The Turkish Kerfuffle - F35 and S-400 Missiles in Competition

It may be too dramatic to call the kerfuffle over S-400 missiles a fight for the soul of Turkey.  I am not a Turkey expert, but I think that Erdogan's victory over the military after the "coup" of 2016 took Turkey down a new security path that may be hard to come back from. Many articles have discussed the issue of the S-400 missile and the US decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 project as a consequence.  A recent article in War on the Rocks helped me to think through my own position on this issue more clearly.

The author of the article, Ray Rounds, makes a number of interesting points about the ineffectiveness of arms as instruments of foreign policy - especially in terms of specific policies.  This ineffectiveness has been at the heart of the finds that Richard Johhnson and I found regarding human rights and arms transfers.  We published a piece in ISQ last year that tried to tie democratic states' stances on human rights to their policy actions in terms of arms transfers.  We found that the actions of these democratic states does not match their rhetoric in any meaningful way.  We have other work under review that tests this proposition using dependence on arms as the independent variable to test whether or not dependence on democratic suppliers can spur states to better human rights records.  The spoiler answer to that particular question is that it does not.

With that in mind, the argument that arms embargoes are more costly and harmful is thought-provoking.  It is especially useful for helping to develop clearer theories of arms transfers in international relations more broadly - my long-term project and personal white whale.

Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course. 

This idea that arms create and strengthen relationships, and cannot simply be used instrumentally to get a particular policy or outcome at a desired time is interesting and nuanced.  It also tracks with my own theoretical leanings to think that arms sales are part of the fabric of international relations precisely because they are a currency of relationships.  They are a currency precisely because the transfer of arms represents the transfer of coercive capabilities that forms the basis of an anarchic world.  In terms of Wendt (1992) arms are a big piece of the anarchy that states are making.

Rounds lists a number of states that have moved to diversify their arms suppliers because of US restrictions, delays, and hesitance in supplying them with weapons over the course of a number of year:

Egypt is one example above; but others such as Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have significantly diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to Saudi Arabia, and few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a U.S. embargo.

In the case of US and Turkey, the refusal of the US to consider Turkey for Patriot Missiles (and some technology transfer and manufacturing offsets) was one of the main factors in influencing Turkey to move towards the Russians.  That move has now jeopardized further cooperation in defense and arms for the F-35, a project that may have kept Turkey in the US/Western orbit for 30-40 years or more. 

State Interests and the Business side of Arms

How do we measure the impact of non-state actors on state policy? I ask because I am generally curious.  I am curious because the answer that question is essential to understanding the complexity of the issue of arms in international relations. I think that the disconnect between the firms that produce weapons, and the states that regulate their sales and purchase them is one of the biggest barriers to really building general theories of arms transfers.

My most recent work on arms transfers relies on a constructivist/role theoretical framing of the state as a corporate actor.  The state has interests and acts deliberately (not always rationally, but deliberately) to advance those interests. Personifying states and accounting for the effects that come through the interaction of these agents is not necessarily new.  However, trying to account for many moving pieces beneath the surface and how they interact to produce the actions and outcomes we can see is still necessary for some degree of understanding.

How does this all relate to arms sales?  Well there are two stories that appeared in my reader this week that have made me think about this issue more deeply than I have for years - probably since I was drafting the first chapter of my dissertation six years ago.

The first story is about the struggles of the Italian defense firm Leonardo.  The firm was recently renamed (previously it was Finmeccanica) after it had troubles with scandals.  Now it is having trouble with orders and generating revenue, and its stock has plunged.  This particular line from the article really jumped out at me:

Leonardo, Europe's largest maker of military hardware after BAE Systems and Airbus, said it hoped to return to "sustainable growth" over the next five years thanks to a new sales strategy, accelerating orders, strict cost control and a better financial strategy.

I wonder about the model for sustainable growth in a defense firm that operates independently. It also operates in an environment where government (both Italian and EU) control over exports can limit the potential sales of the firm. Others have studied this economic paradox regarding arms before - and the original SIPRI arms classifications of hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive supplier accounted for the government policies regarding arms.  Italy is an industrial supplier.  It needs to sell arms in order to support internal business.

The tension is that the Italian government and the EU code restrict arms exports. In deciding how to allow firms to operate and to sell weapons, governments are faced with choices about what the most salient state interest is.  Is it to have a strong defense industry (or any industry) and to generate employment and exports, or is it to operate "responsibly" on the world stage?

The set of choices for state interests is also not simply a dichotomous choice between native industrial capacity and responsible action.  State interests in alliances and other relationships, security for client states, preferences for regional leadership in areas outside their own, or simply state prestige can affect the state's desire to control arms outflows.

That brings me to the second article.  This is a follow up to my post from last week about Trump's new "Buy American" plan.  The United States is sending a State department official to a defense expo in Singapore to promote the sale of US weapons - especially aircraft and missiles.

Whether it is misguided or not [and I am not convinced either way], the Trump administration has determined that it is in America's interest to sell weapons.  The export, balance of trade, and American manufacturing arguments will play well domestically and I think that is one of the primary drivers of the policy. However, the international implications of expanding arms sales could be just as significant - and those implications could be either positive or negative.  US arms purchases can signal greater cooperation with states in the future.  It can signal a willingness by states to improve their own defense capabilities.  Such a signal may make the US more willing to extend further security guarantees, or negate the need for the US to provide the majority the security for particular states or regions (Yarhi-Milo et al 2016).

Whatever the reason for the new emphasis, the outcome will likely be more arms sales.  Researchers will certainly be looking at the effects of those transfers in the years to come.
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Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper. (2016) To Arm or to Ally?: The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances. International Security 41: 90–139.

Fighter Aircraft Sales and the Involvement of the Chief Executive: More Questions than Answers

One of the key questions within the academic literature on arms transfers is simply “why”.  Why do states transfer coercive capability to potential rival states?  The answer to this question is not easy, and there appear to be as many answers to the question as there are states that sell arms.  Explanations for arms sales typically boil down to economic imperatives or state interests. These are good explanations as far as they go, but even if we assume that these are the two main pressures that states face to sell arms, the degree to which one is more important than the other is still on the table.

My own beginning in the literature was launched with an assumption that arms sales by powerful states are used as a deliberate foreign policy tool.  I used the SIPRI classifications for exporters and assumed that the US and Russia (as heir to the Soviet Union) as hegemonic suppliers would be deliberate in their use of arms sales to enhance their foreign policy goals.  I found that this was not the case in either the US or Russia.  Russia is more dependent on arms sales - for a number of reasons that I won’t go into here - than is the US, but that arms sales are still driven by economic and other special interests in the US context.

What is surprising, is the fact that arms sales are an issue that make it onto the agenda of state executives and in meetings between heads of state. In today’s post, I am interested in a number of news articles detailing the sale of aircraft [1] by Russia and the United States.

The first article is mundane.  It describes the delivery of 4 refurbished F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia by the United States. The article describes the process of refurbishment and the means of delivery, and then notes that this is part of a sale of 16 fighters to the Indonesian government.  This article is most interesting when contrasted to the next article.  This article describes a letter sent by two Senators to the Trump administration arguing that the US should sign an agreement to allow F-16s to be produced in India.  The Senators argue that the deal is important to protect American jobs and the capability of producing a weapons system that is vital to the US arsenal.  (The US has almost as many F-16s in its arsenal - 1000 as India has fighter aircraft 1050 - and India has the world’s 4th largest capacity).  

This argument is interesting to me, because it assumes that the President will become involved in brokering deals with other states on behalf of private firms.

The third article is interesting because it examines the communication between different branches of the US government, but in the opposite direction. This article describes the Trump administration’s intention to allow the sale of F-16s to Bahrain reversing the Obama  administration decision that had stopped the sales because of human rights concerns.

The State Department originally notified Congress of the planned $4.87 billion sale last September during the Obama administration.
But it was pulled back because of the Obama administration's concerns that Bahrain had not made promised progress on human rights matters.
The decision by the new administration signals its backing for Sunni-led countries as counterweights to Shi'ite Iran's influence in the region.
Brian Dooley of Washington-based Human Rights First said separating the sale of the warplanes from human rights requirements would "encourage further repression" and create instability in Bahrain.

In my dissertation, I found that the US takes many considerations into view when selling arms, but that state security interests trump all the other considerations.  In this case, regional stability is more important than regime stability.  

The final article is one that describes the use of Arms as a deal sweetener by the Putin regime in negotiation with Serbia for a number of weapons systems.

Serbia is to soon receive six Mikoyan MiG-29 jets from Russia as a gift, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said.
Vucic made the comment after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who personally approved the transfer, Tass reported.
"President Putin will sign a decree in the coming days to transfer the planes to us," Vucic said. "Then, technical issues will have to be tackled: how to transport the planes, whether they should be disassembled into parts or one of the countries will provide its airspace for their flight. Of course, we favor the latter option because this is faster.

Putin has shown a willingness to be involved in bargaining for arms transfers.  He may be considered the arms saleseman in chief because many of his meetings with foreign leaders result in new arms deals being signed.  I am not sure, still, what to make of this behavior from a state and its leader, but I am very interesting in thinking through these issues for a long time.

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[1] Aircraft because that is the latest project I’m working on with one of my coauthors.

Russia and Syria - Arms Related Issues

Russia is now involved in the war in Syria.  Air strikes and naval bombardment along with cruise missile launches, along with the addition of ground troops as advisers is serious business.  The potential for adverse international incidents has increased.  The fighting in Ukraine is contained.  The fighting in Syria is taking place in the context of continued Western and US airstrikes.  The potential for a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia is higher than it has been for a long time.

I am interested in Russia's endgame here.  I am curious as to what Putin thinks he will gain. I just started reading a great book that analyzes Putin's actions, and this quote really jumped out at me:

"...we cannot take any story or so called fact at face value when it comes to Vladimir Putin ... we are dealing with someone who is a master at manipulating information, suppressing information, and creating pseudo-information...In today's world of social media, the public has the impression that we know, or can easily know, everything about everybody.  Nothing, it seems, is private or secret.  And still, after 15 years, we remain ignorant of some of the most basic facts about a man who is arguably the most powerful individual in the world, the leader of an important nation.  When there is no certifiably real and solid information, any tidbit becomes precious." [1]

This jumped out to me again when I watched the Daily Vertical podcast about Putin challenging the western world's way of thinking and facts (LINK).  While I don't think I have any really new insights into what Russia is doing and thinking, I can at least make some observations about the effects of what they are doing in an area that I do have some insights into: arms transfers.

Negative and Potential Negative Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

I have already covered the issue of the Mistral ships.  Russia lost these ships as a direct result of their actions in Ukraine.  The latest word is that Egypt is going to purchase these ships, which is good for France (LINK). Is there a potential that Russia will lose out on other purchases?  Yes, but Russia doesn't import a lot of equipment, so for them, this is just a temporary setback.

The more serious setback for Russia would be if states began cancelling orders for weapons after seeing their actions.  This is a real possibility.  Turkey is very upset at Russia over incursions into its air space as Russia began its air actions over Syria.  This has already had an effect on a joint pipeline project (LINK), and has the potential to damage other relations.  Russia and Turkey have cooperated on helicopter manufacturing in the past (a case study from my dissertation), and if Turkey sees Russia becoming a security risk, it will likely move away from such relations.

The performance of Russian equipment in Syria is also a potential negative side effect.  If Russian equipment performs poorly (like reports of four cruise missiles crashing in Iran instead of hitting targets in Syria (LINK)), then potential customers may decide to look for other options.

Potential Positive Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

There are two potential positive consequences of Russian actions in Syria from the point of view of Russian arms sales. The first is the converse of the last point made above: positive performance by Russian equipment is free advertising for Russian arms.  Seeing weapons tested in combat and working is a great selling point to potential customers.

Other current and potential customers will take note of the point above and may also see the arms relationship becoming a proxy for more formal alliances, thus making continued arms purchases, or new arms purchases more attractive to buyers.  Venezuela recently expanded its arms deal with Russia (LINK), as has Thailand (LINK).  Interestingly, the deal with Thailand appears to be a barter deal for rubber.  This could be an effect of sanctions.  Thailand has been diversifying its arms portfolio in recent years.

Potential Positive Effects for US Arms Sales

For the US, Russia being seen as an aggressor may potentially make arms sales to neighboring states a higher priority.  States will see this as a way to further integrate with existing US-led defense pacts (NATO), and a way to strengthen and emphasize military ties. Norway, for instance, recently added more planes to its F-35 order because of Russian aggression and escalation in the Baltic and North Sea areas (LINK).  This will be dependent on whether states are satisfied with US military hardware, however, which in some recent cases doesn't appear to be the case (LINK).

Other Geopolitical Consequences

Just because I am not going to spend time trying to figure out Putin's motivations, does not mean that I won't point out some geopolitical consequences of Russian military adventurism. The most obvious is that Russia's fears of NATO are now becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as NATO moves to bolster its powers along Russia's borders and to strengthen commitments to states bordering Russia's active military adventures (Poland, Turkey) (LINK).  It is also leading, it appears, to a strengthening of the US resolve on the issue of Ukraine (LINK).

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[1] Hill, Fiona and Clifford G. Gaddy. 2015. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution. p 7.

The Politics and Economics of Arms Sales

I have been doing a lot of thinking lately about the nexus between the politics and the economics of arms sales.  It is a question that lies at the heart of my dissertation, but one which is mostly inadequately appreciated by both economists and political scientists.  I had my class (Politics of Arms in International Relations) read some pieces this week which relate to this decision-making nexus and it has brought some of these issues back to the forefront in my own thinking.

First off is a great quote from Smith, Dunn, and Fontanel (1985) about the problems of politics in the transfer of arms [1]. (Emphasis is mine)

"Although arms transfers comprise a significant component of world trade, they have received little attention from mainstream economists.  This partly reflects the data difficulties which inhibit accurate estimation and quantification, and partly the contamination of the topic by political and strategic elements beyond the economists' expertise."

The idea that an issue is contaminated by political and strategic elements is an interesting perspective of political science.  It is refreshing to see economists admit that there may be something that is beyond their expertise as well!

Smith et al (1985) argue that there are three primary reasons for states to wish to sell weapons:

1.     Strategic: governments wish to maintain an indigenous arms industry ins order to ensure weapons designed exactly to their requirements, national independence of supply, and access to the latest military technology. There is an incentive to export, even if exports are below the average cost. (242-3)
2.     Political leverage in foreign policy: nation can assist their "friends" by strengthening their military position while at the same time having potential to influence their behavior (Kinsella tie-in) or that there is a prohibition that weapons not used aggressively or for internal repression (tie-in with Blanton). (243)
3.     Economic benefits: these include technological spin-offs, employment benefits, economic momentum (243-44)

Caverley and Kapstein [2] look at similar arguments in the case of the United States arms production. They argue that the US lost its advantage in arms exports because of the domestic demands of the pentagon.  The penchant for the US military to ask for the nicest, highest spec equipment means that the finished product is priced out of range for non-domestic buyers.  They give the example of the F-35, which was designed to be a low-cost high tech fighter that would be good enough for most missions and which would be eminently exportable.  The rising costs of that aircraft have meant that many staunch allies have reduced or cancelled orders for the aircraft. The increased design specifications have made the aircraft less suitable for the domestic role that it was originally meant to fill.

This is an interesting dilemma.  The world's superpower which has the advantage of a strong domestic market is being squeezed out because of the unrealistic demands of that same market. This echoes the findings of Smith and colleagues in the case of decreased military spending by Britain, GDR, and the US means fewer exports, while the opposite was true for France and Italy.  They note that it was the civilian oversight of the procurement process in those states - with an eye toward exports - that caused this result.

I had some articles in my newsfeed about aircraft sales that made me think of these arguments today.

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Links

First F-35 built in Europe goes for its maiden Flight: LINK

Making F-35s more quickly can lead to problems: LINK

Kuwait is buying the Eurofighter.  LINK

Brazil is buying a Swedish fighter: LINK  LINK2

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REFERENCES

[1] Smith, Ron, Anthony Humm, and Jacques Fontanel. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting Arms.” Journal of Peace Research 22(3): 239–47.
[2] Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2012. “Arms Away.” Foreign Affairs 91(5): 125–32.

More Arms Round Up - Strategic Bombers and Navy for Russia and United States

US Aircraft News

I have been following the development of the F-35 with interest for the past few years.  It represents a new way of building aircraft, but seems like it may be a model that is not sustainable, or feasible.  I didn't know the US was looking at creating a third generation strategic bomber, but that seems to be the case.  This article gives some details about the development and testing of this new aircraft.  It will be some time before it is ready for production - if it is chosen as an option.  LINK  LINK2

US most Advanced Fighters, the F-22 raptor, deployed (kind of) to Europe as a reassurance against more aggressive Russian maneuvers in Europe's airspace.  The problem with this power projection is the weakness that it represents because of the low numbers of aircraft in service. LINK

Russian Bombers and MiGs

Meanwhile, Russia's strategic bombers the TU-160 is being modernized.  LINK  With new avionics: LINK

Russia's new smart bombs to go on those updated bombers. LINK

Russian MiGs owned by Bulgaria to be repaired in Poland.  LINK

This is a fascinating look at dependence (my students will have read Kinsella (1998) and should know about dependence) and using an outside state to provide maintenance.  This can't be good for Russia's long-term arms sales.  I am wondering about the long-term implications for arms sales if the supplier is seen as being too pushy.  That's a take on things that I don't think I've seen in the literature before.

Link-O-Rama: Arms Edition

Apologies and Excuses

So much for resolutions! (Link) A bold prediction about my future blogging awesomeness followed by 1 post in 5 months is not a stellar beginning.  In my defense, the past 5 months have been as busy as any in my life.  These are the highlights of the past five months:

• The end of the semester
• chairing our graduate admissions committee
• A trip to the US to sit on a hiring committee
• A trip to the US a week later to attend a seminar at Brigham Young University
• Graduation
• A trip to Poland for a conference
• A vacation to the US for 5 weeks to visit family
• The return to Astana to start the new semester with a new role: acting department chairIn addition to the normal activities of getting ready for the semester (preparation of syllabi, courses, etc) I have had the new administrative tasks associated with my new position.  I also had an article accepted for publication that needed work to be ready for the publisher.  I have also been scrambling to put together my paper for the American Political Science Association Meeting (APSA) which is next week. 

I now have a better understanding of the wisdom of my PhD advisers who emphasized that life after graduate school was more busy.  The pressures and activities are a bit different, but it is definitely busy.

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Arms Links

With the preamble over, I am now going to post links to articles about arms.  I am doing this in conjunction with my PLS455/555 Politics of Arms in International Relations course at Nazarbayev University. I thought this would be a good resource for my students as they begin their case study assignments for the course. It is also a good way for me to organize these links and resources and to put together some initial thoughts.  In this edition I will keep my comments brief. I would like to do this more regularly and add more context and analysis. 

F-35

• Australia drops out of F-35 program. Large-scale weapons system collaboration is hard! Link
• A good roundup of lots of arms news.  News on Russian Sukhoi fighter jets, and the ongoing saga of the F-35 fighter. Link
• F-35B not doing well in carrier testing and certification. Link

Mistrel

• France returns Russia's money for the Mistrel.  This is a great example of the politicization of arms transfers. It's an interesting case of Russia importing (Russia is not a major arms importer) and being denied a weapon system that it really wanted. Link
• France needs to sell the Mistrels it is not selling to Russia.  That will prove very difficult. Link

Russian Arms and Navy

• Russia to develop a new "Doomsday" aircraft command center. Link
•  Russian navy to begin building new destroyer - with capabilities that are very impressive and challenging to the US Naval superiority. Does this mean a comeback for the defense industry in Russia? Link
• New Russian drone design. Link
• Seven new and scary Russian weapons systems.  In this sense scary is for the West, or potential military rivals of the Russian state.  Hypersonic weapons are a new class of weapons that pose an interesting dilemma.  They are definitely weapons of the offensive, but are meant to overcome missile shield technology that rendered earlier nuclear offensive capabilities less secure. This is a demonstration of a technological arms race. Link
• Morocco to buy Russian Amur class submarine.  Why? Link
• New love for an old Bear. The TU-95 and nuclear bomber advantages. Link
• Refurbished Russian submarine with all kinds of capabilities baffles US experts. "The Russians were always more innovative at this than we were."  What also struck me about this sub is its length.  It is half the length of a US aircraft carrier.  The Russians don't mess around when it comes to submarines. Link
• Russian air to air missiles R-73 are flying off the shelves of the arms bazaars. Link
• Story about Russia's new Armata tank. Link
• Interesting video of forum on Russian naval power in the 21st century. Link
• Russia selling powerful anti-aircraft missile system to Iran.  Link

India

• Predictions of US-Russian arms competition in India.  This is an interesting field of inquiry.  India just became part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but is also a democratic state, unlike most other members of the organization.  India has traditionally been one of Russia's biggest customers, and I have dealt with the issue of Russian-Indian arms purchases in other posts (Link, Link, Link). Will closer security cooperation cement the relationship that has been built between the two countries? Link
• India is going to be buying a lot of arms in the near to medium future. 4.7 Billion dollars is a good start. Link

US Navy and Military

• US begins work on second "Gerald R. Ford" Class of Aircraft Carrier to be named after JFK. Link
• An interesting piece on the size of the US navy.  Arguments on one side are qualitative (our fewer ships can do more than many more ships were able to do earlier.)  Arguments on the other are quantitative.  Fetishizing numbers is not good policy.  However, arguing in terms of threats faced and the ability of the naval force, as presently constituted, to respond to those threats is good policy. Questioning the definitions of threats is the next step in such an analysis.  Policy in the absence of strategy is rudderless. Link
• Russian jammers supposedly render aircraft carriers useless.  Whither the advantage of carrier groups? Link
• The US is not selling, but is deploying F-22s to Europe to ease the minds of allies.  Increased Russian air activity within the context of the Crimean and Ukrainian conflict is increasing tensions in the region. Link 
• Strong market for used US M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and its variants.  I spent a lot of time in one of these in Baghdad 2003. Link I spent more time in the Bradley, though.
• I don't understand why the US Air Force hates the A-10 so much.  I think the Army would be happy to have these aircraft. Link
• 
  

China

• China is holding a large military parade next week and is having trouble attracting western leaders: Link  and another Link

Communist China generally shies away from the vast annual demonstrations of military might that were a hallmark of the Soviet Union, normally holding such events once a decade to mark the foundation of the People's Republic. 

It has struggled to attract world-wide interest for the parade as world leaders are wary of the tone of the event, and the risk of lending it legitimacy. 

Beijing is becoming increasingly assertive in the region and regularly accuses Tokyo of failing to show sufficient contrition for Japan's 20th-century invasion of China.

Other Miscellaneous Arms Links 

• Analysis of Central Asian Military capabilities.  This should be of interest to my students. Link
• Sweden and Brazil sign a deal for Gripen fighters. The deal includes financial terms, as well as details about the licensing and production of half of the fighters in Brazil.  The jet was also modified to fit Brazil's needs.  Link
• French Deliver Rafale fighters to Egypt.  Link
• This link maybe the most interesting.  It details the problem with Pilatus aircraft that was sold to Chad by Switzerland. The aircraft is not mean to be armed or used offensively, but apparently it has been.  This has led the Swiss to pull back on other potential exports. It is interesting to see a principled stance on arms transfers. Economic theories of arms transfers would predict that Switzerland is under too much financial pressure to export in order to support its domestic manufacturing for a product that has a limited domestic market. Interesting counterexample/mini case study to think about in terms of policy-making and the complexity of arms sales as a topic. Link

Military Aircraft Sales Visualized (1990)

I am working on a new paper that uses SIPRI data to look at more fine-grained transactions than the simple TIV value that I used for my dissertation research.  The project that I am working on is using these data to test some hypotheses that are related to realist behavior by states.  I am in the midst of coding the data.  The coding itself has been a good project to get me down into the details of arms transactions by states.  I am looking at transactions by examining the trade registers for all years from 1990-2013.

I have completed my first year of data coding.  Overall there were 215 distinct military aircraft sales in which aircraft were delivered in 1990.  This involved 26 suppliers, the largest two were the USSR and the United States.  Even more states were the recipients of these aircraft sales.  This included the sale of all types of aircraft ranging from small helicopters to large cargo planes.  The most interesting sales are those involving fighter jets and jets that have other strike capabilities.

Since I can't help it, I have visualized the sale of aircraft between states as a network.  The graph probably needs some work.  I plan on cutting it down into chunks, aircraft by type, at a later time.  For now, though, I thought it would be a fun graph to post.

Data on arms sales come from the SIPRI data.

Presidential Involvement in Arms Sales: Israel and France Edition

Today while I was working on coding aircraft sales (using SIPRI trade register data) I came across and aircraft type that I wanted more details about.  That took me down the Wikipedia wormhole.  What I found was a very interesting history of presidential involvement in arms sales - in this case the French President and sales of Mirage 5 fighters to Israel during the 1960s.

From Wikipedia:

The first Mirage 5 flew on 19 May 1967.^[2] It looked much like the Mirage III, except it had a long slender nose that extended the aircraft's length by about half a metre. A pitot tube was distinctively moved from the tip of the nose to below the nose in the majority of Mirage 5 variants. 

The Mirage 5 retained the IIIE's twin DEFA guns, but added two additional pylons, for a total of seven. Maximum warload was 4,000 kg (8,800 lb). Provision for the SEPR rocket engine was deleted. 

Rising tensions in the Middle East led French President Charles de Gaulle to embargo the Israeli Mirage 5s on 3 June 1967. The Mirages continued to roll off the production line, even though they were embargoed, and by 1968 the batch was complete and the Israelis had provided final payments. 

In late 1969, the Israelis, who had pilots in France testing the aircraft, requested that the aircraft be transferred to Corsica, in theory to allow them to continue flight training during the winter. The French government became suspicious when the Israelis also tried to obtain long-range fuel tanks and cancelled the move.The Israelis finally gave up trying to get the aircraft and accepted a refund. 

Some sources claim cooperation with France resumed outside the public's eye and Israel received 50 Mirage 5s in crates from the AdA, while the AdA took over the 50 aircraft originally intended for Israel, as Mirage 5Fs.^[3][4][5]Officially, Israel claimed to have built the aircraft after obtaining complete blueprints, naming them IAI Nesher.^[6][7]

In my dissertation I looked at the involvement of the Russian president in setting up deals for arms sales to other countries. There are some theories about arms transfers that would say that states such as France would be less likely to bow to pressure to restrict arms sales since there is a great deal of domestic pressure and incentives to produce these weapons systems for export. The customer (Israel) and the context (the 1967 war) are certainly factors to consider when looking at the case.  However, this is also in contrast to France's continued plan to sell Mistrel class ships to Russia in the midst of sanctions on Russia for its actions in Crimea and Ukraine.

I was happy to find more examples of presidential involvement in such matters because it reinforces the important foreign policy implications of exporting coercive capabilities to other states in the world system.  

Why arms control is hard...

This item has been sitting in my reader for a few days.  This statement, made by Vladimir Putin, touches on so many aspects of international relations that I didn't quite know what direction I wanted to take in examining it.  First, the statement:

"Only sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council can serve as a basis for restricting weapons supplies to any particular country. In all other cases, nobody can use any pretext to dictate to Russia or any other country on how they should trade and with whom."

I would like to address two interesting points from the standpoint of my own research on arms transfer that this statement evinces.

1. Arms control is inherently difficult to begin if the two states that have the largest stake in the arms transfer game have an effective veto on limitations of their right to sell weapons.  This is a highly rational position for Russia to take if it sees arms sales as a vital part of its economic, military, or foreign policy portfolio. The built-in veto of the security council turns this international organization into a forum for state to state diplomacy rather than international action in the case of arms transfers.  What I mean by this is that in the case of the US and Russia having disputes over arms transfers to Syria, for example, the veto on the security council by each state means that either state can effectively get what they want in the absence of all but the most spirited international consensus.  
2. The second point is that Putin seems to put arms sales in the same category as other trade.  Nobody can dictate how they trade and with whom.  This is a very interesting sentiment for a state which recently was accepted into the WTO to have.  

The question about arms transfers being a different type of trade is one that I'll leave to another time.  However, Russia continues to hold firm to its position of autonomy in foreign policy.  Its leaders are unwilling to allow the state to be constrained by other states (i.e. the United States) or even by the international community more broadly.  

A Love Hate Relationship with R is Born

I am interested in arms transfers.  I am also interested in networks. In my dissertation I am combining those two interests.  I think that I am looking at some really cool relationships.  This is well and good. However, to do this fun research stuff I have had to leave my comfort zone of STATA and work in R.  Now I am fighting through the twin troubles of learning new software (and a language to code in) and learning new models.

I did a preliminary round of study to make sure that I could do this analysis in an advanced statistics class last semester.  Over the summer R changed versions. The package I use to do my ERGM analysis broke.  That package was updated.  Then my code broke and nothing worked the past two weeks as I have tried to get my analysis done for my dissertation.

After hours of frustrated Googling, I found a note on a blog (that I can't find a link to now... arrrrrgh!) about R namespaces and needing to remove the igraph and statnet packages and reinstall statnet first in order for it to work correctly.  I did this (without reinstalling igraph, just to be sure).  Now things run.  Now I can actually do analysis and not debugging and firefighting with the software.

Enough of the hate. I love Rstudio.  After running through some model specifications last night I decided to try out the knitr package. Awesome.  I still have a lot to learn to make things into real good documents and documentation of my analyses, but you can check out this link to my output for my test models here.

And here is a network graph of France's (egocentric) arms network during the 1950s.  The network is created from the main world network.  The world network accounts for all arms transactions from 1950 to 1959.  The sociomatrix shows a 1 if state i sold weapons to state j at any point during the 10 year window.

Created Using R. Data come from SIPRI.

Feudal Domains - Congress, the Military, and Arms Procurement

As part of my dissertation research I am examining the processes through which states make foreign policy decisions.  I am specifically interested in the policies that lead to the export of arms from one state to another. My dissertation focuses on this decision-making in the United States and Russia.  Today's reading of Chapter 5 of Richard Halloran's book To Arm a Nation proved to be a rich source of material.

This chapter focuses on the "Feudal Domains" within both the military and Congress which create unnecessary duplication of efforts in acquisition of arms.  The problems of acquisition are a result of turf battles within both institutions - Congress and the Military. The issue in Congress is the temptation to use the vast military budget to gain political advantage:

"Congress is the site of dozens of fiefs, each more concerned with its own turf....The primary reason is simple - money.  The military budget is so immense that everyone seeks to get as much of it as possible spent in his home state or election district." (Halloran 1986, 146-7)

Within the defense department, the problems come as a result of turf battles between powerful procurement chiefs that are exacerbated by the inter service rivalry within the military more generally.

"But the personnel fiefs are minor compared with those in the procurement of arms, equipment, vehicles ammunition, spare parts, and the vast storehouse of supplies for a modern military force.  It is surely the most divided and conflicting set of fiefs within the military establishment, rarely developing weapons that would be used by more than one service and hence could be produced economically." (Halloran 1986, 161)

Another point that is made by Halloran is of interest to those trying to research processes of decision making.   That is the difference between the people and the system.  He discusses some of the idiosyncrasies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He contends that they don't function well as advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.  The written reports and advice that comes from the Joint Chiefs is "...generally irrelevant, normally unread, and most always disregarded." (Halloran 1986, 163).  This is in contrast to informal meetings between the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense which were characterized by Harold Brown (President Carter's SECDEF).  Brown noted that these face-to-face meetings were "extremely helpful" (ibid).

Of particular interest to those interested in the processes leading to exports are the vignettes on page 170 of ways that Members of Congress push for extra production of weapons systems that benefit their district.

• Carl Levin (D, MI) - Pushes for an additional 120 M1 tanks (840 as opposed to the 720 requested by military)
• Howard Metzenbaum (D, OH) - critic of military spending but big supporter of the B1 bomber program because of the components made in Ohio.
• Sam Nunn (D, GA) - "respected for his evenhanded approach [to defense spending]" fought to have additional C5 aircraft built in Georgia even though the Army and Air Force favored a new plane.

In these cases it seems that there would be pressure from Congress to find foreign outlets for such weapons systems built in their home districts.  If we can sell such items to allies across the world, it is even better for the local economies that Members of Congress represent so fiercely.  Is that a reasonable assumption to make?  Can I think of this as one of the drivers of US arms export policy?

References

Halloran, Richard. To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America’s Endangered Defenses. 1st ed. Macmillan, 1986.

World Arms Network 1950 and 1975

I am starting work on my dissertation.  The first thing I needed to do was to get all of my arms transfer data into a form that I can work with it for network analysis.  That effort is going nicely.  I spent a little time today playing around with the graphs for the year 1950.  Here is the worldwide arms network for 1950:

I also ran a quick graph of the arms network in 1975.  The thing that jumps out is the difference in the number of states that are importing weapons.  The graph as an analytical tool is nearly useless given the crowded nature of the arms market.  This is why I have to utilize real Social Network Analysis tools to get at the questions I really want to answer.  Graphs are fun, though.

Venezuela, Bonds, and Russian Arms

Venezuela bond deals point to arms buying: Caracas, Venezuela (UPI) Nov 8, 2011



Bond deals by Venezuela point to defense purchases made in Moscow to circumvent a U.S. arms embargo and other difficulties faced by Caracas in its quest for military suppliers for its armed forces.
The bond deals worth $3.6 billion come at a time of growing political uncertainty in Venezuela over the health of President Hugo Chavez, who is receiving treatment for cancer in Cuba.


As a reference for the news article above is a graph I pulled together from data from SIPRI (www.sipri.org) on Russian arms exports to Venezuela.  The data are for the years 1992-2010.  As I have noted in posts on Syria, Russia appears to play by different rules with foreign policy when arms deals are available.

Russian and US Arms Exports - A Very general Overview

This particular post is just a bit of motivation for me.  I am doing a little exploratory work for my dissertation, but I am also working on learning how to use R for statistical analysis/graphing.  This is the result of my afternoon and evening.  The data come from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

These graphs show the total arms exports from both the US and Russia (USSR before 1991).  There are two things that stand out from this simple visualization: 1) arms transfers are a cyclical process at the macro level, and 2) Russian arms exports dropped off much more quickly than the U.S., but are now rebounding along with the U.S.