My last post, on the unsurprising turn in US foreign policy regarding arms sales outlined part of the arguments that I am developing about the underlying reasons for arms sales by states. A story on the RFE/RL website the next day has got me thinking again. It is not always easy defending arms sales as a practice. As a practice, arms sales may seem to justify policies and regimes which engage in ugly activities. Those activities may be directed at neighbors, or at their own population. Arms are fungible to the extent that once states have them, they can be used as the recipient state sees fit.
Russia is planning on selling advanced fighter aircraft to Burma (Myanmar), which is in the midst of an ethnic cleansing crisis. The US has condemned the sale, saying that the military is conducting this ethnic cleansing. This sale by Russia has a bad appearance. A state's military is directly involved in an ongoing campaign that is violating human rights - and causing death and suffering on a large scale. The question that I had after reading this was whether or not the US condemnation of Russian sales are hypocritical.
Richard Johnson and I in a forthcoming ISQ article break down arms sales by type to examine the hypothesis that democratic states do not sell arms to human rights abusers. Our theory is that many weapons are not that useful in violating human rights (arms are only partially fungible), and so states will make deals for certain types of weapons with states that are human rights violators. Our paper is an observational study where we look to establish broad patterns. We find that there doesn't seem to be discernment across weapons systems (except for land-based vehicles sold by the US) for any of the major democratic arms suppliers (US, Britain, Germany, France). In general, states sell arms to human rights violators.
In a follow up study, we should examine whether or not the military of those states are involved in repression, or if there are other state actors. The reason that this distinction would be important, is that if the military is viewed as being professional, and outside of the internal repression apparatus, there may be an expectation by supplying states that the weapons sold will not, in fact, be used for repression (or that there is a low likelihood that they will be). The US position on Burma may be a reflection of this view. The military is involved in the repression, and therefore all arms sales should be banned until the situation is clearer.
In this case, the US position seems less like hypocrisy, and more like a nuanced policy that engages with the dual nature of arms. States have a monopoly on violence, and that violence can be turned inward. However, the consequences to the international system of states where there is not a monopoly of violence (weak and failing/failed states) can ultimately lead to worse outcomes. The sale of arms is part of this complex interaction. Russia's actions seem to be driven more for a need to establish any kind of influence with any state that will have them. Putin as salesman in chief needs wins, and he'll take them even if it leads to the loss of life by others.
Russia is planning on selling advanced fighter aircraft to Burma (Myanmar), which is in the midst of an ethnic cleansing crisis. The US has condemned the sale, saying that the military is conducting this ethnic cleansing. This sale by Russia has a bad appearance. A state's military is directly involved in an ongoing campaign that is violating human rights - and causing death and suffering on a large scale. The question that I had after reading this was whether or not the US condemnation of Russian sales are hypocritical.
Richard Johnson and I in a forthcoming ISQ article break down arms sales by type to examine the hypothesis that democratic states do not sell arms to human rights abusers. Our theory is that many weapons are not that useful in violating human rights (arms are only partially fungible), and so states will make deals for certain types of weapons with states that are human rights violators. Our paper is an observational study where we look to establish broad patterns. We find that there doesn't seem to be discernment across weapons systems (except for land-based vehicles sold by the US) for any of the major democratic arms suppliers (US, Britain, Germany, France). In general, states sell arms to human rights violators.
In a follow up study, we should examine whether or not the military of those states are involved in repression, or if there are other state actors. The reason that this distinction would be important, is that if the military is viewed as being professional, and outside of the internal repression apparatus, there may be an expectation by supplying states that the weapons sold will not, in fact, be used for repression (or that there is a low likelihood that they will be). The US position on Burma may be a reflection of this view. The military is involved in the repression, and therefore all arms sales should be banned until the situation is clearer.
In this case, the US position seems less like hypocrisy, and more like a nuanced policy that engages with the dual nature of arms. States have a monopoly on violence, and that violence can be turned inward. However, the consequences to the international system of states where there is not a monopoly of violence (weak and failing/failed states) can ultimately lead to worse outcomes. The sale of arms is part of this complex interaction. Russia's actions seem to be driven more for a need to establish any kind of influence with any state that will have them. Putin as salesman in chief needs wins, and he'll take them even if it leads to the loss of life by others.
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