The Turkish Kerfuffle - F35 and S-400 Missiles in Competition

It may be too dramatic to call the kerfuffle over S-400 missiles a fight for the soul of Turkey.  I am not a Turkey expert, but I think that Erdogan's victory over the military after the "coup" of 2016 took Turkey down a new security path that may be hard to come back from. Many articles have discussed the issue of the S-400 missile and the US decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 project as a consequence.  A recent article in War on the Rocks helped me to think through my own position on this issue more clearly.

The author of the article, Ray Rounds, makes a number of interesting points about the ineffectiveness of arms as instruments of foreign policy - especially in terms of specific policies.  This ineffectiveness has been at the heart of the finds that Richard Johhnson and I found regarding human rights and arms transfers.  We published a piece in ISQ last year that tried to tie democratic states' stances on human rights to their policy actions in terms of arms transfers.  We found that the actions of these democratic states does not match their rhetoric in any meaningful way.  We have other work under review that tests this proposition using dependence on arms as the independent variable to test whether or not dependence on democratic suppliers can spur states to better human rights records.  The spoiler answer to that particular question is that it does not.

With that in mind, the argument that arms embargoes are more costly and harmful is thought-provoking.  It is especially useful for helping to develop clearer theories of arms transfers in international relations more broadly - my long-term project and personal white whale.

Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course. 

This idea that arms create and strengthen relationships, and cannot simply be used instrumentally to get a particular policy or outcome at a desired time is interesting and nuanced.  It also tracks with my own theoretical leanings to think that arms sales are part of the fabric of international relations precisely because they are a currency of relationships.  They are a currency precisely because the transfer of arms represents the transfer of coercive capabilities that forms the basis of an anarchic world.  In terms of Wendt (1992) arms are a big piece of the anarchy that states are making.

Rounds lists a number of states that have moved to diversify their arms suppliers because of US restrictions, delays, and hesitance in supplying them with weapons over the course of a number of year:

Egypt is one example above; but others such as Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have significantly diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to Saudi Arabia, and few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a U.S. embargo.

In the case of US and Turkey, the refusal of the US to consider Turkey for Patriot Missiles (and some technology transfer and manufacturing offsets) was one of the main factors in influencing Turkey to move towards the Russians.  That move has now jeopardized further cooperation in defense and arms for the F-35, a project that may have kept Turkey in the US/Western orbit for 30-40 years or more. 

Turkey and Russian Missiles

In December, word leaked that Turkey was buying S-400 systems from Russia.  There are a number of aspects of this sale that are both interesting and troubling. There are two very interesting aspects to me of this deal.  The first is that the sale was apparently concluded based on personal conversations between Erdogan and Putin.  I am fascinated by the personal involvement that state leaders have in the sale and transfer of weapons systems.  It is an area that is very under-researched, and one that I am working on in various ways in my own research on arms sales.

The second fascinating aspect of this sale for me is the potential that this sale has as an indicator of future alliance moves by Turkey.  This article (Link) by RFE-RL has a good write up of the problems that such a move has for NATO and future inter-operability of systems.  The news over this past weekend (January 19) that Turkey had launched an offensive against US-Backed Kurdish fighters in Syria also indicates that Turkey may be moving more closely into alignment with Russia on security matters in the region.  Neither of these things is good for the strength of NATO and the future of NATO-Turkish relations.

I am fascinated by this potential of arms sales as a bellwether for state relations and policy.  In the policy world, there is a great deal of need of and desire for accurate indicators.  This is the problem of strategic intelligence and planning.  How can we know what is planned by both adversary and ally?  That is the first step in determining what our own plans and reactions can be. Looking at arms sales as a leading indicator for alliance shifts seems to be a promising direction for research.

Complicating the Turkish story, however, is a follow up story that appeared just a week (Jan 7, 2018) after the RFE-RL (Dec. 29, 2017) story on Turkey's purchase of the missiles.  It is a Reuter's story about the signing of an agreement between Turkey and Eurosam, which is a French-Italian missile firm to develop surface to air missiles jointly.

Russia will not sign agreements to allow for the transfer of its technology, and so Turkey is going to continue to pursue its own missile program.  The issue of dependence on supplier is more acute with Russian and Turkish deals since the two countries have a long history of antagonism toward each other.

All of this is to say that although arms transfers may not be the sexiest topic in international relations, there are plenty of interesting things that are happening, plenty of puzzles, and plenty of unexplored stories for those that are interested.  And enough material that hopefully those of us that are interested can help others see the importance of this topic.