On the Margins - Research Topics and "Selling" your work in Academia

Today I received a desk reject for a paper that a coauthor and I wrote.  The paper is a good one and it does something that we don't think any other scholars have done.  We didn't sell that point well enough, apparently, and the editors decided that our paper didn't fit the scope of their journal.  That is fine and good, and a real part of academia.  I understand that.  However, I am beginning to see a pattern that I had not noticed before when I was less confident in my own work.

Arms transfer research is not mainstream in terms of "big topics" in international relations.  I understood that when I picked the topic.  There is interest in the subject, but it ebbs and flows. Big work in big journals often ignores the more nuts and bolts empirical work of studying patterns in arms flows when they discuss how arms effect international relations.  A good example of this is the recent work by Yarhi-Milo and colleagues building on work by James Morrow about the choice that states have in providing arms or making alliances.  The paper is excellent and the empirical case studies do a great job of illustrating their larger point - that arming protege states is an option for patron states who don't want to be obligated by a formal alliance.

The theory is about great powers - and specifically great powers who are interested in extended deterrence.  This is a limited set of states. The use of case studies in this work is very appropriate. However, ignoring the work that has looked at arms transfers as a general pattern and its findings is a blind spot that is not caught by editors or reviewers.

When work that is grounded in the empirical patterns of arms sales between all states attempts to address wider theories of IR, however, the standards are much different.  That is the case with the paper that was rejected.  The paper addresses an issue that is simply taken for granted or assumed away in the broad literature on international relations - the existence of arms sales by states that are not great powers.  The desk rejection will allow us to "re-frame" the paper in a stronger way and send it back out.  That's not the main issue.  The issue is the difference between how this paper was dealt with and a paper by the same coauthor and I who wrote about arms and human rights and had the paper accepted at International Studies Quarterly.

That paper was accepted because of its relationship with human rights, not because of the arms aspect itself.  Work is also more accepted when it deals with the normative issues of arms control.  In this sense, arms work is not only marginalized, it becomes politicized because work that does not fit into "acceptable" categories may not even make it past the first gate-keepers. 

From a career standpoint this is something that needs to be considered.  In a publish or perish environment, the lack of outlets for work on the margins can either move people away from a topic, or lead them to study in ways that conform to conventional wisdom rather than challenging that work and its assumptions. This is a subtle way in which bias can creep into academic work, and which weakens overall knowledge and the process of creating it.

____________________________

Morrow, James D. (1993) Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. International Organization 47: 207–233.

Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper. (2016) To Arm or to Ally?: The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances. International Security 41: 90–139.

Russia and Burma - Arms Sales in the News

My last post, on the unsurprising turn in US foreign policy regarding arms sales outlined part of the arguments that I am developing about the underlying reasons for arms sales by states.  A story on the RFE/RL website the next day has got me thinking again. It is not always easy defending arms sales as a practice.  As a practice, arms sales may seem to justify policies and regimes which engage in ugly activities.  Those activities may be directed at neighbors, or at their own population.  Arms are fungible to the extent that once states have them, they can be used as the recipient state sees fit. 

Russia is planning on selling advanced fighter aircraft to Burma (Myanmar), which is in the midst of an ethnic cleansing crisis. The US has condemned the sale, saying that the military is conducting this ethnic cleansing.  This sale by Russia has a bad appearance.  A state's military is directly involved in an ongoing campaign that is violating human rights - and causing death and suffering on a large scale. The question that I had after reading this was whether or not the US condemnation of Russian sales are hypocritical.

Richard Johnson and I in a forthcoming ISQ article break down arms sales by type to examine the hypothesis that democratic states do not sell arms to human rights abusers.  Our theory is that many weapons are not that useful in violating human rights (arms are only partially fungible), and so states will make deals for certain types of weapons with states that are human rights violators.  Our paper is an observational study where we look to establish broad patterns.  We find that there doesn't seem to be discernment across weapons systems (except for land-based vehicles sold by the US) for any of the major democratic arms suppliers (US, Britain, Germany, France).  In general, states sell arms to human rights violators.

In a follow up study, we should examine whether or not the military of those states are involved in repression, or if there are other state actors.  The reason that this distinction would be important, is that if the military is viewed as being professional, and outside of the internal repression apparatus, there may be an expectation by supplying states that the weapons sold will not, in fact, be used for repression (or that there is a low likelihood that they will be). The US position on Burma may be a reflection of this view.  The military is involved in the repression, and therefore all arms sales should be banned until the situation is clearer.

In this case, the US position seems less like hypocrisy, and more like a nuanced policy that engages with the dual nature of arms.  States have a monopoly on violence, and that violence can be turned inward.  However, the consequences to the international system of states where there is not a monopoly of violence (weak and failing/failed states) can ultimately lead to worse outcomes. The sale of arms is part of this complex interaction.  Russia's actions seem to be driven more for a need to establish any kind of influence with any state that will have them.  Putin as salesman in chief needs wins, and he'll take them even if it leads to the loss of life by others.

Salesman in Chief - An unsurprising Development in Arms Transfers

One of the most fascinating pieces of news about arms sales came out in a Reuters story a few days ago. The gist of the plan is that the Trump administration has a plan for the diplomatic and military apparatus to make the sale of arms a priority.  It's part of the "buy American" plan to increase manufacturing capability within the US.

President Donald Trump is expected to announce a “whole of government” approach that will also ease export rules on U.S. military exports and give greater weight to the economic benefits for American manufacturers in a decision-making process that has long focused heavily on human rights considerations, according to people familiar with the plan.

This is a real shift in the recent policies of the United States in terms of seeking to be more limited about which states received US arms.  Richard Johnson and I have a paper coming out in ISQ soon that looks at whether or not this rhetoric on human rights has any real substantive effects on arms sales by major democratic suppliers (hint: it does not - with a few caveats).  Our study is a follow up and expansion of Lindsay Blanton's 2005 work that looked at US arms sales only [1].

I am not surprised by this development. In my 2013 PhD thesis[2] I examined US and Russian decision-making on arms sales.  I found that both states were reliant on foreign sales to some degree. Russia has had - and this increased under Putin - a strategy of arms promotion at all levels of the state for a long time.  It is surprising how often Putin's name comes up when new arms deals are announced.  He is Russia's salesman in chief when it comes to arms sales.

The US move to an open policy of arms sales promotion makes sense under two common assumptions about arms sales.  The first assumption is about economics - and apparently that is the argument that is being made to justify this shift in foreign policy.  It is expensive to develop new weapons systems.  It is expensive to maintain manufacturing for spare parts.  Having external customers keeps production going, and provides partial relief for development costs.  It provides employment (which is particularly important in defense industries that can affect Congressional races where they are concentrated), and it ensures domestic manufacturing capability into the future. 

During the Cold War both the US and the Soviets could sustain their arms development because of the large internal market for weapons and the sizes of their military economies in general.  The end of the Cold war changed the imperatives for both states.  Russia felt this need first, and more acutely.  The United States needed arms sales more after the contraction of the armed forces during the 1990s.

The second assumption about arms sales that supports this development is the idea that arms purchases and sales are part of relationship building between states. This is a connection that has not been explored too deeply by arms scholarship. My current book project, which adapts and expands my dissertation examines these relationships more closely. Trump is a businessman in a business that is dominated by personal relationships. It seems natural that he would want to have a policy that reflects those preferences.  The fact that he is focusing on the sale of arms highlights to me the importance of arms sales to state identity. Arms sales are still not "sexy" like conflict and other types of security studies, but the more we see such fascinating real-world examples of their importance, the more likely that academics will pay more attention.
_______
[1]  Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 2005. "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports." International Studies Quarterly 49: 647–668.

[2] Willardson, Spencer L. 2013. "Under the Influence of Arms: The Causes and Consequences of Arms Transfers." PhD Thesis. University of Iowa. Link