Venezuela Needs Help!!!

"Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has called on Russia and the Vatican to help fend off what he described as a U.S. "military threat," and said he will soon go to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin." Link

 After Trump stated that the US would consider force to intervene against the Madura regime, he has called on Putin the "man of peace" to help protect the country from the US.  I was curious about how much Venezuela already relies on Russia for its security needs and so I downloaded the SIPRI data for arms transfers from 2000-2016.

Source: SIPRI

The short story is that Russia is already ensuring Venezuelan security through arms transfers.  The other largest exporter (nearly $1 Billion in arms) is China.  It's always interesting to see the way that material realities are reflected in rhetoric and vice-versa. 

Russian Consistency on Regime Change (and odds and ends)

Russia is warning the US about a push for regime change in Syria (LINK).  I think that Russia's policy has always been consistent in this regard. And their position has been borne out in the chaos that enveloped Egypt, Libya, and Iraq in the absence of strong leadership.  Democracy promotion is fine and good, but there has to be some semblance of political order and institutional ability (or social capital) to be able to develop it.

The lesson from Iraq is that any regime change imposed from the outside needs to be accompanied by very strong planning for the post-regime period.  Organic changes to leadership from popular uprisings may also be shaky.

We have given Putin's Kremlin plenty of ammunition in its offensive against democracy promotion by supporting regime change irresponsibly.

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This is an interesting article on the shake up of the Baltic Sea Fleet.

Clearly, for the purge to be so large and so open, the misconduct in the Baltic Fleet had to be very serious and very widespread. Yulia Nikitina and Irina Tumakova from Fontanka.ru have published a long article documenting the faults attributed to the fleet’s now-former leadership. The condition of the fleet under Viktor Kravchuk had supposedly declined when compared to how it was under his predecessors, who received much less financing than he did in the last four years. 

In other words, the Baltic Fleet purge appears to be a signal to other Russian military commanders (including mid-level ones) that corruption that has a negative effect on combat readiness will not be tolerated and will result in punishment far more severe than the usual honorable retirement given to senior officials who misbehave.

 Russia's military readiness has become political. 

Doctored Intelligence and ISIS, is this a Crisis?

Why don’t political scientists study intelligence as part of other issues? That is a longer post for a different day and the subject of a paper that I currently have under review at a journal. For today, though, I am interested in the potential for politicization of intelligence processes.

This is in the news again.  A few months ago a news story caught my eye about the fact that intelligence analysts at CENTCOM were being asked to change their assessments about ISIS (A good recap of the controversy is here).  The story is in the news again after the Paris attacks and the new conflagration that is occurring in Syria presently.

Analysts assert that they were asked to tone down assessments that the Islamic State was growing in strength despite the coalition actions against them.

Among the complaints is that after the U.S. air campaign started in August 2014, the metrics to measure progress changed. They were modified to use measures such as the number of sorties and body counts -- a metric not used since the Vietnam War -- to paint a more positive picture. 

Critics say this "activity-based approach" to tracking the effectiveness of strikes does not paint a comprehensive picture of whether ISIS is being degraded and contained.

President Obama has responded to the allegations and said that he doesn't think that the White House has been kept in the dark about the nature of ISIS, and that the administration didn't want intelligence "shaded by politics."

Whether or not President Obama was directly involved in ordering intelligence to be "softened politically" is not the question.  The question is how any president can expect to get unvarnished intelligence when the incentives are built into the system to give information to the boss that things are going well.

In a recent book, Garthoff (2015)[1] explores the relationship between Soviet Leaders and Intelligence.  One of the key points of his book is that Soviet leaders relied on their own conceptions of the main adversary (the US) in evaluating intelligence.  Even if a system exists to funnel "pure intelligence" to a leader, his or her particular lens on the world will always affect the interpretation, and subsequent decisions based on that intelligence.  One of the fundamental questions about foreign policy is whether or not states behave as rational actors.  This depends on whether or not individuals act rationally. Theories of satisficing, of using heuristics to make decisions rather than carefully exploring all options helps us to understand behavior quite well.  If we truly want to understand how intelligence works, we need to understand not only the processes by which it is produced, but the processes by which it is consumed.

In the case of the CENTCOM reports, if the President was given access to the raw intelligence, it is unlikely that the doctored reports made that much difference in national-level decision making.  However, having reports that show success may change the calculus at the operational level, leading to poor strategic outcomes.

One of the other lessons from Garthoff was that Soviet leaders could not rely on intelligence assessment from the KGB and GRU precisely because those organizations were expressly ideological and their assessments were not objective enough to provide clear guidance for decision-making. If the US Intelligence Community (IC) becomes similarly politicized it will lead to marginalization of that government function.

From a bureaucratic survival perspective, then, it is is probably in the best interest of the IC to be (or at least appear to be) politically neutral and ideology free.  The short-term gains in political favor will lead to long-term decline in the political power of the institution.

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[1] Garthoff, Raymond. 2015. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War. Georgetown University Press.

The Politics and Economics of Arms Sales

I have been doing a lot of thinking lately about the nexus between the politics and the economics of arms sales.  It is a question that lies at the heart of my dissertation, but one which is mostly inadequately appreciated by both economists and political scientists.  I had my class (Politics of Arms in International Relations) read some pieces this week which relate to this decision-making nexus and it has brought some of these issues back to the forefront in my own thinking.

First off is a great quote from Smith, Dunn, and Fontanel (1985) about the problems of politics in the transfer of arms [1]. (Emphasis is mine)

"Although arms transfers comprise a significant component of world trade, they have received little attention from mainstream economists.  This partly reflects the data difficulties which inhibit accurate estimation and quantification, and partly the contamination of the topic by political and strategic elements beyond the economists' expertise."

The idea that an issue is contaminated by political and strategic elements is an interesting perspective of political science.  It is refreshing to see economists admit that there may be something that is beyond their expertise as well!

Smith et al (1985) argue that there are three primary reasons for states to wish to sell weapons:

1.     Strategic: governments wish to maintain an indigenous arms industry ins order to ensure weapons designed exactly to their requirements, national independence of supply, and access to the latest military technology. There is an incentive to export, even if exports are below the average cost. (242-3)
2.     Political leverage in foreign policy: nation can assist their "friends" by strengthening their military position while at the same time having potential to influence their behavior (Kinsella tie-in) or that there is a prohibition that weapons not used aggressively or for internal repression (tie-in with Blanton). (243)
3.     Economic benefits: these include technological spin-offs, employment benefits, economic momentum (243-44)

Caverley and Kapstein [2] look at similar arguments in the case of the United States arms production. They argue that the US lost its advantage in arms exports because of the domestic demands of the pentagon.  The penchant for the US military to ask for the nicest, highest spec equipment means that the finished product is priced out of range for non-domestic buyers.  They give the example of the F-35, which was designed to be a low-cost high tech fighter that would be good enough for most missions and which would be eminently exportable.  The rising costs of that aircraft have meant that many staunch allies have reduced or cancelled orders for the aircraft. The increased design specifications have made the aircraft less suitable for the domestic role that it was originally meant to fill.

This is an interesting dilemma.  The world's superpower which has the advantage of a strong domestic market is being squeezed out because of the unrealistic demands of that same market. This echoes the findings of Smith and colleagues in the case of decreased military spending by Britain, GDR, and the US means fewer exports, while the opposite was true for France and Italy.  They note that it was the civilian oversight of the procurement process in those states - with an eye toward exports - that caused this result.

I had some articles in my newsfeed about aircraft sales that made me think of these arguments today.

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Links

First F-35 built in Europe goes for its maiden Flight: LINK

Making F-35s more quickly can lead to problems: LINK

Kuwait is buying the Eurofighter.  LINK

Brazil is buying a Swedish fighter: LINK  LINK2

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REFERENCES

[1] Smith, Ron, Anthony Humm, and Jacques Fontanel. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting Arms.” Journal of Peace Research 22(3): 239–47.
[2] Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2012. “Arms Away.” Foreign Affairs 91(5): 125–32.

Don't call it a comeback!

Dear Spencer,

I have not been keeping up with this blog at all in the last few months.  I am involved in many projects and am still in the process of settling into my job at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan.  I would like to make this blog more of a part of my process of writing and thinking through issues that I am working on, but I am still thinking of ways that I can do that meaningfully.

My job is to write and to produce content. That content needs to be peer reviewed and validated by gatekeepers.  The kind of writing that I am doing here - or  not doing here- is unfiltered and unfettered. I think that there is value in the interaction of both types of writing.  If there are any regular readers of this blog (not even my wife or mother read this, so I don't have a lot of hope), which is unlikely since there is no regular writer on this blog, please be patient as I get back into the swing of things.

Topics that I will be posting on in the future:

• Pedagogy - I am especially interested in incorporating undergraduates into the research process.
• Technology - My personal computer is now running UBUNTU.  My academic writing is done in a text editor and LaTeX.  I am moving from Stata to R for my statistical analysis work.  There are a lot of changes for me on the technology front.
• A new research area I am interested in: Covert Action by states.
• More on military issues and arms sales.
• Some work on role theory and network analysis - a new book project (from an ongoing paper project with my dissertation adviser and mentor, Cameron Thies).
• Russia-Ukraine stuff.  Because I lived in Donetsk for two years, and this is a pretty big deal.

That's the plan for the future.  I am aiming to have one or two short posts a week with maybe a longer piece up once a month or so.  I may be ambitious and work to get my longer pieces linked to, or re-posted on some of the blogs of the cool kids.  Wouldn't that be something!

Best,

Spencer

Iraq's new Civil War - Why Detention Matters.

Background

The past week has been interesting for me, sitting on the sideline and reading about detainees in Iraq.  The leader of the ISIS group that took over Mosul was released from Bucca in 2009.  The stories that are coming out about him now are primarily about how no one knows much about him.  The latest revelation is that he made a remark to the US soldiers releasing him to the effect that he would "See them in New York." That is a bit ominous given the stature of his group.  He is now the prime target of US forces. (See the following story for more background.)

My interest in this story comes from many sources. First, the news that Mosul had fallen deeply saddened me.  I was in Mosul from April to October 2003. I was stationed at the airfield there and worked as the leader of a Tactical Human Intelligence Team gathering information on threats to US forces and Iraqis in the area.  Mosul was very stable and pleasant during my time there. Mosul was the success that General Petraeus would capitalize on in his meteoric rise over the next decade.

Second, my next tour to Iraq in 2007-08 was to Camp Bucca.  Camp Bucca during the height of the surge was a contradiction.  It was an overcrowded mess (more than 25,000 detainees) of a camp that was simultaneously growing with the influx of detainees and working to reform the system to release them.  We hit a period of growth, and then the releases started.  The camp was run using doctrines from U.S. military incarceration, US Prisoner of War procedures, and a smattering of counterinsurgency.  The counterinsurgency aspects were taking root as we arrived.

Third, I have written on the subject of detention academically - and am one of the few political science scholars to do so. It is an area that has lacked attention in the past, but which now may become more obvious as a key aspect of conflict resolution, policy-making, and strategy.

Flawed System

One of the first papers I wrote as a graduate student dealt with the issue of releasing prisoners from detention centers.  The logic of the paper was simple. If detainees are properly classified using intelligence, the release of less dangerous detainees is sound policy.  However, the less certain we become about the classification of detainees, the more dangerous detainees will be released back into the fight.  This is a fairly obvious point, but it was made with my own personal experience in trying to classify detainees at Camp Bucca.  The fact is that we were not good at initially identifying dangerous detainees or updating our files through continued intelligence activities.

That is why I was unsurprised by the quotes of the commanding officer who was in charge of the facility when Baghdadi was released.  He says of the ISIS leader: 

"He didn't rack up to be one of the worst of the worst," said Col. Ken King, who oversaw Camp Bucca in 2008 and 2009. 

Baghdadi may have tried to manipulate other detainees or instigate reactions from the guards, but he knew the rules well enough not to get in serious trouble. 

"The best term I can give him is savvy," said King, who first spoke to the Daily Beast. 

The colonel recalled that when Baghdadi was turned over to the Iraqi authorities in 2009, he remarked, "I'll see you guys in New York," an apparent reference to the hometown of many of the guards. 

"But it wasn't menacing. It was like, 'I'll be out of custody in no time,'" King said.

The description of the detainee is one who knew that the Americans were easily manipulated by those who played lip service to the rules of the camp.  His probing and manipulation are skills that he certainly honed while in custody.  Camp Bucca was described at one point as a training ground for Jihadists.  The half-measures taken by US forces in 2007-08 were not enough to really identify the smartest of the hard-core jihadists.  We essentially created a Darwinian system where those with enough savvy to avoid detection could increase their skills.

The time to solve the crisis in Iraq has passed.  Bucca is closed, the US doesn't have troops on the ground. However, we do have the ability to patch some of these flaws before our exit in Afghanistan, and to learn from them for our next wars.

Naked Self Promotion

One place to start is by committing more intelligence resources to detention facilities. This needs to be coupled with a change in the way that we collect and analyze intelligence from such facilities. I made this recommendation in an article last year.

Willardson, Spencer. “Strategic Intelligence During Coin Detention Operations – Relational Data and Understanding Latent Terror Networks.” Defense & Security Analysis 29, no. 1 (2013): 42–53.

I also have a working paper about the Surge in Iraq that details why the process of detention was important in separating the Sunnis and Shiites and ending the first Civil war.  If you are interested in the latest version of this paper, please email me. 

Finally, I have a database with detainee stats from Iraq from early 2003 through the beginning of 2009. These data come from some Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that I made.  A description of the data can be found on my website. LINK.

A quick review of "The Beijing Consensus" and Central Asia

As I mentioned in my last post, I wanted to read the Beijing consensus to see what it said about the role of China in Central Asia.  The answer is that it depends.  There is very little in the book that talks about the region.  In fact there were only two or three mentions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at all - and these were really just in passing.

The more complicated answer is that the overall thesis of the book is about the ways that Beijing is circumventing the west's ideal of linking liberal economies with liberal polities.  The appeal of the China model is great for the autocratic rulers in the Central Asian states who face some similar issues as the Chinese. The primary motivator for these states is a need for stability.  This is shared by all the states in the region.  China and Russia are at the top of the list of states that have based their foreign policy on the stance that internal stability is the trump card.

For leaders around the world that look at the aftermath and continuing problems of the Arab Spring and the Euromaiden revolution brewing in Ukraine, the ideal of stability is attractive. The adherence of these states to the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty is a key to understanding Russian foreign policy and its positions in the UN.

This book is an important read for those that are interested in nuanced narratives of the way the world works.  It is important for reminding academics and policy wonks alike that there is a competing market in the world for ideas, and that there are powerful states that are backing a different set of ideas and ideals.

Central Asia and China - Research Note and Questions

Questions

I am beginning an interest in security issues in Central Asia.  I am interested in a few aspects of security.  The first is the continued existence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its future.  How does a a treaty organization with two great powers that have traditionally been enemies work out?  What are the consequences of China's growing economic ties and Russia's historical ties to the area?  I am also fascinated by the fact that India is a member of the organization, but is a democracy.  How will the organization hold up in the long-term, and what shape will it take if it does survive?

Central Asia as Cake

Some of these questions are brought up in an article on the RFE/RL site:
General Liu Yazhou of China’s People’s Liberation Army perhaps summed up China’s interest in Central Asia best when he said, “Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to modern China by the heavens.” 

Central Asia’s energy resources -- oil, natural gas, uranium -- are the cake.
China needs these resources to fuel its economic growth and Beijing is seeking them everywhere in the world. 

But why send oil tankers half way around the world when Central Asia has numerous pipelines, railways and roads are being constructed, largely with Chinese money. All that can bring oil, gas, uranium, and various minerals from Central Asia to China. And the Chinese loans that the Central Asian governments are accepting to develop their oil and gas fields and build the infrastructure needed to export these resources to China are in fact pre-payment for goods to be received later.

Link to full article

The article goes on to downplay the potential expansionist/empire building motivations for China. One key portion of this argument is that China has enough problems within its own borders without expanding them and inviting further unrest. The article also notes that Russia's continued interest in - and support of the military forces of states in the region (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) make it unlikely that China will be able to military dominate the region.

Exercising Restraint

One interesting aspect of the SCO is that its mission has remained defensive.  The organization won't take over security aspects of Afghanistan with the withdrawal of NATO, for example (RIA Novosti). This fits with Russia's own policy urging restraint in the internal matters of other states.

China's own foreign policy of engaging with dictators has not been going well either. States such as Sudan and Venezuela are becoming less stable and less attractive as economic partners.  As Zachary Keck argues in the Diplomat:

This underscores, however, that far from being a strength, China’s dictatorship diplomacy is a sign of its weakness. Because China entered the globalization game relatively late, almost all the most attractive economic partners already had strong and long-standing ties to Western nations. As a result, China to some degree has simply had to settle for the more problematic nations that the West refused to deal with. This inevitably required taking on more risk, and this risk has not paid off for China. Indeed, in the course of just a few short years China’s dictatorship diplomacy has virtually imploded all over the globe.

I have more questions than ideas about security in Central Asia right now, but I am starting a reading list. The first book I have on there is The Beijing Consensus.


See it on Amazon

If you have other books you recommend, please leave them in the comments! 

Link-O-Rama: Russia's Domestic Market & Russian Arms Exports

Today I am sharing a number of links I keep saving in my Google Reader to get to later.  They deal with Russia and arms transfers primarily.  It is a mix of positive (for Russia) developments, negative developments, and some weirdness.  The weirdness is that Russia continues to fight against the rest of the world community on the arms to Syria issue. While it is true that arms sales to Libya have not yet been banned (primarily because of Russia's adamant opposition to the possibility), the consensus of the world is coalescing against the regime.  That is potentially long-term bad news for Russia's arms sales to that state.

However, the arms deal to Iraq (see below) is a sign that Russia may be able to regain some of its lost ground in the region.  The items from Libya are a bit confusing.

The bad news for Russia's arms industry is that it is losing past customers (even present allies) for its radar systems.

The last point I want to make before I get to the links is that Russia is really playing the embattled and encircled card on the issue of arms in general.  There is no doubt that the arms industry is a key component of Russia's foreign policy portfolio.

Putin wants to Re-arm Russia 

“In June, we in particular discussed implementation of a state armament program regarding aviation,” he said. “We will keep the issue under constant control.” 

“We will have no other historic chance to solve these ambitious tasks the country is now facing to ensure its defense capability in due time and with due quality when [the required] funds are available, thank God,” Putin said. “Tomorrow we will have none of these funds, and time will be lost.”

Part II

Russia will continue to build up its own defense capabilities according to foreseeable threats stated President Vladimir Putin at a meeting at the Defense Ministry, reports the Voice of Russia's correspondent from the session.

There are multiplying and expanding zones of instability on the planet: with non-stop armed conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the danger of radicalism and chaos being exported to Russia from neighboring regions. 

"At the same time there are methodical attempts being carried out to undermine the strategic balance," President Putin said.

Russia at War over Arms Sales

MOSCOW, March 2 (RIA Novosti) – Russia is facing a ‘real war’ aimed at hampering the country’s legal deliveries of weapons to Syria, the head of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation has said. 

“A real war has been declared against us,” Alexander Fomin told Ekho Moskvy radio on Friday without specifying who has declared the war. 

“The [Russian] ships are lured into ports and arrested there under various devised pretexts. When the ships are at sea, any insurance is canceled,” Fomin said adding that any attempts to deliver the contracted goods are being thwarted.

Libya and IRAQ
Iraq 

Indeed, when it became known that Iraq had problems with the Russian deal, there was widespread speculation that Washington had pressured Maliki to stop buying from Moscow to keep him dependent on the United States. 

That and the widespread accusations of corruption in the deal... 

Libya

There were denials all round at the time but the Americans, like the Russians, need hefty exports to keep assembly lines running amid massive cutbacks in domestic defense spending [1]. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said Feb. 27 he will shortly ask the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed in 2011. 

Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said Monday that Moscow had reservations about that, given the Tripoli government's lack of authority and multiple security threats but he said Russia was ready to help the new Libya "facilitate the possible acquisition of arms." 

Russia's RIA Novosti new agency reports Algeria, another Cold War client, is another target, but Algiers has quarreled with Moscow on the quality of its arms and isn't expected to be a major buyer of Russian systems.

More on Libya

The Libyan authorities should do everything possible to stop the spread of Libyan weapons in the region and beyond, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said on Wednesday. 

Rebels in Libya, some of them from Islamist groups, ousted and killed long-standing dictator Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 after a months-long uprising, in which they received assistance from NATO forces. Government arsenals across the country were looted during the conflict.

Wouldn't arms leakage present an opportunity for more sale to Libya in the long-run if they get the contracts?

Russia and Vietnam

Moscow will proceed with plans this year to help Vietnam launch a new submarine fleet and train the crews, Russian Defense Ministry Sergei Shoigu said on Wednesday.

Vietnam ordered six submarines in order to counter Chinese expansion in the area. 

Estonia (and Belarus)

TALLINN, March 7 (RIA Novosti) - Estonia’s Air Defense Forces have dismantled their last obsolete Soviet-made radars, the General Staff of the country’s armed forces said on Thursday. 

One P-37 type radar will be installed as a monument at the Amari military base, while another will be sent to an aviation museum. 

At present, two radar stations monitor Estonia’s airspace - a TPS-77 at Kallavere, in western Estonia and an ASR-8 at Amari, not far from Tallinn. 

In late March, a new radar station will be opened on Muhu Island featuring a medium-range Ground Master 430 3D air-defense radar [2] with an effective range of up to 470 kilometers (295 miles) and an altitude of up to 30 kilometers (100,000 feet). 

Another post-Soviet republic, Belarus, said in mid-February it would replace a Russian radar station with an indigenous one and dispose of its Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 fighters.

The fact that even Belarus (Russia's erstwhile ally) is moving away from Russian-produced radar does not bode well for the reputation of Russian defense products.  This is a serious problem for Russia given its priority of exporting weapons.
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[1] One of the assumptions I make in my dissertation is that both the US and Russia can use arms transfers as foreign policy tools because their domestic markets can support the arms industry.  This assumption does not seem to be holding up well.

[2] These are manufactured by the Thales group, a French firm.

Russia and India Arms Relations Redux

Vladimir Putin spent some time in India this past week.  One of the primary deals struck between the two states during the visit, was the sale of $3 Billion worth of Russian helicopters - a tender, which was rumored to be going to the United States earlier in the month.

The Russian Ambassador to India had this to say about plans for further cooperation between the two states: (source)

...the deals that have been struck as part of the ten-year programme of military and technical cooperation between India and Russia are estimated at $30 billion. 

On Monday, during the Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India, several important agreements in the military area were signed in New Delhi.

The helicopter and other aircraft deal looks like this:

Under one contract, India will buy 71 Mi-17B-5 Hip helicopters worth $1.3 billion, while the other provides for the delivery of assembly kits for 42 Su-30MKI Flanker fighters, worth $1.6 billion. 

The two countries also signed a number of cooperation agreements in the defense and technology sector, notably between Russian Helicopters and Elcom Systems Pvt Ltd.

Here is the blurb from a BBC story that really highlights the personal role that Putin is playing in getting these deals signed:

In an article in India's Hindu newspaper, Mr Putin described as a "historic step" the declaration of strategic partnership between the two countries signed in 2000. 

The Russian leader also said that the military co-operation between the two nations has reached an "unprecedented level". 

Russia's currently accounts for some 70% of India's arms purchases, the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi reports. 

But India has recently signed a number of big defence contracts with the US and other countries, including France and Israel, our correspondent says. 

Russia is concerned, he adds, that its traditional position as India's main arms supplier could be under threat.

And that's the rub.  As I have already pointed out on this blog (11/30/2012 "Are they Related?"), India is one of Russia's primary partners.  China has gained ground recently, but India is still number one or two in all years since the early 1990s - and essentially helped keep Russia afloat in the arms export world in the 1990s.  The fact that Putin is soliciting arms deals and spending his time indicates that to the Russian government (in the form of Putin), arms sales are an important aspect of foreign policy.  This is mostly likely due to the domestic implications of losing the ability to produce arms and shutting down the factories that produce Russia's most sophisticated export materials.

"Private" Military Companies in Russia

The headline in my RSS feed from RIA Novosti made me think that Russia was going to privatize its military production.  It turns out that the "Private Military" companies would be state owned/sponsored private security forms on the order of Blackwater or whatever they are calling themselves these days:

The Russian government’s Military Industrial Commission may consider creating private military companies in Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said Wednesday. 

Russia’s significant economic interests abroad often operate in “difficult” conditions, and such companies would facilitate their work, said Rogozin, who oversees Russia's military-industrial complex. 

“We are thinking about whether our money should go toward financing foreign private security [and] military companies, or whether we should consider the feasibility of such companies in Russia itself,” he said.

 The article points out that such firms are useful for the US because it saves the government insurance money when people die on missions that are contracted to these firms rather than carried out by the military.  Insurance isn't a problem for the Russian military which doesn't really deal in such financial niceties according to Alexander Golt:

“In Russia, the state has practically no financial responsibility to the loss of military personnel.”

The question that remains for me is what affect such state-sponsored paramilitary firms would have on Russia's foreign policy actions.  It is plausible to think of such firms being hired by Assad, for instance, to perform various protective tasks, training, or necessary maintenance.  It would provide a bit of cover to Russia's government which could point to market principles and non-interference with private firms to justify unpopular foreign policy commitments.  This will definitely be an interesting area to watch in the coming years.

Odds and Ends: Russian Foreign Policy

I recommend all of Karaganov's columns for concise and clear analysis of Russian politics and for interesting policy prescriptions.  His latest article is no exception.  You can read the entire article by following the link below.

Russia's Luck Has Run Out Sergey Karaganov Russia has been unbelievably lucky in its relations with foreign powers over the past 12 years. But despite positive trends, things are looking less rosy on the country's domestic political front. Read more >

One item that Karaganov picks up on is one that is echoed in a column from Dmitri Trenin.  Karagonov writes: 

In terms of economic development, it is crucial that Russia link itself more closely to the Asian economic powers. This can be accomplished by developing Siberia and the Far East. Russia needs to attract huge foreign investment in the region's infrastructure, raw materials processing and timber. In return, Russia would need to provide highly favorable tax incentives and legal guarantees. 

To boost these efforts, the Kremlin should consider moving part of its functions to a major city in Siberia or the Far East — a "second capital" of sorts. For Russia to have any hope of rivaling Asia's spectacular rise, it would need a modern-day project on a par with the construction in the early 1700s of St. Petersburg, Peter the Great's "window to Europe." 

 Trenin writes (link to article here):

The chief new element in the relationship is easy to see. It is the historical role reversal. In 1979, China's gross domestic product was a mere 40 per cent of that of the Russian republic within the Soviet Union. Nowadays, China's GDP is between four and five times bigger than Russia's. At the heyday of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Soviet Union was a military superpower and the People's Liberation Army was essentially preparing for a "people's war". Today, China's defense budget is the world's second largest, way ahead of the 5th-placed Russia. Even more importantly, China's research and development budget dwarfs Russia's. Ultimately - Russians, who heretofore have never lived with a strong China, need to adjust to the new reality. 

For the Russians, of course, having refused in a previous era a junior partnership arrangement with the US, to run now into China's embrace would be not only bitter irony - but supreme folly. Right now, Moscow is busy to craft an Asia policy that is more than a China one. They are already reaching out to Japan, are strengthening relations with South Korea, and are revamping their long-time strategic bonds with India - by now much frayed. They are also seeking economic and security integration with Central Asia, which the Chinese are increasingly viewing as their own backyard.

The irony of Russia's focus on the west and missile shields and problems in Europe is that conflict with another state is more likely to come in one of the Central Asian republics with interference from China.  In terms of what I usually think about on this blog - how will these shifting alliances and economic development change the way that arms are sold throughout the world, and throughout this region?

"Why Does Russia Support Dictators?"

This article in RIA has an interesting take on Russia's stand in Syria. In it Fyoder Lykonov argues that Russia is just being consistent in its foreign policy on interventionism in general.

Is Russia's policy really that short-sighted? Its prospects for having influence in the Middle East look vague indeed. The reserve of confidence built up during the Soviet period has been depleted, and it is unclear whether today's Russia is ready to step out onto the global stage. But the rest of Russia's policy is not so unreasonable. 

Moscow has made it clear that bypassing legitimate measures is not an option, this just results in random actions like the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which everyone  now recognizes was a mistake. So others can either respect Russia’s opinion by taking a neutral stance on the conflict in Syria, or act at their own risk and peril, something which it appears no one is willing to do.

The focus is, of course, on Russia’s global status, but Moscow also wants to keep the door open for an alternative solution to be found. The only other option is a military and political tunnel which will inevitably lead to a war with international ramifications.

 I have no problem with the idea that Russia is acting on principle in the Syrian case.  It is clear that Russia is not opposed to states taking their own interests into their own hands - as in its dispute with Georgia a few years ago.  Those states will then need to deal with the fallout of their own actions. Russia is opposed to cloaking those interventions with international respectability.  While this is a perfectly valid worldview, and consistent with the premium that Moscow places on state sovereignty, it will not make Russia's adherence to the principle any easier, or any more palatable to the narrative of human rights and compassionate interventionism that is the basis of the dialogue in Syria presently. 

Russia, Syria, and Arms - Oh My!

The following excerpts from this Russian news article highlight the strange "dependence" of Russia on arms sales.  Russia seems intent on proving that it is a "Great Power" through demonstrations of how it can defy the rest of the world community.  This continued "opposition" strategy does not imply that Russia is strong enough to do what it wants.  It really seems to show that Russia is not confident enough in its own position to take a non-realist, non-material stance on issues.  Thoughts?

Russia to honor Syria arms contracts | World | RIA Novosti: "Libya.

Russia will honor all arms contacts with Syria despite continuing violence against anti-government protesters in the country, a senior military official said on Sunday. 

“Since there are no restrictions on the supply of arms to Syria, Russia will fulfill its obligations under the contracts signed with this country,” Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, deputy head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, told reporters in Dubai. 

“Russia is interested in continuing mutually beneficial cooperation with the new Libyan government, both on the already-signed contracts and prospective deals,” he said.
In September, Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil said his country would not buy Russian arms. Observers said the decision came as little surprise because of Moscow’s links with the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and its slowness to recognize the rebel leadership as the legitimate government. 

Dzirkaln also said Russia hoped to continue arms sales to Yemen when violence there ended."

Does it matter how the violence ends?  If Russia continues to support the Assad regime does it do so because it is afraid that a different regime will not look to Russia for arms?  How do these arms contracts that Russia seems so keen to uphold further Russian interests in the long-term?

Venezuela, Bonds, and Russian Arms

Venezuela bond deals point to arms buying: Caracas, Venezuela (UPI) Nov 8, 2011



Bond deals by Venezuela point to defense purchases made in Moscow to circumvent a U.S. arms embargo and other difficulties faced by Caracas in its quest for military suppliers for its armed forces.
The bond deals worth $3.6 billion come at a time of growing political uncertainty in Venezuela over the health of President Hugo Chavez, who is receiving treatment for cancer in Cuba.


As a reference for the news article above is a graph I pulled together from data from SIPRI (www.sipri.org) on Russian arms exports to Venezuela.  The data are for the years 1992-2010.  As I have noted in posts on Syria, Russia appears to play by different rules with foreign policy when arms deals are available.

Russian Service Members Pay Increase - Troubling Trend?

Russian service members to earn almost as much as NATO counterparts: President Dmitry Medvedev has signed a law raising the salaries of Russian service personnel starting January 1, 2012.

Will the raises in salary come with an expected rise in professionalism?  Much of the Russian military structure and activity has always seemed to be based on cheap/unskilled labor of conscripts and a core of officers that are proficient.  It seems that the rank structure would have to change in order for the pay changes to seem feasible and responsible.  

This, coupled with Putin's recent remarks about the foreign policy of the United States, may be cause for a little concern.  Is Russia becoming a military state?

Russia’s military spending will begin increasing rapidly in 2012, from 13.9% of budget expenses in 2011 to 14.6% in 2012, 17% in 2013 and 18.8% in 2014. 

“Military spending will grow 1.5%-2% nearly every year, which is a considerable increase,” said Igor Nikolayev, chief strategist at FBK, a private audit firm. “Together with spending on security and law enforcement, this is more than one-third of all budget expenditures.” 

Increased military spending was one of the reasons behind the resignation of Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who urged a reconsideration of the military spending program. 

While military spending will grow, allocations for education and healthcare will be reduced. In particular, spending on education will fall from 5.1% this year to 4.7% in 2012, 4% in 2013 and 3.4% in 2014. Healthcare expenses will be even smaller: 4.6% in 2011, 4.4% in 2012, 3.7% in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014.

Russia and Syria: Arms and Alliances

The story referenced below gives a good overview of the relationship between Russia and Syria.  It is especially interesting that the ties that have made Russia and Syria "allies" are commercial and center on arms.  Russia, by supporting Syria with weapons, is able to maintain influence in the region.  This is an interesting contrast to the deteriorating arms relationship with Iran.

As international pressure on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria grows, Russia has maintained a perplexing timidity towards developments. Moscow has steadfastly refused to stake out an unambiguous position on events in Syria, a diplomatic paralysis that may end up proving more costly to Moscow in the long run. 

Some analysts say the Kremlin's careful stance is a result of its unwillingness to lose its only real Middle Eastern ally and a desire to avoid a confrontation with the West. 

"Syria remains Russia's only ally in the Middle East," Vladimir Karyakin from the state Institute for Strategic Research said. "We abandoned the rest either during perestroika or during the recent Arab revolutions. We even betrayed some - like Libya or Egypt, for example."
Russia has been a major arms supplier to Syria since the Soviet era and political cooperation with Damascus has often been far more valuable to Moscow than money. In 2005, Russia wrote off more than 70 percent of Syria's $13-billion debt, much of which was the result of Soviet-era arms deliveries. 

Although financial interests now play a more important role in defining Moscow's approach to Syria than during the Cold War, political concerns still remain the cornerstone, analysts say. Since the early 1970s, the country has hosted Russia's only naval supply and maintenance base outside the former Soviet Union in its Mediterranean port of Tartus.
"If we lose such an ally, we will lose our foothold in the Middle East," Karyakin warned.

Conflicting interests paralyze Russian diplomacy on Syria: analysts | Features & Opinion | RIA Novosti:

The following graphs show the growing importance of Russian arms imports to Syria.  I put together the graphs using data from SIPRI.