was the result of Soviet-era arms deliveries. 

Although financial interests now play a more important role in defining Moscow's approach to Syria than during the Cold War, political concerns still remain the cornerstone, analysts say. Since the early 1970s, the country has hosted Russia's only naval supply and maintenance base outside the former Soviet Union in its Mediterranean port of Tartus.
"If we lose such an ally, we will lose our foothold in the Middle East," Karyakin warned.

Conflicting interests paralyze Russian diplomacy on Syria: analysts | Features & Opinion | RIA Novosti:

The following graphs show the growing importance of Russian arms imports to Syria.  I put together the graphs using data from SIPRI.