The Turkish Kerfuffle - F35 and S-400 Missiles in Competition

It may be too dramatic to call the kerfuffle over S-400 missiles a fight for the soul of Turkey.  I am not a Turkey expert, but I think that Erdogan's victory over the military after the "coup" of 2016 took Turkey down a new security path that may be hard to come back from. Many articles have discussed the issue of the S-400 missile and the US decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 project as a consequence.  A recent article in War on the Rocks helped me to think through my own position on this issue more clearly.

The author of the article, Ray Rounds, makes a number of interesting points about the ineffectiveness of arms as instruments of foreign policy - especially in terms of specific policies.  This ineffectiveness has been at the heart of the finds that Richard Johhnson and I found regarding human rights and arms transfers.  We published a piece in ISQ last year that tried to tie democratic states' stances on human rights to their policy actions in terms of arms transfers.  We found that the actions of these democratic states does not match their rhetoric in any meaningful way.  We have other work under review that tests this proposition using dependence on arms as the independent variable to test whether or not dependence on democratic suppliers can spur states to better human rights records.  The spoiler answer to that particular question is that it does not.

With that in mind, the argument that arms embargoes are more costly and harmful is thought-provoking.  It is especially useful for helping to develop clearer theories of arms transfers in international relations more broadly - my long-term project and personal white whale.

Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course. 

This idea that arms create and strengthen relationships, and cannot simply be used instrumentally to get a particular policy or outcome at a desired time is interesting and nuanced.  It also tracks with my own theoretical leanings to think that arms sales are part of the fabric of international relations precisely because they are a currency of relationships.  They are a currency precisely because the transfer of arms represents the transfer of coercive capabilities that forms the basis of an anarchic world.  In terms of Wendt (1992) arms are a big piece of the anarchy that states are making.

Rounds lists a number of states that have moved to diversify their arms suppliers because of US restrictions, delays, and hesitance in supplying them with weapons over the course of a number of year:

Egypt is one example above; but others such as Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have significantly diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to Saudi Arabia, and few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a U.S. embargo.

In the case of US and Turkey, the refusal of the US to consider Turkey for Patriot Missiles (and some technology transfer and manufacturing offsets) was one of the main factors in influencing Turkey to move towards the Russians.  That move has now jeopardized further cooperation in defense and arms for the F-35, a project that may have kept Turkey in the US/Western orbit for 30-40 years or more. 

Military Aircraft Decisions - News Roundup

Pakistan and China are working on a joint fighter project to reduce Pakistan's dependence on Western arms imports. From the article:

The FC-1/ JF-17 Thunder is a joint Chinese-Pakistani project that aimed to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on western firms for advanced fighters, by fielding a low-cost multi-role lightweight fighter that can host modern electronics and precision-guided weapons. It isn’t a top-tier competitor, but it represents a clear step up from Pakistan’s Chinese MiG-19/21 derivatives and French Mirage III/V fighters. This positioning addresses a budget-conscious, “good enough” performance market segment that the West once dominated, but has nearly abandoned in recent decades.

 This reminds me of Caverly and Kapstein's (2012) article in Foreign Policy about the wisdom of the US moving to a model that builds "good enough" weapons that are more attractive for export.  The US has plenty of issues with Pakistan, but in terms of building long-term relations with countries, having them locked into your weapons systems seems to be a good one. 

Airbus sold the C295 to the Ivory Coast.  The Ivory Coast operates a very small air force (two transport planes and 3 helicopters) but are now purchasing from Europe.  The other aircraft are old Soviet aircraft, so this represents a shift to new suppliers, which is an interesting development.

In other decision-news, Singapore has chosen US-made F-35s as the next generation fighter rather than French or Chinese aircraft.  Singapore has a modern military and operates a lot of US equipment already, and decided to stay with the US in terms of upgrading its fighter fleet.

It took Singapore more than five years to make a decision on which planes to buy as they had to look carefully at specifications and what was needed, said Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen in a Facebook post. 

"Our agencies will now have to speak to their US counterparts to move the process forward," Ng said, adding it could be up to a year before any planes are purchased 

The F-16s are due to be taken out of service in around 10 years' time, meaning it was time to acquire their replacement and begin training pilots, he said.

The timeline is interesting.  A ten-year horizon to plan and implement the next generation of aircraft (and a five-year decision timeline) really locks states into relationships in ways that deserve further exploration.
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Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. (2012) Arms Away. Foreign Affairs 91: 125–132.

The complexity of Arms Sales

A recent article about India's pursuit of advanced aircraft illustrates the complicated world of arms transfers.

The article itself is correcting some misinformation that India was going to purchase the F-35 and open up some joint manufacturing facilities for the aircraft there.  It turns out that initial inquiries into the possibility of F-35s in the future was confused with a current bid for the purchase of F-16 fighters.  India is looking to upgrade its aircraft but is in the bidding stage with both Saab and Lockheed Martin.

In both cases, the Indians will open factories to perform final assembly.  Such licensing and joint production is common.  F-16s are manufactured in Turkey under a similar agreement, for example.  The F-35 is a unique program because it is being built on licensing and co-production from the very beginning with partners all over the world.  It is a complex and collaborative endeavor that relies on pre-existing alliance ties and mutual trust and support. 

India is not approved for the purchase of the F-35 at this time.  The authors of the article noted that the issues of technology transfer that are more acute with this particular advanced aircraft.  The components are more advanced and there is a real worry that the technology could fall into the wrong hands.

For me this article is fascinating because it touches on so many of the complex and fascinating aspects of arms sales that I have been thinking about for the past few years.  The first is the importance of relations and relationship building.  There is a great deal of high-level negotiation that takes place for these arms deals - because they must be approved (in the case of the US) by the State Department working with the Department of Defense.  It is not just a mater of defense firms going out and making sales.

The complexity of licensing and production deals is another aspect of arms transfers that is unique.  There is an incentive for many states to build their own capacity while they purchase weapons systems.  This makes sense from a realist perspective of anarchy and fits with the logic of internal balancing outlined by Morrow (1993).  States don't want to be too dependent on arms imports because it limits their own actions.  States that wish to play a more independent role in international relations will avoid becoming too dependent on a supplier.

Even if the production facilities are mainly symbolic, they offer some work, build native capabilities, and establish the state as being less dependent than a state that simply imports finished arms. My current thinking about arms is about the ways that they are used to socialize states, and the use of licensing deals is an avenue that needs to be explored in more depth.
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Morrow, James D. (1993) Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. International Organization 47: 207–233.

Aircraft Round Up for June 2016

My news feed has been filled with stories related to the sale of aircraft.  I want to link to those articles with a bit of my own commentary about how these sales fit in with my own theories and ideas about arms sales.

Nigeria and the Super Tucano

This is an interesting case of a Brazilian plane being manufactured in the US for Afghanistan and Lebanon.  Nigeria wants to buy these anti-insurgency aircraft to fight against Boko Haram, but the US needs to approve the sale since the manufacturing takes place on US territory. This is the first example of this type of arrangement that I have run across, and it simnply fascinates me.  The web of interconnected production facilities makes arms sales and production as well as their sales multi-national.  I wonder about the ability of states like the US to act as veto players for such sales.  What is the trade-off or point at which Brazil would move manufacturing to its own territory in order to avoid any such complications in the future?

Canada and the F-35 Rejection
Canada is no longer on board with the F-35.  As one of the initial partners, this is an interesting case.  It is also interesting whether Trudeau will be in power long enough to find an alternative to the Canadian Air Force's aging fleet. The F-18 Superhornet, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Rafale and Grippen are the alternatives that Canada is currently considering.

"For 10 years, the Conservatives completely missed the mark when it came time to deliver to Canadians and our military the equipment they need," the Liberal prime minister said in parliament.

"They clung to a plane that does not work and is far from working."

The biggest issue with Canada dropping out is the political fallout.

Pakistan and the F-16 End Run

This piece illustrates the difficulty of using arms as a carrot or stick in foreign policy.  If the US refuses to sell F-16s to Pakistan, it will seek to buy used aircraft from Jordon.  In this case, the initial sales decision by the US must be considered even more carfully if there is a question about resale potential.  This is a realistic possibility because many countries fly the F-16 and so it should be possible to find spare parts from willing suppliers.  Pakistan is shopping because of Congressional demands that it stop harboring Islamic militants.

China, Russia, and the US and Next Generation Bombers

Bomber aircraft are the most strategic of the aircraft.  They have previously been built primarily by the US and Russia. China is now in on the game.  Russia, the US, and China all expect to have these new bombers as part of their arsenal by 2025.  The 9-year time frame from now shows the complication of developing and manufacturing these aircraft.  In the US case, the arms acquisition bureacuracy is such that projects tend to drag longer and longer with each new generation of aircraft.

F-35 can't compete?

Adding to the woes of the F35 is the analysis that it cannot compete with older Soviet/Russian models of aircraft, specifically the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker.  The F35 is the Pentagon's most expensive arms acquisition ever and it has been mired in delays, scandals, and bureaucratic infighting from its inception.

Turkey and Attack Helicopters
Turkey is still trying to obtain an attack helicopter.  The most interesting part of this article (which is about Turkey shortlisting potential companies from which to purchas) is the discussion about human rights and the problems of competing in arms sales when such restrictions are not universally applied:

Franco-German company Eurocopter's position was made more difficult as Berlin initially banned it from participating because of concerns over human rights in Turkey, although the German Government relented.

Philippe Camus, co-chief executive of European Aeronautic, Defense and Space, says the Turkish decision against Eurocopter will push the issue of common export policy to the top of the agenda and that Europe's capitals must work together to create a single coherent policy.

Apache for Qatar

It seems as if these are part of the payment for Qatar's role as broker in getting Bergdahl from the Taliban.  It seems like a steep price to pay.  If Qatar will be an ally in other areas, then this might be okay. It seems hypocritical considering Qater's human rights record vs. that of Turkey that advanced attack aircraft were easily obtained by that government.

A round up of arms-related goodness

This is a post for me to take care of some bookkeeping tasks.  There have been a number of articles written about arms sales that relate to my research interests lately.  However, I have needed to put them aside to finish up some other projects and to finish up the end of the year.  I will present this as a roundup list with a little commentary so I can come back and do some deeper work with these sources later.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War ended long ago.  The US has now lifted its arms prohibition on the country.  It was done via an executive order and announced by President Obama.  This is an interesting story for me.  In this case, the prohibition on sales was political - trumping economic concerns.  This decision is also political - a signal to China about the US interests in security in the region. It looks like the US will start fielding requests for aircraft. (LINK)

Russia has been supplying arms to Vietnam for a long time.  I wrote a vignette about naval sales to Vietnam for a paper I wrote in 2012 (unpublished).  Here is an interesting piece on the mechanics who maintain Russian-made Sukhoi jets for Vietnam (LINK).  This aspect of arms sales and military effectiveness has not really made its way into the literature on arms sales.  I think that it is really fascinating. If arms are something more than symbolic, they need to be maintained. The capacity for states to maintain their own high-end equipment puts them ahead of states that need to rely solely on the manufacturing country.  I am still thinking of how this could be incorporated into a research paper, so for now it remains an interesting small question.

Russia

Russia and arms are always interesting.  An interesting article from RFE/RL outlines the proliferation of new and fancy weapons being built by Russia and the fear that they will lead to a new arms race.

In other interesting news, Russia and the US (along with the rest of the P5) agreed to re-arm the Libyan government for that government to fight internal rebels (LINK).  This is a very interesting state of affairs.  The norm for western governments has been to avoid providing weapons to states to deal with internal repression (at least in policy and rhetoric). Now states are agreeing that states arming to fight against extremists is okay.  This in many ways validates the Russian position in Syria. States have a right to protect their regime from violence. Does this signal a shift in norms to take into account the growing threat of Islamic violence (i.e. ISIS), or is this a unique case?

F-35

The Pentagon admitted that the F-35 will be delayed and will not be ready for full production until (at least) 2018 (LINK).  The delays in this program are an interesting issue in arms acquisition and production.  The F-35 was supposed to be cheaper and better and it is morphing into a hybrid that is neither.  For me the interesting question to ask in a few years is whether the political capital gained by outsourcing and cooperating on its production are worth the cost in terms of acquisition cost and speed as well as the ratio of those two factors in effectiveness.

Humor - More F-35s and Photoshop!

US Air Force photo.

Pentagon Requests 500 Gold-Plated F-35s

Read more: http://www.duffelblog.com/2015/09/pentagon-requests-500-gold-plated-f-35s/#ixzz3o2uHjFdN

This added to the Red Baron (LINK) post from a few weeks ago made my day!



The barrage of photoshop memes in response to REN-TV in Russia photoshopping the US Ambassador onto a Kremlin protest is hilarious.

Russia and Syria - Arms Related Issues

Russia is now involved in the war in Syria.  Air strikes and naval bombardment along with cruise missile launches, along with the addition of ground troops as advisers is serious business.  The potential for adverse international incidents has increased.  The fighting in Ukraine is contained.  The fighting in Syria is taking place in the context of continued Western and US airstrikes.  The potential for a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia is higher than it has been for a long time.

I am interested in Russia's endgame here.  I am curious as to what Putin thinks he will gain. I just started reading a great book that analyzes Putin's actions, and this quote really jumped out at me:

"...we cannot take any story or so called fact at face value when it comes to Vladimir Putin ... we are dealing with someone who is a master at manipulating information, suppressing information, and creating pseudo-information...In today's world of social media, the public has the impression that we know, or can easily know, everything about everybody.  Nothing, it seems, is private or secret.  And still, after 15 years, we remain ignorant of some of the most basic facts about a man who is arguably the most powerful individual in the world, the leader of an important nation.  When there is no certifiably real and solid information, any tidbit becomes precious." [1]

This jumped out to me again when I watched the Daily Vertical podcast about Putin challenging the western world's way of thinking and facts (LINK).  While I don't think I have any really new insights into what Russia is doing and thinking, I can at least make some observations about the effects of what they are doing in an area that I do have some insights into: arms transfers.

Negative and Potential Negative Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

I have already covered the issue of the Mistral ships.  Russia lost these ships as a direct result of their actions in Ukraine.  The latest word is that Egypt is going to purchase these ships, which is good for France (LINK). Is there a potential that Russia will lose out on other purchases?  Yes, but Russia doesn't import a lot of equipment, so for them, this is just a temporary setback.

The more serious setback for Russia would be if states began cancelling orders for weapons after seeing their actions.  This is a real possibility.  Turkey is very upset at Russia over incursions into its air space as Russia began its air actions over Syria.  This has already had an effect on a joint pipeline project (LINK), and has the potential to damage other relations.  Russia and Turkey have cooperated on helicopter manufacturing in the past (a case study from my dissertation), and if Turkey sees Russia becoming a security risk, it will likely move away from such relations.

The performance of Russian equipment in Syria is also a potential negative side effect.  If Russian equipment performs poorly (like reports of four cruise missiles crashing in Iran instead of hitting targets in Syria (LINK)), then potential customers may decide to look for other options.

Potential Positive Consequences for Russian Arms Sales

There are two potential positive consequences of Russian actions in Syria from the point of view of Russian arms sales. The first is the converse of the last point made above: positive performance by Russian equipment is free advertising for Russian arms.  Seeing weapons tested in combat and working is a great selling point to potential customers.

Other current and potential customers will take note of the point above and may also see the arms relationship becoming a proxy for more formal alliances, thus making continued arms purchases, or new arms purchases more attractive to buyers.  Venezuela recently expanded its arms deal with Russia (LINK), as has Thailand (LINK).  Interestingly, the deal with Thailand appears to be a barter deal for rubber.  This could be an effect of sanctions.  Thailand has been diversifying its arms portfolio in recent years.

Potential Positive Effects for US Arms Sales

For the US, Russia being seen as an aggressor may potentially make arms sales to neighboring states a higher priority.  States will see this as a way to further integrate with existing US-led defense pacts (NATO), and a way to strengthen and emphasize military ties. Norway, for instance, recently added more planes to its F-35 order because of Russian aggression and escalation in the Baltic and North Sea areas (LINK).  This will be dependent on whether states are satisfied with US military hardware, however, which in some recent cases doesn't appear to be the case (LINK).

Other Geopolitical Consequences

Just because I am not going to spend time trying to figure out Putin's motivations, does not mean that I won't point out some geopolitical consequences of Russian military adventurism. The most obvious is that Russia's fears of NATO are now becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as NATO moves to bolster its powers along Russia's borders and to strengthen commitments to states bordering Russia's active military adventures (Poland, Turkey) (LINK).  It is also leading, it appears, to a strengthening of the US resolve on the issue of Ukraine (LINK).

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[1] Hill, Fiona and Clifford G. Gaddy. 2015. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution. p 7.

The Politics and Economics of Arms Sales

I have been doing a lot of thinking lately about the nexus between the politics and the economics of arms sales.  It is a question that lies at the heart of my dissertation, but one which is mostly inadequately appreciated by both economists and political scientists.  I had my class (Politics of Arms in International Relations) read some pieces this week which relate to this decision-making nexus and it has brought some of these issues back to the forefront in my own thinking.

First off is a great quote from Smith, Dunn, and Fontanel (1985) about the problems of politics in the transfer of arms [1]. (Emphasis is mine)

"Although arms transfers comprise a significant component of world trade, they have received little attention from mainstream economists.  This partly reflects the data difficulties which inhibit accurate estimation and quantification, and partly the contamination of the topic by political and strategic elements beyond the economists' expertise."

The idea that an issue is contaminated by political and strategic elements is an interesting perspective of political science.  It is refreshing to see economists admit that there may be something that is beyond their expertise as well!

Smith et al (1985) argue that there are three primary reasons for states to wish to sell weapons:

1.     Strategic: governments wish to maintain an indigenous arms industry ins order to ensure weapons designed exactly to their requirements, national independence of supply, and access to the latest military technology. There is an incentive to export, even if exports are below the average cost. (242-3)
2.     Political leverage in foreign policy: nation can assist their "friends" by strengthening their military position while at the same time having potential to influence their behavior (Kinsella tie-in) or that there is a prohibition that weapons not used aggressively or for internal repression (tie-in with Blanton). (243)
3.     Economic benefits: these include technological spin-offs, employment benefits, economic momentum (243-44)

Caverley and Kapstein [2] look at similar arguments in the case of the United States arms production. They argue that the US lost its advantage in arms exports because of the domestic demands of the pentagon.  The penchant for the US military to ask for the nicest, highest spec equipment means that the finished product is priced out of range for non-domestic buyers.  They give the example of the F-35, which was designed to be a low-cost high tech fighter that would be good enough for most missions and which would be eminently exportable.  The rising costs of that aircraft have meant that many staunch allies have reduced or cancelled orders for the aircraft. The increased design specifications have made the aircraft less suitable for the domestic role that it was originally meant to fill.

This is an interesting dilemma.  The world's superpower which has the advantage of a strong domestic market is being squeezed out because of the unrealistic demands of that same market. This echoes the findings of Smith and colleagues in the case of decreased military spending by Britain, GDR, and the US means fewer exports, while the opposite was true for France and Italy.  They note that it was the civilian oversight of the procurement process in those states - with an eye toward exports - that caused this result.

I had some articles in my newsfeed about aircraft sales that made me think of these arguments today.

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Links

First F-35 built in Europe goes for its maiden Flight: LINK

Making F-35s more quickly can lead to problems: LINK

Kuwait is buying the Eurofighter.  LINK

Brazil is buying a Swedish fighter: LINK  LINK2

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REFERENCES

[1] Smith, Ron, Anthony Humm, and Jacques Fontanel. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting Arms.” Journal of Peace Research 22(3): 239–47.
[2] Caverley, Jonathan, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2012. “Arms Away.” Foreign Affairs 91(5): 125–32.

Link-O-Rama: Arms Edition

Apologies and Excuses

So much for resolutions! (Link) A bold prediction about my future blogging awesomeness followed by 1 post in 5 months is not a stellar beginning.  In my defense, the past 5 months have been as busy as any in my life.  These are the highlights of the past five months:

• The end of the semester
• chairing our graduate admissions committee
• A trip to the US to sit on a hiring committee
• A trip to the US a week later to attend a seminar at Brigham Young University
• Graduation
• A trip to Poland for a conference
• A vacation to the US for 5 weeks to visit family
• The return to Astana to start the new semester with a new role: acting department chairIn addition to the normal activities of getting ready for the semester (preparation of syllabi, courses, etc) I have had the new administrative tasks associated with my new position.  I also had an article accepted for publication that needed work to be ready for the publisher.  I have also been scrambling to put together my paper for the American Political Science Association Meeting (APSA) which is next week. 

I now have a better understanding of the wisdom of my PhD advisers who emphasized that life after graduate school was more busy.  The pressures and activities are a bit different, but it is definitely busy.

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Arms Links

With the preamble over, I am now going to post links to articles about arms.  I am doing this in conjunction with my PLS455/555 Politics of Arms in International Relations course at Nazarbayev University. I thought this would be a good resource for my students as they begin their case study assignments for the course. It is also a good way for me to organize these links and resources and to put together some initial thoughts.  In this edition I will keep my comments brief. I would like to do this more regularly and add more context and analysis. 

F-35

• Australia drops out of F-35 program. Large-scale weapons system collaboration is hard! Link
• A good roundup of lots of arms news.  News on Russian Sukhoi fighter jets, and the ongoing saga of the F-35 fighter. Link
• F-35B not doing well in carrier testing and certification. Link

Mistrel

• France returns Russia's money for the Mistrel.  This is a great example of the politicization of arms transfers. It's an interesting case of Russia importing (Russia is not a major arms importer) and being denied a weapon system that it really wanted. Link
• France needs to sell the Mistrels it is not selling to Russia.  That will prove very difficult. Link

Russian Arms and Navy

• Russia to develop a new "Doomsday" aircraft command center. Link
•  Russian navy to begin building new destroyer - with capabilities that are very impressive and challenging to the US Naval superiority. Does this mean a comeback for the defense industry in Russia? Link
• New Russian drone design. Link
• Seven new and scary Russian weapons systems.  In this sense scary is for the West, or potential military rivals of the Russian state.  Hypersonic weapons are a new class of weapons that pose an interesting dilemma.  They are definitely weapons of the offensive, but are meant to overcome missile shield technology that rendered earlier nuclear offensive capabilities less secure. This is a demonstration of a technological arms race. Link
• Morocco to buy Russian Amur class submarine.  Why? Link
• New love for an old Bear. The TU-95 and nuclear bomber advantages. Link
• Refurbished Russian submarine with all kinds of capabilities baffles US experts. "The Russians were always more innovative at this than we were."  What also struck me about this sub is its length.  It is half the length of a US aircraft carrier.  The Russians don't mess around when it comes to submarines. Link
• Russian air to air missiles R-73 are flying off the shelves of the arms bazaars. Link
• Story about Russia's new Armata tank. Link
• Interesting video of forum on Russian naval power in the 21st century. Link
• Russia selling powerful anti-aircraft missile system to Iran.  Link

India

• Predictions of US-Russian arms competition in India.  This is an interesting field of inquiry.  India just became part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but is also a democratic state, unlike most other members of the organization.  India has traditionally been one of Russia's biggest customers, and I have dealt with the issue of Russian-Indian arms purchases in other posts (Link, Link, Link). Will closer security cooperation cement the relationship that has been built between the two countries? Link
• India is going to be buying a lot of arms in the near to medium future. 4.7 Billion dollars is a good start. Link

US Navy and Military

• US begins work on second "Gerald R. Ford" Class of Aircraft Carrier to be named after JFK. Link
• An interesting piece on the size of the US navy.  Arguments on one side are qualitative (our fewer ships can do more than many more ships were able to do earlier.)  Arguments on the other are quantitative.  Fetishizing numbers is not good policy.  However, arguing in terms of threats faced and the ability of the naval force, as presently constituted, to respond to those threats is good policy. Questioning the definitions of threats is the next step in such an analysis.  Policy in the absence of strategy is rudderless. Link
• Russian jammers supposedly render aircraft carriers useless.  Whither the advantage of carrier groups? Link
• The US is not selling, but is deploying F-22s to Europe to ease the minds of allies.  Increased Russian air activity within the context of the Crimean and Ukrainian conflict is increasing tensions in the region. Link 
• Strong market for used US M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and its variants.  I spent a lot of time in one of these in Baghdad 2003. Link I spent more time in the Bradley, though.
• I don't understand why the US Air Force hates the A-10 so much.  I think the Army would be happy to have these aircraft. Link
• 
  

China

• China is holding a large military parade next week and is having trouble attracting western leaders: Link  and another Link

Communist China generally shies away from the vast annual demonstrations of military might that were a hallmark of the Soviet Union, normally holding such events once a decade to mark the foundation of the People's Republic. 

It has struggled to attract world-wide interest for the parade as world leaders are wary of the tone of the event, and the risk of lending it legitimacy. 

Beijing is becoming increasingly assertive in the region and regularly accuses Tokyo of failing to show sufficient contrition for Japan's 20th-century invasion of China.

Other Miscellaneous Arms Links 

• Analysis of Central Asian Military capabilities.  This should be of interest to my students. Link
• Sweden and Brazil sign a deal for Gripen fighters. The deal includes financial terms, as well as details about the licensing and production of half of the fighters in Brazil.  The jet was also modified to fit Brazil's needs.  Link
• French Deliver Rafale fighters to Egypt.  Link
• This link maybe the most interesting.  It details the problem with Pilatus aircraft that was sold to Chad by Switzerland. The aircraft is not mean to be armed or used offensively, but apparently it has been.  This has led the Swiss to pull back on other potential exports. It is interesting to see a principled stance on arms transfers. Economic theories of arms transfers would predict that Switzerland is under too much financial pressure to export in order to support its domestic manufacturing for a product that has a limited domestic market. Interesting counterexample/mini case study to think about in terms of policy-making and the complexity of arms sales as a topic. Link