Russia and Ukraine Links - Tanks and Missile Launchers Edition

A few weeks ago I put up some links about Russia and Ukraine (LINK).  I am adding to that collection again today. 

Russian tanks in the crisis (LINK).  It is getting harder and harder for Russia to deny that it is materially supporting the rebels in the breakaway region.  The article is a fascinating study in the use of open sources and social media to gather intelligence.  While this intelligence can be shared easily, since it doesn't involve disclosing classified sources or methods, the danger is that it feeds into the narrative of the Kremlin about US misinformation and propaganda regarding its role. Winning the propaganda game is very difficult for the defensive side. Not only are Russian tanks being used, but the training and showmanship associated with Russia.  Russia has been running tank olympics for the past few years, and the rebels did the same thing with their tanks a few weeks ago (LINK).



The same group that is finding evidence of Russian tanks and soldiers in Ukraine is releasing evidence of Russia's BUK missiles being used to shoot down the Malaysian Airlines jet in July 2014. (LINK).

Bellingcat, which analyzes information available on the Internet, said on October 8 that the Buk antiaircraft system involved in the incident can be traced from the Russian city of Kursk in June 2014 to a field outside the Ukrainian town of Snizhne in Donetsk Oblast on the day of the flight MH17 disaster. 

The next day, the launcher from the same Buk system -- with only three missiles instead of the normal compliment of four -- was documented to be near the Russian border in Luhansk Oblast, the report says. 

"We have looked at all the open-source investigation we've done over the last 18 months and it seems a pretty firm conclusion that the Russian military provided the missile launcher that shot down MH17, that the missile was launched from outside of Snizhne," Bellingcat founder and director Eliot Higgins says. "And we were able to track the Buk missile launcher back to the actual unit who provided it, the 53rd Brigade." 

Higgins added that Bellingcat has forwarded information about the individual members of the 53rd Brigade who might have been involved in shooting down MH17 to authorities investigating the incident.

 Is it any wonder that Ukraine now views Moscow as the main aggressor in their new military doctrine (LINK)? I mentioned in an earlier post about Russia's involvement in Syria that Putin is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy about the encirclement of Russia by NATO (LINKhttp://grimyard.blogspot.com/2015/10/russia-and-syria-arms-related-issues.html). He has only himself to blame.

Russia's Internal Arms Consumption

Russia is trying to re-equip its own army (LINK).  This has been going on for awhile.  P.M. Medvedev announced recently that the goal for new equipment in the Russian military is being raised to 75 percent new equipment by 2020.

There are a few implications for this, both internally and externally.  The first is that this is a move that is both about the military and about the militarized economy.  One of my favorite books about the subject of Russia's military economy is by Gaddy and Ickes (2002) [1].  This book talks about the distortions caused by the Soviet Union's militarized economy.  Russia's economy is still riding the oil and gas boom, but employment in those sectors is still small.  There are numerous factory towns (large and larger) whose existence and employment base was dependent on the militarized economy.

Vladimir Putin has elevated arms sales to the same level of state enterprise as the oil and gas industries.  The reasons for this are plentiful. One reason is that arms still are symbolically important.  The more states that use Russia's weapons, the greater Russia's perception of its own uniqueness and importance.  A second reason is hinted at above - Putin needs to employ individuals.  One way to do that is to continue to ride the distortions of the Soviet economy (to a lesser scale) by emphasizing the military industrial complex.

There have been some reports that Russian firms are unable to produce arms sufficiently to meet their obligations to external customers, let alone to fulfill such an ambitious rearmament agenda.  However, by emphasizing internal purchasing of weapons the Kremlin is sending a strong signal that these industries will have the continued support of the state - and that may goad them into ramping up production through hiring, streamlining processes, etc.

This will be an interesting phenomenon to keep an eye on.  To what degree will the Russian military re-arm itself in the coming years?[2]
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[1] Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. 2002. Russia’s Virtual Economy. Washington  D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

[2] I did not tackle the issue of corruption in this post. I have addressed it earlier (here and here). That will be an even bigger issue as more funds are funneled into the defense sector.

Note: It has been a while since I've posted anything here.  This is not a widely-read forum in general (and for now I'm okay with that), and has been more of a way for me to keep my thoughts together and to have a little fun doing side projects.  I have finished my dissertation and am in the process of moving to a visiting professor position at UNLV.  I may not be writing much over the summer either.