Arms and Civil War Intervention

The complexity of civil wars and intervention has been on my mind a lot lately.  I tend to look at everything through the lens of arms sales, and this is a really "good" time to think about these issues. Arms sales are in the news a great deal because of the ongoing proxy war in Yemen and the role that Western weapons are playing in that conflict as they are deployed by the different sides, especially by the Saudis.

In addition to proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, Libya is also the site of continued fighting.  Earlier this week, government forces found US weapons in the hands of rebel forces. There is an ongoing investigation about the source of these weapons, but it appears at first blush that they were originally sold to UAE (LINK). This would be a violation of the terms of sale to UAE and of the UN arms embargo to Libya in general, so it's a pretty serious issue.

I have a graduate student who is working on an MA thesis about outside intervention in civil wars, and she sent me an article from Brookings about this phenomenon. The article itself is about the analogies that we use to discuss wars and how analogies and history are weaponized and politicized to make different points, and that they take on a shorthand meaning to represent a certain viewpoint about intervention: think Munich vs. Vietnam as an analogy. Toward the end of the article there is a sentence that stood out to me and got me thinking about arms sales and civil war intervention:

"The proxy war problem highlights that, for the United States, ending civil wars is not merely a question of political will, but also a question of capacity. It is true that the US military is the most powerful in the world, but it is not the case that US military intervention will always tip the balance toward peace." 

 I thought about this in terms of two papers by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010, 2014) and how they have examined the "technologies of rebellion" and their effects on the outcome of civil war. They find that conventional war (fought with technology on both sides) leads to deadlier wars, but wars that are shorter in duration and with longer-lasting outcomes.

One way to think of this is that intervention on the part of the US government may not require physical intervention. Intervention in terms of providing equipment may be enough to tilt wars.  This brings me back to some of the research on arms transfers that took place at the height of the Cold War. Arms sales from the US and USSR to the third world were a deep concern because of the idea that these weapons may have been fueling conflict in many areas of the world.

There are a lot of normative and empirical pieces to unpack when thinking about intervening in civil conflicts. The role that arms can play (on both sides) is one that still needs to be explored more systematically.

Politics, Relationships, and International Arms Transfers

Arms transfers and the politics and relationships that surround them are everywhere when you are tuned in to them.  I know that I suffer from an extreme case of selective attention in the case of arms transfers, but I find them fascinating to think about.  I am constantly surprised both by how much we think about arms transfers in terms of human rights and foreign policy, but how little we actually think about the strategic logic of transferring coercive capabilities between states.  It is an area that is deeply in need of theorizing, and that is what I've taken as my central research task.

This week I had a few stories pop up in my news feed that reinforce the social and political nature of arms transfers.  The first one is one that I find very fascinating - it is the case of Turkey ordering S-400 missiles from Russia.  The original sale is problematic from the point of view of NATO since the S-400 is designed to shoot down NATO aircraft.  The symbolic move of Turkey away from NATO suppliers to Russia also signaled some deeper trends in the fracturing relationship between Erdogan and the West as a whole. 

I wrote about that sale in more detail earlier this year on this blog (LINK) and focused on the aspect that this particular sale may be an interesting case of a leading indicator that can be used to predict a state's alliance and ideological affiliation in the future.  One aspect that I didn't think of was the current state of Russian-Western relations and the fact that Russia faces sanctions.  The US is telling Turkey along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to back out of the purchase of these missiles from Russia or face the threat of sanctions themselves. LINK

In terms of the sanctions regime, it makes sense that explicitly military goods would be at the top of the list of sanctioned goods.  The fact that these arms are being considered by US allies is potentially troubling in and of itself in terms of what it may mean about the strength of trust between these states and the US in terms of security guarantees.

The second story that caught my eye was the potential for Ukraine to jointly produce armored vehicles with Thailand (LINK).  An article by Vucetic and Tago (2015) that I recently discovered (via Twitter) does a very good job of outlining the trade-off between autonomy and efficiency in the acquisition of arms.  It is most efficient to purchase arms off the shelf, but that leaves a state vulnerable to pressure from the selling state (which is the subject of the first part of this post).  It is costly and inefficient from an economic standpoint. 

What I found fascinating was the description of the meeting between the delegation from Thailand who came to Kyiv as part of bilateral talks between the nation.  The talks between the delegations are about strategic partnerships.  One way that is being considered to increase that partnership is to go into the business of arms together. One aspect of arms transfers that has been interesting to me since I started researching them 8 years ago is the high level of discussions that are involved in these purchases and how often heads of state or with cabinet/department level heads. 

The building of relationships through the transfer of weapons often seems to be part of an elaborate trust exercise.  I love the idea of Suchman and Eyre (1992) and their institutional logic of arms transfers, but I think that the social aspect of states bargaining and building relations based on arms tells an even deeper and surprising story.  It's a story that I'm happy to keep chipping away at.

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Suchman, Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. (1992) Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation. Sociological Forum 7: 137–161.

Vucetic, Srdjan, and Atsushi Tago. (2015) Why Buy American? The International Politics of Fighter Jet Transfers. Canadian Journal of Political Science 48: 101–124.

Salesman in Chief - An unsurprising Development in Arms Transfers

One of the most fascinating pieces of news about arms sales came out in a Reuters story a few days ago. The gist of the plan is that the Trump administration has a plan for the diplomatic and military apparatus to make the sale of arms a priority.  It's part of the "buy American" plan to increase manufacturing capability within the US.

President Donald Trump is expected to announce a “whole of government” approach that will also ease export rules on U.S. military exports and give greater weight to the economic benefits for American manufacturers in a decision-making process that has long focused heavily on human rights considerations, according to people familiar with the plan.

This is a real shift in the recent policies of the United States in terms of seeking to be more limited about which states received US arms.  Richard Johnson and I have a paper coming out in ISQ soon that looks at whether or not this rhetoric on human rights has any real substantive effects on arms sales by major democratic suppliers (hint: it does not - with a few caveats).  Our study is a follow up and expansion of Lindsay Blanton's 2005 work that looked at US arms sales only [1].

I am not surprised by this development. In my 2013 PhD thesis[2] I examined US and Russian decision-making on arms sales.  I found that both states were reliant on foreign sales to some degree. Russia has had - and this increased under Putin - a strategy of arms promotion at all levels of the state for a long time.  It is surprising how often Putin's name comes up when new arms deals are announced.  He is Russia's salesman in chief when it comes to arms sales.

The US move to an open policy of arms sales promotion makes sense under two common assumptions about arms sales.  The first assumption is about economics - and apparently that is the argument that is being made to justify this shift in foreign policy.  It is expensive to develop new weapons systems.  It is expensive to maintain manufacturing for spare parts.  Having external customers keeps production going, and provides partial relief for development costs.  It provides employment (which is particularly important in defense industries that can affect Congressional races where they are concentrated), and it ensures domestic manufacturing capability into the future. 

During the Cold War both the US and the Soviets could sustain their arms development because of the large internal market for weapons and the sizes of their military economies in general.  The end of the Cold war changed the imperatives for both states.  Russia felt this need first, and more acutely.  The United States needed arms sales more after the contraction of the armed forces during the 1990s.

The second assumption about arms sales that supports this development is the idea that arms purchases and sales are part of relationship building between states. This is a connection that has not been explored too deeply by arms scholarship. My current book project, which adapts and expands my dissertation examines these relationships more closely. Trump is a businessman in a business that is dominated by personal relationships. It seems natural that he would want to have a policy that reflects those preferences.  The fact that he is focusing on the sale of arms highlights to me the importance of arms sales to state identity. Arms sales are still not "sexy" like conflict and other types of security studies, but the more we see such fascinating real-world examples of their importance, the more likely that academics will pay more attention.
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[1]  Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 2005. "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports." International Studies Quarterly 49: 647–668.

[2] Willardson, Spencer L. 2013. "Under the Influence of Arms: The Causes and Consequences of Arms Transfers." PhD Thesis. University of Iowa. Link

Fighter Aircraft Sales and the Involvement of the Chief Executive: More Questions than Answers

One of the key questions within the academic literature on arms transfers is simply “why”.  Why do states transfer coercive capability to potential rival states?  The answer to this question is not easy, and there appear to be as many answers to the question as there are states that sell arms.  Explanations for arms sales typically boil down to economic imperatives or state interests. These are good explanations as far as they go, but even if we assume that these are the two main pressures that states face to sell arms, the degree to which one is more important than the other is still on the table.

My own beginning in the literature was launched with an assumption that arms sales by powerful states are used as a deliberate foreign policy tool.  I used the SIPRI classifications for exporters and assumed that the US and Russia (as heir to the Soviet Union) as hegemonic suppliers would be deliberate in their use of arms sales to enhance their foreign policy goals.  I found that this was not the case in either the US or Russia.  Russia is more dependent on arms sales - for a number of reasons that I won’t go into here - than is the US, but that arms sales are still driven by economic and other special interests in the US context.

What is surprising, is the fact that arms sales are an issue that make it onto the agenda of state executives and in meetings between heads of state. In today’s post, I am interested in a number of news articles detailing the sale of aircraft [1] by Russia and the United States.

The first article is mundane.  It describes the delivery of 4 refurbished F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia by the United States. The article describes the process of refurbishment and the means of delivery, and then notes that this is part of a sale of 16 fighters to the Indonesian government.  This article is most interesting when contrasted to the next article.  This article describes a letter sent by two Senators to the Trump administration arguing that the US should sign an agreement to allow F-16s to be produced in India.  The Senators argue that the deal is important to protect American jobs and the capability of producing a weapons system that is vital to the US arsenal.  (The US has almost as many F-16s in its arsenal - 1000 as India has fighter aircraft 1050 - and India has the world’s 4th largest capacity).  

This argument is interesting to me, because it assumes that the President will become involved in brokering deals with other states on behalf of private firms.

The third article is interesting because it examines the communication between different branches of the US government, but in the opposite direction. This article describes the Trump administration’s intention to allow the sale of F-16s to Bahrain reversing the Obama  administration decision that had stopped the sales because of human rights concerns.

The State Department originally notified Congress of the planned $4.87 billion sale last September during the Obama administration.
But it was pulled back because of the Obama administration's concerns that Bahrain had not made promised progress on human rights matters.
The decision by the new administration signals its backing for Sunni-led countries as counterweights to Shi'ite Iran's influence in the region.
Brian Dooley of Washington-based Human Rights First said separating the sale of the warplanes from human rights requirements would "encourage further repression" and create instability in Bahrain.

In my dissertation, I found that the US takes many considerations into view when selling arms, but that state security interests trump all the other considerations.  In this case, regional stability is more important than regime stability.  

The final article is one that describes the use of Arms as a deal sweetener by the Putin regime in negotiation with Serbia for a number of weapons systems.

Serbia is to soon receive six Mikoyan MiG-29 jets from Russia as a gift, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said.
Vucic made the comment after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who personally approved the transfer, Tass reported.
"President Putin will sign a decree in the coming days to transfer the planes to us," Vucic said. "Then, technical issues will have to be tackled: how to transport the planes, whether they should be disassembled into parts or one of the countries will provide its airspace for their flight. Of course, we favor the latter option because this is faster.

Putin has shown a willingness to be involved in bargaining for arms transfers.  He may be considered the arms saleseman in chief because many of his meetings with foreign leaders result in new arms deals being signed.  I am not sure, still, what to make of this behavior from a state and its leader, but I am very interesting in thinking through these issues for a long time.

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[1] Aircraft because that is the latest project I’m working on with one of my coauthors.

Link-O-Rama: Russia's Domestic Market & Russian Arms Exports

Today I am sharing a number of links I keep saving in my Google Reader to get to later.  They deal with Russia and arms transfers primarily.  It is a mix of positive (for Russia) developments, negative developments, and some weirdness.  The weirdness is that Russia continues to fight against the rest of the world community on the arms to Syria issue. While it is true that arms sales to Libya have not yet been banned (primarily because of Russia's adamant opposition to the possibility), the consensus of the world is coalescing against the regime.  That is potentially long-term bad news for Russia's arms sales to that state.

However, the arms deal to Iraq (see below) is a sign that Russia may be able to regain some of its lost ground in the region.  The items from Libya are a bit confusing.

The bad news for Russia's arms industry is that it is losing past customers (even present allies) for its radar systems.

The last point I want to make before I get to the links is that Russia is really playing the embattled and encircled card on the issue of arms in general.  There is no doubt that the arms industry is a key component of Russia's foreign policy portfolio.

Putin wants to Re-arm Russia 

“In June, we in particular discussed implementation of a state armament program regarding aviation,” he said. “We will keep the issue under constant control.” 

“We will have no other historic chance to solve these ambitious tasks the country is now facing to ensure its defense capability in due time and with due quality when [the required] funds are available, thank God,” Putin said. “Tomorrow we will have none of these funds, and time will be lost.”

Part II

Russia will continue to build up its own defense capabilities according to foreseeable threats stated President Vladimir Putin at a meeting at the Defense Ministry, reports the Voice of Russia's correspondent from the session.

There are multiplying and expanding zones of instability on the planet: with non-stop armed conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the danger of radicalism and chaos being exported to Russia from neighboring regions. 

"At the same time there are methodical attempts being carried out to undermine the strategic balance," President Putin said.

Russia at War over Arms Sales

MOSCOW, March 2 (RIA Novosti) – Russia is facing a ‘real war’ aimed at hampering the country’s legal deliveries of weapons to Syria, the head of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation has said. 

“A real war has been declared against us,” Alexander Fomin told Ekho Moskvy radio on Friday without specifying who has declared the war. 

“The [Russian] ships are lured into ports and arrested there under various devised pretexts. When the ships are at sea, any insurance is canceled,” Fomin said adding that any attempts to deliver the contracted goods are being thwarted.

Libya and IRAQ
Iraq 

Indeed, when it became known that Iraq had problems with the Russian deal, there was widespread speculation that Washington had pressured Maliki to stop buying from Moscow to keep him dependent on the United States. 

That and the widespread accusations of corruption in the deal... 

Libya

There were denials all round at the time but the Americans, like the Russians, need hefty exports to keep assembly lines running amid massive cutbacks in domestic defense spending [1]. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said Feb. 27 he will shortly ask the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed in 2011. 

Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said Monday that Moscow had reservations about that, given the Tripoli government's lack of authority and multiple security threats but he said Russia was ready to help the new Libya "facilitate the possible acquisition of arms." 

Russia's RIA Novosti new agency reports Algeria, another Cold War client, is another target, but Algiers has quarreled with Moscow on the quality of its arms and isn't expected to be a major buyer of Russian systems.

More on Libya

The Libyan authorities should do everything possible to stop the spread of Libyan weapons in the region and beyond, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said on Wednesday. 

Rebels in Libya, some of them from Islamist groups, ousted and killed long-standing dictator Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 after a months-long uprising, in which they received assistance from NATO forces. Government arsenals across the country were looted during the conflict.

Wouldn't arms leakage present an opportunity for more sale to Libya in the long-run if they get the contracts?

Russia and Vietnam

Moscow will proceed with plans this year to help Vietnam launch a new submarine fleet and train the crews, Russian Defense Ministry Sergei Shoigu said on Wednesday.

Vietnam ordered six submarines in order to counter Chinese expansion in the area. 

Estonia (and Belarus)

TALLINN, March 7 (RIA Novosti) - Estonia’s Air Defense Forces have dismantled their last obsolete Soviet-made radars, the General Staff of the country’s armed forces said on Thursday. 

One P-37 type radar will be installed as a monument at the Amari military base, while another will be sent to an aviation museum. 

At present, two radar stations monitor Estonia’s airspace - a TPS-77 at Kallavere, in western Estonia and an ASR-8 at Amari, not far from Tallinn. 

In late March, a new radar station will be opened on Muhu Island featuring a medium-range Ground Master 430 3D air-defense radar [2] with an effective range of up to 470 kilometers (295 miles) and an altitude of up to 30 kilometers (100,000 feet). 

Another post-Soviet republic, Belarus, said in mid-February it would replace a Russian radar station with an indigenous one and dispose of its Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 fighters.

The fact that even Belarus (Russia's erstwhile ally) is moving away from Russian-produced radar does not bode well for the reputation of Russian defense products.  This is a serious problem for Russia given its priority of exporting weapons.
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[1] One of the assumptions I make in my dissertation is that both the US and Russia can use arms transfers as foreign policy tools because their domestic markets can support the arms industry.  This assumption does not seem to be holding up well.

[2] These are manufactured by the Thales group, a French firm.

The Enemy of my Friend - India Pakistan and Russia

This article popped up in my news feed this morning.  It is about Russia's anger that India is purchasing fighters from France. The gist of the argument is that Russia has been India's "true strategic partner" since the 1960s.  The evidence for this is that Russia has voluntarily abstained from selling weapons to India's primary enemy, Pakistan.

Russia now feels betrayed that India is not rewarding that loyalty. India is still the largest customer of Russian arms.  However, if India continues to seek alternatives, Russia could find a lucrative source of income drying up or at least becoming more difficult to assure.

Here is the money quote from the head of Rosoboroneksport:

“We do not sell military equipment to Pakistan, only because of our loyalty to India. But all other nations, with whom India does business, sell their weapons and systems to Pakistan. We are India’s true strategic partners.”

I had the data for arms networks laying around (for my dissertation) so I quickly put together graphs for both India and Pakistan.  These are the ego networks for the two states, which means that these are not the full world arms network, only those states involved in sales to either India or Pakistan.

Neither of these two graphs shows much difference in the composition of states selling weapons.  In the Pakistan network, shown at the bottom, Russia is located at the edge of the graph and is not selling directly to Pakistan.  In all other respects, though the networks are very similar.

I guess the question is now to what extent Russia has deliberately not sold to Pakistan.  If Russia has made a decision not to sell that is one thing.  If Pakistan has not tried to buy because it was being supplied by the US and its allies and wanted to maintain that source for its weapons, then this is a different conversation. The idea that Russia is engaging in a deliberate version of Heidegger's rule (The enemy of my friend if my enemy) is what is most fascinating to me about this entire episode.